Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004 by Hillinger, Ingrid Michelsen & Hillinger, Michael G.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2004
Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger
Boston College Law School, hillinge@bc.edu
Michael G. Hillinger
University of Massachusetts - Dartmouth, mhillinger@umassd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Law and Society
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger and Michael G. Hillinger. "Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004." American Bankruptcy Institute Law
Review 12, (2004): 331-420.
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS IN BANKRUPTCY: 2004
INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER* & MICHAEL G. HILLINGER**
INTRODUCTION
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
A. CERCLA
1. Purpose
2. Scope
3. Causes of Action
a.. Cleanup by Third Parties & Recovery of Costs
b. Potentially Responsible Parties
c. Cleanup by Responsible Parties
d. Injunctions to Stop Future Releases
e. Types of Liability
f Corporate Liability
g. Contribution Actions
h. Defenses to Liability
i. Challenges to EPA Actions
4. Settlement
B. RCRA
C Other Federal & State Laws
II. ABANDONMENT
A. Abandonment Power
B. Midlantic
C. No Abandonment in Contravention of State Statute Reasonably Designed
To Protect Public Health or Safety from Identified Hazards
D. Narrower Readings of Midlantic
1. No Imminent & Identifiable Harm
2. No Unencumbered Estate Assets
3. Abandonment Subject to Conditions
4. Multi-Part Tests for Abandonment
E. Significance ofAbandonment Issue: Much Ado About Nothing?
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This article grew out of written materials we prepared for
the 2003 Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute.
The authors wish to thank Neil Schumacher, Boston College Law School class of 2005, for his heroic
research assistance and insights, especially about corporate liability and contribution actions. Ingrid
Hillinger also wishes to thank Darald and Juliet Libby for their very generous support of her research and
that of her colleagues.
." Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Southern New England School of Law. I wish to thank the
Southern New England School of Law for its generous research assistance.
ABILAWREVIEW
III. TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS
A. Introduction
B. Ohio v. Kovacs
1. What Kovacs Decided
2. What Kovacs Did NOT Decide
C. Injunctive Relief
1. Injunctive Relief: Does It Give Rise to a Claim?
2. Injunctive Relief: Does It Violate the Stay?
D. When Does Environmental Liability Arise?
1. Claim Exists When Right to Payment Exists
2. Claim Exists When Conduct Giving Rise to Liability Occurs
3. Claim Exists When Conduct Plus Relationship Exists
4. Claim Exists When Conduct, Relationship & Fair Contemplation of
Liability Exist
5. Post-Confirmation Liability
6. Post-petition Creation & Perfection of Superlien: Violation of the
Automatic Stay?
E. Environmental Obligations as Administrative Expense?
1. Significance of Administrative Expense Issue
2. Reading v. Brown: The Fairness Exception
3. Midlantic Corollary
4. Ongoing Duty; Ongoing Expense
5. Cleanup Costs Are Not Administrative Expense
6. The Compromise Position: Some Administrative Expense, Some Not
7. Post-petition Fines & Penalties as Administrative Expenses
F. Contingent Claims for Contribution Against Debtor: Section 502(e)(1)(B)
IV. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES & WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
CONCLUSION
[Vol. 12: 331
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS IN BANKRUPTCY: 2004
INTRODUCTION
During the 1930s, it was said that Germany's situation was serious but not
hopeless whereas Austria's situation was hopeless but not serious. The present
treatment of environmental obligations in bankruptcy is serious and hopeless. It is
not possible to treat all claims equitably and to give environmental claims special
preference. It is not possible to give debtors a fresh start and make them pay for
cleanups. The goals of bankruptcy conflict with the goals of environmental law, in
particular, CERCLA.1 For years now, courts have noted the tension' and its
inevitable by-product, confusion.3 Courts and commentators have called on
Congress or the Supreme Court to establish which should prevail.4 The silence has
been deafening. Courts have had to do the best they could under difficult
circumstances.
The case law mishmash is hardly surprising. Some opinions reflect the
gravitational pull of bankruptcy. Others orbit around environmental concerns and
enforcement of environmental laws. All opinions find support for their conclusions
' CERCLA is the acronym for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2000)) (providing regulation aimed toward protection of public health and environment).
2 As one court stated:
[tlhis case demonstrates the difficulty encountered when two governmental
policies--one federal and one state-come into arguable conflict. On the one hand, the
federally created bankruptcy policy requires that the assets of a debtor be preserved and
protected, so that in time they may be equitably distributed to all creditors without
unfair prejudice. On the other hand, the environmental policies of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania requires [sic] those within its jurisdiction to preserve and protect
natural resources and to rectify damage to the environment which they have caused.
The potential conflict between these two policies is presented in this case, in which the
Commonwealth has attempted to force a company which has petitioned in bankruptcy
to correct violations of state antipollution laws, even though this action would have the
effect of depleting assets which would otherwise be available to repay debts owed to
general creditors.
Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 1984); see In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pac. R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The interface of bankruptcy laws and environmental
laws has perplexed courts since the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act ...."); In re Elsinore, 66 B.R. 723, 735 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (recognizing conflict exists
between United States Bankruptcy Code and state environmental laws).
' See Cal. Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating
"[clonflict and confusion are almost inevitable."); Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 974 F.2d at
777 (discussing conflict arising from interface of bankruptcy and environmental law); Signature Combs, Inc.
v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1038 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (recognizing inability to avoid conflict and
confusion which arise from interplay of bankruptcy and environmental law).
4 See Debra L. Baker, Bankruptcy: The Last Environmental Loophole?, 34 S. TEx. L. REV. 379, 404
(1993) (arguing Congress must set forth correct application and enforcement of environmental laws);
Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental Framework, 44 FLA. L. REV.
153, 155 (1992) (saying "[e]ither the United States Supreme Court or the United States Congress must
resolve definitively the issue of the proper status of environmental claims in bankruptcy proceedings.");
David W. Marston, Jr., In re Reading Co.: Cutting off Environmental Claims that Never Existed During
Bankruptcy, 43 VILL. L. REV. 637, 639 n.9 (1998) (stating "[t]he United States Supreme Court has not ruled
on the precise issue of when a CERCLA claim arises for bankruptcy purposes.").
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in Ohio v. Kovacs5 and Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection,6 two Supreme Court pronouncements in the area. Lower
courts have revisited and reexamined these opinions much like ancient priests
studied the entrails of goats. Kovacs and Midlantic have meant different things to
different courts.
This article attempts to canvass the present state of environmental affairs in
bankruptcy. The picture it paints is not pretty. As one court observed:
[t]he interface of environmental cleanup laws and federal
bankruptcy statutes is never tidy; jurisprudentially, it is somewhat
grubby... [CERCLA] ... seek[s] to protect public health and the
environment by facilitating the cleanup of environmental
contamination and imposing costs on the parties responsible for the
pollution .... [Bankruptcy law was] designed to give a debtor a
fresh start by discharging as many of its debts as possible. The
tension between these fundamental aspects of our national policy is
profound.
We begin with a brief overview of environmental laws.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
A. CERCLA
1. Purpose
Most environmental-bankruptcy case law involves CERCLA.8 Congress
enacted CERCLA in 1980 principally to: (1) ensure immediate cleanup of
contaminated sites; and (2) allocate the cleanup costs to those responsible for the
problem.9 The legislative history and case law suggest CERCLA was also intended
S469 U.S. 274, 279-81 (1985) (holding obligation to clean up hazardous waste site is debt and is subject
to discharge).
6 474 U.S. 494, 506-07 (1986) (holding bankruptcy court did not have power to authorize abandonment of
facility where waste oil was processed without conditions to protect public health and safety).
7 CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pac. R.R. (In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.), 3
F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Carter Day Indus. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Assocs.), 838
F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988) (recognizing conflict between CERCLA and Bankruptcy Code because goals of
CERCLA are at odds with underlying premise of bankruptcy); Jensen v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A. (In re
Jensen), 114 B.R. 700, 705 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990) (discussing inherent conflict between CERCLA and
Bankruptcy Code).
8 This article will refer to CERCLA's internal section numbering, where section 101 corresponds to 42
U.S.C. § 9601, section 102 to 42 U.S.C. § 9602, and so forth.
9 See Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act of 1980, 45 BuS. LAW. 923, 924 (1990) (indicating
CERCLA allows federal government to conduct its own cleanup of toxic substances and authorizes those
who incur cleanup costs to recover them within limitations of Act); see also Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper
Indus., 312 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2002) ("CERCLA's twin purposes are to promote prompt and effective
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to: ensure proper handling of hazardous wastes; promote voluntary cleanups;
encourage early reporting of hazardous spills; and deter future contamination.
10
Because Congress assumed it would not take long to clean up our country's
environmental disasters, CERCLA had a five-year sunset date. The Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) not only reauthorized
CERCLA, but fortified its provisions. 1
2. Scope
CERCLA covers responses to releases and threatened releases of "hazardous
substances." Hazardous wastes are a subcategory of hazardous substances.
12
Chemicalg listed as hazardous in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the
Solid Waste Disposal Act are included, as are 700 additional hazardous substances
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and the sharing of financial responsibility among the parties whose actions
created the hazards."); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986)
("Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to provide a comprehensive response to the problem of hazardous
substance release.").
'0 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6128 (noting bill
would establish program for appropriate environmental response to protect public health and induce persons
to voluntarily take remedial measures); Heidt, supra note 4, at 156 ("Congress enacted CERCLA with the
primary goals of (1) identifying and cleaning up toxic waste sites and (2) placing the cleanup cost on persons
responsible for the contamination."); see also Barr, supra note 9, at 924 (citing Chemical Waste Mgmt. v.
Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
" See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (indicting act's purpose is "[t]o extend and amend the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980"). SARA strengthened
the original enactment of CERCLA by creating more stringent cleanup standards, creating the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, increasing Superfund monies, and codifying judicial
interpretation of the original Act. See John C. Cruden, CERCLA Overview, SGIOI A.L.I.-A.B.A. 351, 353-
54 (2002) (discussing SARA's and Superfund's more stringent standards). Congress has repeatedly
reauthorized CERCLA, each time setting aside more money for cleanups. See also EPA v. Sequa Corp. (In
re Bell Petroleum Servs.), 3 F.3d 889, 915 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting SARA has "undoubtedly clarified and
strengthened executive's CERCLA responsibilities and authority.").
12 As defined in CERCLA, hazardous substances include the following:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section
9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or
listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but
not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant
listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated
as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and
the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or
synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2000). The petroleum exclusion is significant. Petroleum is listed as hazardous in
other environmental laws, but petroleum companies are oftentimes not liable under CERCLA. See Robert T.
Lee, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 267, 270 (Government Institutes, Inc., 12th ed. 1993).
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listed by the EPA.' 3  CERCLA also covers releases of "pollutants or
contaminants,"'14 a broad category of substances that "will or may reasonably be
anticipated to cause" harmful health effects. 5 The broad scope of "pollutants or
contaminants" seldom impacts private parties because CERCLA only gives the
EPA a cause of action for cleanup of hazardous substances.
"Release," like most terms in CERCLA, is defined broadly. It seems to include
every conceivable manner in which a substance might leave its container, 6 with the
exception of motor vehicle exhaust emissions, which are specifically excluded.
3. Causes of Action
a. Cleanup by Third Parties & Recovery of Costs
CERCLA provides three main remedies. First, section 10417 authorizes the
President, and thus the EPA, to remove or arrange for removal of hazardous
substances. Under this section, the EPA may institute a removal action or a
remedial action in response to a release or threatened release of hazardous
substances. A removal action is a short-term action designed to protect the public
health and welfare.1 8 A remedial action is a long-term, permanent action designed to
address the contamination. 19 The EPA may convert a removal action to a remedial
13 See Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2003) (listing hazardous substances); see
also Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 984 (lst Cir. 1995) (noting hazardous
substance is defined in CERCLA by incorporating lists of substances in other statutes such as Clean Water
Act); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (D. Del. 1986) (indicating statute relies
on cross-referencing to other environmental statutes to define its terms).
14 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2000); see Apache Powder Co. v. United States, 968 F.2d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(noting CERCLA "directs EPA to establish criteria for determining the highest-priority sites for removal of
releases or threatened releases of ... pollutants or contaminants."); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d
922, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating CERCLA authorizes EPA to "respond to the release of... 'pollutants or
contaminants'.., which may present 'an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.").
" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(33) (2000); see Eagle-Picher Indus., 759 F.2d at 925 (indicating EPA is authorized to
take remedial measures in response to release of hazardous substances); United States v. Wallace, 893 F.
Supp. 627, 630 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (noting release of hazardous substances which posed substantial threat to
public health, welfare and environment warranted remedial action under CERCLA).
16 A "release" is "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting,
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2000).
"7 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing president to take remedial measures when hazardous
substances have been released into environment); Indus. Park Dev. Co. v. EPA, 604 F. Supp. 1136, 1139
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (noting authority of EPA to take remedial measures is presumed under CERCLA section
104); Pinole Point Props., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 286 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (stating
"section 104 gives the President the authority to act in response to the release of hazardous substances.").
is See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2000) (defining removal actions). These cleanups are limited to a twelve
month time period and a project cost of $2 million. See Cruden, supra note 11, at 359 (discussing cleanup
process). However, the time and cost constraints may be avoided if the situation fits within statutory
exceptions outlined in section 104(c). 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (2000). "The breadth of these exceptions
generally means that in situations where EPA wants to continue a removal action beyond one year or above
$2 million, it can find a basis for doing so." Lee, supra note 12, at 276.
'9 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2000). See Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 993
F.2d 915, 931 n.19 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing remedial action); Cruden, supra note 11, at 359 (analyzing
three-step remedy process under CERCLA).
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action when necessary.
Remedial actions require the property to be listed on the National Priorities List
(NPL). 20 Remedial actions are funded from the Hazardous Substance Superfund,
widely known as Superfund.21 The Superfund allows remediation of contaminated
sites even when responsible parties do not exist or when they exist but lack the
requisite resources to fund the cleanup.
Before the EPA begins a cleanup, it must evaluate the site extensively and
prepare a record of its proposals. It must address any public comments in that
record. The record forms the basis for judicial review.
If the EPA funds the cleanup, section 107 permits it to recover the associated
costs from potentially responsible parties (PRPs).22 This is known as a
"reimbursement" or "cost recovery" action. This right to reimbursement remedy is
available to states, private parties, and the federal government.23 So, if a private
party or a state performs a cleanup, it has the right, under CERCLA, to seek
reimbursement from responsible parties.24
20 Section 105 of CERCLA created the NPL. Based on a variety of factors, the EPA assigns a "score" to a
contaminated site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (2000) (determining criteria for priorities among releases
or threatened releases). This allows the EPA to rank sites objectively, and, as the name implies, to establish
priorities. The NPL is part of the National Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA must update it each year.
Because a listing on the NPL often means the EPA is willing to institute a remedial action, parties sometimes
challenge the proceedings-usually unsuccessfully. See Lee, supra note 12, at 273 (explaining NPL and
noting its importance as CERCLA response procedure).
21 The Superfund is funded by a general corporate tax, taxes on certain chemicals and oil, and
appropriations from general revenue. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000). Before the federal government may
commence a remedial action, it must secure an agreement from the state to pay 10% of the costs. 42 U.S.C. §
9604(c)(3) (2000) (providing choice between 10% of costs or 50% of sum expended in response to release).22 Thomas J. Salerno & Robert J. Miller, Environmental Issues, in CHAPTER 11 THEORY & PRACTICE: A
GUIDE TO REORGANIZATION (James F. Queenan, Jr. et al. eds., LRP 1994 & Supp.) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§
9606(a)-(b), 9607(a) (1988)); see In re Kaiser Group Int'l, Inc., 289 B.R 597, 604-05 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)
(discussing purpose of section 107 and how it applies in cases when government is potentially responsible
party); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 144 B.R. 765, 769 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding defendant and
plaintiffs co-liable for future cleanup costs under section 107(a)(3)).
23 Section 107 states, in relevant part:
Any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the occurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for - (A) all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (2000); see Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 529 (8th Cir. 2003)
(finding landowner could not bring action unless it fell within enumerated defense of section 107(b));
Goodrich Corp. v. Middlebury, 311 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing statute and resolving contribution
claims).
24 The only difference between the two actions is the burden of proof. Under section 107(a)(4)(A), the
EPA is entitled to any costs "not inconsistent" with the NPL, whereas private parties are entitled to costs
"consistent" with the NCP. In a private action, the burden is on the party seeking reimbursement to show
compliance with the NCP. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2000).
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b. Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs)
Environmental contamination is bad. Cleanups are not cheap. The class of
parties potentially liable under CERCLA is broad. Congress believed a broad net
was necessary to fund cleanups and deter future contamination. PRPs include the
following:
26
1. any owner or operator of a vessel or a facility,
27
2. any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
3. any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, 28 and
4. any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
occurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance .... 9
CERCLA defines "person" broadly. A "person" is any individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States government, state, municipality, commission, political subdivision of
a State, or any interstate body. 30 According to the case law, a bankruptcy estate
qualifies as a "person."3
25 Cleanups seldom cost less than $1 million and "not infrequently" exceed $50 million. See Lee, supra
note 12, at 284 (noting association between increased costs and extensive groundwater contamination).
26 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (2000); see Dico, Inc., 340 F.3d 525 at 529 (quoting statute); Buffalo Color
Corp. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 409, 415 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing and applying statute).
27 The definition of "owner or operator" excludes two categories of owners: those who "without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, hold indicia of ownership to protect [a] security
interest," and any unit of local government that received control of property due to tax delinquency or
bankruptcy. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (2000).
28 This category of PRPs often contains the defendants with the deepest pockets. See Lee, supra note 12,
at 293 (noting of most major CERCLA sites many of these parties are Fortune 500 companies).
29 This fourth category encompasses transporters and resellers of hazardous substances.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000); see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 56 (1998) (quoting
definition in statute); United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 323 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating statute broadens
term "person" to include United States government, states, municipalities, and others).
31 See In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (treating debtor's estate as
"person" under CERCLA); Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 73 B.R. 494, 499
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1987), affd in relevant part, 126 B.R. 656 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1 (Ist
Cir. 1992) (deeming debtor and debtor's estate as "person" within meaning of CERCLA); In re Stevens, 68
B.R. 774, 779 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (discussing principal debtor's estate as person under CERCLA).
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CERCLA distinguishes between current owners and former owners.32 Current
owners and operators of a vessel or facility are liable for any release of a hazardous
substance. Former owners are liable only if they owned or operated a vessel or
facility "at the time of disposal." The term "release" is broader than "disposal.
' 33
Courts construe "disposal" differently.34 The distinction only matters when a former
owner is sued for "passive migration." Assume Owner 1 introduces contaminants
into the environment. They spread throughout the soil and groundwater during
Owner 2's ownership without any human intervention. This type of spreading is
commonly described as "leaching." The definition of "release" includes "leaching."
The definition of "disposal" does not. Consequently, current owners are liable for
leaching. Former owners are not.
Nevertheless, the lot of former owners is hardly ideal. They may be liable for
other types of "passive" harm. Several of the words used to define "disposal" have
both an "active" and a "passive" sense. 35 For example, it is often impossible to
determine when a tank stopped leaking-after which time, passive environmental
harm alone can occur. Courts have struggled to determine whom Congress meant
to hold liable in this type of situation.
At one extreme is the Fourth Circuit, which held a landowner liable when it
purchased and promptly resold property that had been contaminated by leaking
underground storage tanks.36 According to the court, RCRA case law established
that the definition of "disposal" included passive leaking, leaking that did not
involve affirmative human intervention. The court noted it could not ignore RCRA
case law. Moreover, a contrary holding would frustrate CERCLA's purpose of
encouraging prompt cleanup of hazardous substances. If former owners were not
liable, an owner could avoid liability by selling the property. Current owners, no
less "passive" than their predecessors, could not pursue them for a share of the
cleanup costs.
37
32 Current owners are put into a separate category from former owners. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2000)
(current owners); id. § 9607(a)(2) (former owners) (2002).
33 The definition of "release" includes the term "disposal," every word that the definition of "disposal"
includes, and some additional words. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000) (defining "disposal") with 42
U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2000) (defining "release.").
34 Congress defined the term in RCRA: "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing of any ... hazardous waste ... [such that it] may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
35 Technically, the distinction is between a transitive and intransitive sense. Consider the word "leak": "he
leaked sensitive information to the press" vs. "the pipe leaked." The latter could be described as "passive"
because no human conduct effected the leaking.36 See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1992); see also United
States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding responsibility under
CERCLA cannot be contracted to another party); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d
Cir. 1985) (finding liability even without ownership of site at time of disposal).37 See S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control v. Commerce & Indus. Ins., 372 F.3d 245, 261 (4th Cir. 2004)
(discussing CERCLA declaratory judgment claim for present or retrospective harm); Nurad, 966 F.2d at
845-46 (recognizing owner could avoid liability by standing idle while hazard festered); In re FCX, Inc., 96
B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding polluted property may be abandoned if violations do not pose
immediate threat to public).
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In the middle, a majority, are the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. They
have imposed liability only when "active" human intervention occurred.38
According to those courts, Congress would have no reason to divide current owners
and former owners into separate categories if all owners-both at the time of
release and thereafter-were responsible.
The Ninth Circuit has rejected the active-passive distinction altogether.39 It says
the proper inquiry is to "determine whether the movement of contaminants is, under
the plain meaning of the terms, a 'disposal.' Put otherwise, do any of the terms fit
the hazardous contamination at issue? 40 Applying its plain meaning standard, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that no "disposal" had occurred when hazardous substances
emerged from tar-like and slag materials that had entered the soil. "IS]preading,'
'migration,' 'seeping,' bozing,' and possibly leaching"' could describe what
occurred, but not "discharge,... injection, dumping,. . . or placing."' 41
Regardless of the standard, the passive migration analysis is distinct from the
innocent landowner defense.42 The former focuses exclusively on whether a
"disposal" occurred while a former owner held title to the property. Courts that
immunize former owners from passive migration do so because their construction
of "disposal" requires affirmative human conduct. Courts that allow former owners
to assert the innocent landowner defense (not all do) do not look at the character of
the "disposal," or indeed, at the landowner's conduct at the time of disposal at all.
Instead, they inquire into the landowner's conduct prior to purchase, i.e., whether
the landowner "undertook all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property.,
43
CERCLA imposes liability for all costs of removal or remedial action, all other
response costs, 44 damages for the injury or destruction of natural resources, and the
38 See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 707 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting certain actions must
be taken to prevent or mitigate damage to public health); ABB Indus. Sys. v. Prime Tech., 120 F.3d 351, 358
(2d Cir. 1997) (discussing CERCLA's innocent owner defense); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d
706 (3d Cir. 1996) (defining class of people liable for response costs and contribution); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
Koppers Co., 40 F.3d 750, 761 (5th Cir. 1994) (declining to adopt Fourth Circuit rationale).
3 See W. Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 689 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing CERCLA
claim between several potentially responsible parties); Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d
863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (promulgating new inquiry to determine liability); Servco Pac. Inc. v.
Dods, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1197 (D. Haw. 2002) (discussing Ninth Circuit's holding in Carson).
40 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 270 F.3d at 879; see Cal. Ex Rel. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v.
Neville Chem., 358 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining which terms fit contamination at issue);
Andrea Ruiz Esquide, Note, Carson Harbor Village v. Unocal Corporation: Using Background Principles to
Solve CERCLA s Ambiguities?, ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 481-85 (2003) (discussing and analyzing Ninth
Circuit's en banc decision in Carson regarding disposal).
41 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 270 F.3d at 879; see 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000) (defining disposal); Gilroy
Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners & Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (stating diligent pursuit
would preclude action for cleanup costs).42 See discussion infra Part 3(h).
4'42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (2000). See generally In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990) (discussing liability of subsequent owners).
44 Although generally the government may recover attorneys' fees because "enforcement" costs, including
attorneys' fees, are a subset of "response" costs, the courts are split as to whether private parties may recover
them. See Lee, supra note 12, at 296 (explaining some courts find private attorney fees to be unrecoverable
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costs of any necessary health effects or assessment studies.45 Section 107 gives
private parties who are not responsible for the contamination a right to clean up and
seek reimbursement from PRPs.46 This encourages private parties to perform
cleanups. Responsible parties who clean up have a right of contribution against
other responsible parties.47 Courts allocate the cost among PRPs using a variety of
equitable factors. PRPs who have settled their liability with the government can sue
other PRPs who have not.
To sum up, there are five elements of a claim under section 107 for cost
recovery:
(i) the defendant is a PRP; and
(ii) there has been a release or a threat of release,
(iii) of a hazardous substance,
(iv) from a vessel or facility,
(v) which has led to the incurrence of response costs.
48
c. Cleanup by Responsible Parties
Sections 104 and 106 also authorize an EPA administrative action to compel a
PRP to clean up a site. 49 The EPA may require the property owner or other PRP to
perform the cleanup if the EPA determines the PRP will do so "properly and
promptly. 50  Cleanup orders to PRPs are often referred to as "unilateral
administrative orders." 5' This remedy is available only if the harm poses an
response costs while other courts reason enforcement costs extend to private attorney fees because parties
are seeking to enforce their right to recover in CERCLA actions).4 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000) (describing scope of liability and damages); see also In re Kaiser Group
Intl, Inc., 289 B.R. 597, 608 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (holding party liable for total response costs); In re
Eagle-Picher Indus., 144 B.R. 765, 770 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (discussing responsibility for remediating
waste sites).
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607; see also Barr, supra note 9, at 997 (discussing right of private parties to seek
reimbursement); see also discussion infra Part 3(g).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000) (stating "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable"). Until SARA, there was no explicit right of contribution, although courts
interpreted section 107 to permit contribution. Congress added section 113(f) to "clarify and confirm" the
right. See discussion infra Part 3(g).
48 See Lee, supra note 12, at 295; see also United States v. Consol. Coal Co., 345 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir.
2003) (discussing elements necessary for section 107 liability); Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of N.
Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1302 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (announcing elements of CERCLA prima facie case for either
direct recovery or contribution).
49 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (2000); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No.
1:01CV00658, 2004 WL 1943740, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (discussing interplay between sections
104 and 106).
5 0 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2000) (granting authority for removal and other remedial actions); see also
Hi-Mill Mfg. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 884 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (discussing EPA
actions and defense costs); United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 571, 577 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (recognizing EPA's authority to ensure prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites).
51 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("EPA may issue unilateral
administrative orders ("UAOs") after notice to the affected state, directing the responsible parties to clean up
the hazardous sites .... ); United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 2002)
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imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
52environment. The existence of a risk of harm satisfies the "imminent harm"
requirement.5 3 If the individual or corporation ordered to do the cleanup is skilled in
the field, the order may require the responsible party itself to do the cleanup.
Alternatively, the order may require the responsible party to hire a third party to do
it.
CERCLA imposes hefty penalties on those who fail to comply with a cleanup
order.5 4 This remedy is only available to the federal government.
d. Injunctions to Stop Future Releases
Finally, section 106 authorizes the EPA to request an injunction to prevent a
party from engaging in further releases of hazardous waste.55 This form of relief,
sometimes called an "abatement" action, is available when: (1) the EPA determines
that a threat is presented by an "actual or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from a facility;" and (2) the danger or threat poses "imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment.
'
"
56
Once again, only the federal government can seek injunctive relief. The United
States district court with jurisdiction over the contaminated site is authorized to
(noting issuance of two administrative orders); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153
F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing use of unilateral administrative orders).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a); see also Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group., 973 F.2d
1320, 1325 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing substantial danger to public and environment). Cf Midlantic Natl
Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 516 (1986) (noting respondent's interest in protecting public
health).
53 See Barr, supra note 9, at 933 (noting government need only prove endangerment may exist); see also In
re Rancourt, 207 B.R. 338, 344 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1997) (recognizing actual or threatened release of hazardous
substances posed imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or environment); In re
MCI, Inc., 151 B.R. 103, 108 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) (discussing burden of proving there is no imminent
danger to public).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (announcing amount of fines permissible for failing to comply with order); see
also Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting EPA's ability to assess civil penalties for
noncompliance with certain CERCLA provisions); Barr, supra note 9, at 934 (discussing penalty scheme
and available penalty enhancements).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (giving President power to take action if environmental threat arises); see also
Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 1493 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining section 106 limits
availability of injunctive relief to federal plaintiffs, including EPA); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., No. CIV-1-81-38921, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24317, at *6-*7 (E.D. Tenn. August 16, 1984)
(claiming injunctive relief may only be brought by Attorney General at request of President, who is advised
by EPA).
56 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a); see United States v. Conservation Chem. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 162, 191-94 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (stating section 106(a) authorizes United States to seek mandatory injunction against responsible
parties when President determines there may be imminent and substantial endangerment to public health,
welfare, or environment because of actual or threatened release of hazardous substance); Barr, supra note 9,
at 932-33 (explaining government must establish elements set forth in section 9606(a) and show hazardous
substance may pose imminent threat and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, or
environment).
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grant such relief.57
e. Types of Liability
PRPs are strictly liable under CERCLA. 58 For example, even if the
contamination occurred before an owner acquired the property, the owner is still
strictly liable.59 PRPs do not necessarily have to have known a site is
contaminated.6 ° Congress determined that strict liability was appropriate under
CERCLA because activities related to the manufacture, transportation, usage, and
61disposal of hazardous substances are abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous.
Although the Act is silent, courts have made liability under CERCLA joint and
several.62 Joint and several liability relieves courts of the arduous, if not impossible,
task of apportioning fault. Strict liability, acting in tandem with joint and several
liability, obviates the need to identify each and every PRP and its contribution
before requiring one PRP to clean up.
63
" See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a); Barr, supra note 9, at 933 ("[T]he district court of the United States in the
district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief .. "); see also Conservation
Chem. Corp., 661 F. Supp. at 1427 (stating CERCLA requires full trial when mandatory injunctive relief is
sought).
58 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985):
Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an
explicit provision for strict liability was not included in the compromise. Section
9601(32) provides that "liability" under CERCLA "shall be construed to be the standard
of liability" under section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, which courts
have held to be strict liability ....
Id; see also Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 993 F.2d 915, 921 (1st Cir. 1993)
(stating all PRPs are strictly liable); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990)
("liability for cost incurred is strict .... ").
59 See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1044-45 (stating reason for strict liability is to impose liability in
situations where person who contaminated land cannot be located); see also New York v. Westwood-Squibb
Pharm. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 372, 380 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating owner's liability extends to disposals
occurring during and before ownership of property); In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pac. R.R. Co., 130
B.R. 521, 523 (N.D. 111. 1991) ("The Supreme Court has recognized that anyone in possession of a hazardous
waste site is liable for remedying the situation.").
60 See SALERNO & MILLER, supra note 22, at 26:7 (explaining defendant does not have to have knowledge
or intent to be held liable); see also O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 719 (D.R.I. 1988) (stating if plaintiff
can prove the statutory elements of section 107(a)(3), then defendant may be held liable whether she had
knowledge or not); In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pac. R.R. Co., 130 B.R. at 523 (finding current owner
of facility subject to strict liability standard).
61 See 126 CONG. REC. H31, 964-65 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio); 126 CONG. REC. H31, 978 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Jeffords); 126 CONG. REC. S30, 932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph); see also Barr,
supra note 9, at 976 (affirming legislative history shows strict liability is imposed because manufacture,
transportation, usage, or disposal of hazardous substances is an "abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous"
activity).
62 Congress purposely did not impose joint and several liability on CERCLA defendants in the 1980
version of the Act. Congress left the nature of the liability to the courts to decide. See Barr, supra note 9, at
977-78 (stating courts have noted Congress struck proposal to impose joint and several liability in all
CERCLA cases).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Md. 1986) ("The courts have
consistently rejected attempts by CERCLA defendants to compel the government to round up every other
available defendant, noting that defendants can protect themselves through the impleader provision of Rule
14."); see also Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1450 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (citing
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f Corporate Liability
Under section 107(a)(3), "any person" who "owned or possessed" a hazardous
substance and arranged for its disposal or transportation for disposal may be held
directly liable. According to the case law, "person" includes corporate officers and
parent corporations. 64 After all, Congress could have limited the definition of
"person" just like it limited the definition of "owner or operator" in section
101(20)(A). 5 It chose not to. Therefore, corporate officers and parent corporations
may be held liable as "arrangers."
Moreover, under section 107(a)(1) and (2), parent corporations may be held
directly liable as "operators., 66 Some courts have focused on whether the parent
corporation exercised "substantial control" over the PRP corporation's overall
business activities-not merely on its control over the liability-creating hazardous
substance activities. 67 The parent's conduct did not always approach the level
required under a veil-piercing analysis (usually formulated as "domination" or
"mere instrumentality"). Parent corporations actively involved in running the
subsidiary, perhaps without actually making its environmental decisions, have been
held liable.68
Dickerson); Barr, supra note 9, at 978-79 (noting CERCLA plaintiffs can chose among jointly liable parties
and are not required to bring in all available defendants).
64 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743
(8th Cir. 1986) (explaining "person" under section 107(a)(3) includes both individuals and corporations,
including corporation's officers and employees); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894 (E.D.N.C.
1985) (stating both corporations and individuals fall under statute's definition of "person.").
65 See Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 743 (applying "owner or operator" definition); see
also Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 884 (holding corporate officer liable as arranger); accord Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating corporate defendants may be held
liable as arrangers).
6642 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(2) (2000); see, e.g., FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dept of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843
(3d Cir. 1994) (noting some courts have found corporations liable as operators); Lansford-Coaldale Joint
Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding some parent corporations liable as
operators). But see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1998) (stating parent corporations are
only liable under section 107(a)(2) as operators if they exert power or influence over their subsidiary by
actively participating in and exercising control over the subsidiary's business); Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James &
Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 233 (W.D. La. 1988) (finding corporation not liable as operator when it did not
engage in daily operations of disposal of hazardous waste).
See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (stating factors to determine operator status include whether person or
entity controlled finances of facility, managed employees of facility, and managed daily business operations
of facility); see also Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1220 (holding corporation must have
substantial control over facility in question to be liable as operator); Joslyn Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 233
(holding corporation liable under owner and operator status).
68 See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1220 (declaring some corporations liable under
operator status strictly on basis of control over facility); Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 894 (implying mere capacity
to control the facility is enough to find liability under operator status); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.
Supp. 898, 913 (D.N.H. 1985) (denying defendant corporation's motion for summary judgment because
corporation may have been operator under statute). Circuits were split over whether the authority to control,
as opposed to actual control, was sufficient. Compare Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev.
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338(9th Cir. 1992) and Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992) (both adopting authority to control standard), with Jacksonville Elec. Auth.
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A recent Supreme Court opinion, United States v. Bestfoods,69 casts doubt on
these decisions. The Court clarified the differences between direct and derivative
liability. It reasoned that CERCLA did not abrogate the common law rule
proscribing the use of the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud or injustice.70 It then
held that a parent corporation can be held derivatively liable under subsections
107(a)(1) and (2) only if the corporate veil could be pierced. 71 Finally, it emphasized
that a parent could be held directly liable as an "operator."
The Court purported to abrogate cases holding parent corporations "directly"
liable-via a broad construction of "operator"--on facts that would be insufficient
to pierce the veil.72 The Court did not mention the "control" test at all, even though
it was the way courts would apparently get around the veil-piercing rules. In
reaffirming direct "operator" liability for parent corporations, it provided no new
standard, thus inviting courts to use a modified "control" test (perhaps confining
their inquiry to control over hazardous substance activities). In the bankruptcy
context, the Bestfoods decision has important implications for successor liability.
Every circuit court to decide the issue has concluded that Congress intended to
impose liability on successor corporations, even though it gave no explicit statutory
authorization. 73 CERCLA is designed to promote speedy cleanups. Imposing the
v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991) (adopting actual control standard).
69542 U.S. 51 (1998).
70 Id. at 61 (declaring CERCLA did not abrogate corporate liability law); cf Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410,
415 (1932) (explaining generally a corporation and its stockholders are two separate entities); Coxe v.
Handy, 24 F. Supp. 178, 180 (D. Del. 1938) (stating as general rule corporations are separate entities from
their stockholders).
71 See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63-64 ("The Court of Appeals was accordingly correct in holding that when
(but and only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation be charged with derivative
CERCLA liability for its subsidiary's actions."); see also Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6, 22-23
(1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bestfoods); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2000)
(recognizing change in corporations' liability as owners and operators recognized by Supreme Court).
72 See, e.g., Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1220 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding parent
corporation liable based on some control over subsidiaries); Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 894 (implying some
corporations may be liable based simply on their capacity to control subsidiaries); Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at
913 (stating defendant was possibly liable as operator even if corporate veil could not be pierced).
73 See N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning, based on judicial
rule of construction, Congress "intended to include all known forms of business and commercial enterprises"
by using "person" in CERCLA); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining
to read section 9607(a) in manner "subverting the Act's purpose of holding responsible parties liable for
cleanup costs" and instead, reading CERCLA "to advance its primary goals."); John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston
Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 405 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding "liabilities traveled to the successor"); United States
v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding successor liability is permitted
under CERCLA); United States v. Mex. Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 486-87 (4th Cir. 1992) ("It would
serve little purpose to include corporations responsible for hazardous waste sites, but not their corporate
successors, within the class of 'covered persons."); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240,
1245 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Congress intended successor corporations within the description of entities that are
potentially liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs."); La.-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1262
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding Congress did intend successor liability in CERCLA and extending Smith Land to
asset purchase); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988)
("Congressional intent supports the conclusion that, when choosing between the taxpayers or a successor
corporation, the successor should bear the cost.").
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cost of the cleanup on the purchasing entity-which benefited from the selling
entity's environmental abuses through a lower price in an asset sale, merger or other
business combination-is not unfair.74 Bankruptcy courts have long struggled to
apply CERCLA's successor liability principles in the context of asset sales and
reorganizations.75
In New York v. National Services Industries, Inc.,76 the Second Circuit
reexamined the proper standard for successor liability after Bestfoods. Prior courts
had adopted a "substantial continuity" test because it was more consistent with
CERCLA's purposes than the common law approach.77 However, the court
understood Bestfoods to mean that the courts "must apply common law rules and
not create CERCLA-specific ones.,7 8 Accordingly, the court remanded to determine
whether a corporation's purchase of customer lists, contracts, inventory, and
74 See N. Shore Gas Co., 152 F.3d at 650 ("Holding the successor corporation liable for the cost of cleanup
is not necessarily unfair, since the successor and its shareholders likely will have derived some benefit form
the predecessor's use of the pollutant and savings that resulted from the hazardous methods."); Smith Land &
Improvement Co., 85 1 F.2d at 92 ("Benefits from the use of the pollutant as well as savings resulting from
the failure to use non-hazardous disposal methods inured to the original corporations, its successors, and
their respective stockholders . . . ."). See generally Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Ultimate Independence of the
Federal Courts: Defying the Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal Common Law Powers, 36 CONN. L.
REv. 425, 463-64 (2004) (discussing potential for corporations to manipulate general rule of asset purchaser
non-liability and common law exceptions necessary to avoid abuse).
75 See, e.g., Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beaser E., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 391, 405-06 (M.D. Pa. 1998)
(applying successor liability based on "continuity enterprise" theory in CERCLA action against
manufacturer that previously contaminated site); New York v. Panex Indus., Inc., No. 94-CV-0400E, 1996
WL 378172, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 24, 1996) (analyzing whether "asset purchase" resulted in de facto
merger or "substantial continuation" when successor acquired company after seller reorganized); Ninth Ave.
Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 BR. 716, 729 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (concluding bankruptcy court
order approving sale of debtor's assets to defendant "free and clear" of all claims did not preclude successor
liability); New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co., 174 BR. 366, 382, 386, 389 (N.D.N.Y. 1994)
(detcrmining asset purchase resulted in de facto merger as well as a "continuing enterprise" or "substantial
continuity" between buyer and seller, and chapter 7 debtor was deemed liable as successor).
76 352 F.3d 682, 684-85, 687 (2d Cir. 2003) (refusing to find substantial continuity doctrine is part of
general federal common law and finding after Bestfoods, it should have no bearing in determination whether
corporation assumes CERCLA liability based on asset purchase); see New York v. Westwood-Squibb
Pharm. Co, Inc., 90-CV-1324C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13841, at *59 (W.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004) (citing
National Services Industries, 352 F.3d at 687, and concluding substantial continuity test is "no longer good
law"); CERCLA: Substantial Continuity' Test Can 't Be Used For Successor Liability Under CERCLA,
ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP. (Jan. 16, 2004) (discussing holding in National Services Industries).
77 Nat7 Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d at 685 (discussing court's application of substantial continuity test
articulated in Betkoski, rather than federal common law rule, was more consistent with CERCLA's goals);
see Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 519 ("CERLCA is entitled to a construction that advances its primary goals. Because
the substantial continuity test is more consistent with the Act's goals, it is superior to the older and more
inflexible 'identity rule."); Mex. Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d at 487-89 (justifying imposition of CERLCA
liability under substantial continuation test).71Nat 7 Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d at 685; see Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
this school refuses to "depart[] from the longstanding principles of corporate law," though rejecting view);
Westwood-Squibb Pharm. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13841, at *59 (quoting Bestfoods: "[i]n order to
abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common
law.").
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trademarks fit into one of the traditional successor liability exceptions.79
If other courts follow the same restrictive approach, purchasing entities (and
arguably reorganized debtors) may be able to avoid more easily the environmental
liabilities of their predecessors. Moreover, after Bestfoods, the question remains
open whether general federal common law (as applied in labor and securities cases)
or state common law governs.
80
g. Contribution Actions
So far, we have addressed three different scenarios for cleanup and cost
recovery. In one scenario, a non-responsible party, such as a neighbor, a local
government, or the EPA, cleans up a site. In that case, the non-responsible party
would bring a reimbursement action under section 107 against one, several or all
PRPs. Any PRP is liable to a non-responsible party for 100% of the cleanup cost.
The non-responsible party need not, and probably would not, join all PRPs in its
reimbursement action. Congress wanted to ensure prompt reimbursement of non-
responsible parties. The plaintiff-non-responsible party only needs to sue the most
obvious or most convenient PRP, probably the current owner in many cases.
Suppose the non-responsible party sues the current owner (and only the current
owner). It obtains a $2 million judgment. It would be unfair for the current owner
to foot the entire bill, especially if it did not create the mess or was one of several
parties responsible for it. The current owner, now judged liable, can bring a
contribution action under section 113(f) against any other PRPs to recover some or
all of the $2 million. Section 113 gives courts broad discretion to allocate the costs
fairly and equitably among PRPs joined in a contribution action.81
In a second scenario, the EPA goes to federal court to obtain an injunction
under section 106 ordering the current owner-PRP to stop harming a site. In a third
scenario, the EPA issues an administrative order under sections 104 and 106,
'9 Nat7 Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d at 687. These exceptions were typical of successor liability rules, which
hold the purchasing entity liable if: (1) the transaction was a de facto merger, (2) the purchaser impliedly
accepted the liabilities, or (3) the purchasing entity was a "mere continuation" of the selling entity. The
"mere continuation" exception generally requires an identity of stock, stockholders, and directors. New York
unsuccessfully argued that the "substantial continuation" exception was a specialized application of the
"mere continuation" exception. Id. at 685-86.
8 0 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998) ("There is significant disagreement among
courts and commentators over whether, in enforcing CERCLA's indirect liability, courts should borrow state
law, or instead apply a federal common law of veil piercing."); N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d
642, 650 (noting most circuits holding successor liability is available under CERCLA have "concluded that
the parameters of the doctrine should be fashioned by federal common law."); Mex. Feed & Seed Co., 980
F.2d at 487 n.9 (stating "considering the national application of CERCLA and fairness to similarly situated
parties, the district court was probably correct in applying federal law.").
81 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (2000) ("In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."); see also
Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kan., Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 802-03 (10th Cir. 1996)
(upholding district court's holding relying on grant of broad discretion in section 9613(0(1)); Westwood-
Squibb Pharm. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13841 at *64 (interpreting section 9613(f)(1) to afford court
"broad discretion to balance the equities in the interests of justice.").
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ordering the current owner to clean up a site. Here, too, the PRP would cast around
for other PRPs against whom it could bring a contribution action under section
113(f).8 2
In all three situations, the law is settled. Any PRP who involuntarily incurs
more than its "fair share" of cleanup costs-whether by paying a money judgment
or by complying with an injunction or EPA administrative action--can recover the
difference under section 113(f).
What about the PRP who voluntarily remediates a site? Here, the result is not
so clear.
Suppose the current owner of a warehousing site knows that the prior owners
dumped hazardous chemicals into the soil. The current owner has not contributed
to any deterioration. The chemicals now pose a problem because the owner wishes
to convert the warehouses into something else. Moreover, it plans to sell a parcel of
the property. A sale will be difficult because any future owner will become a PRP
and hence, liable for part of the cleanup, if it ever occurs. Few buyers want to
assume that liability.
Because a "release" has occurred, the EPA could order the current owner to
clean up the site, but the EPA has not yet exercised that power. The local
authorities are likewise unwilling or unable to expend funds to clean up, even
though they could recover the cost from the current owner. Can the current owner
clean up the site and sue the former owners who actually created the mess? Or must
the current owner sit around and wait for an EPA administrative action or a clean up
by a non-PRP who then sues the current owner? Given the cost of some cleanups,
knowing in advance when and from whom the money will come makes a
difference. Moreover, if the current owner cannot voluntarily undertake a clean up
with recourse against other PRPs, the property is not put to its most efficient use,
and neighbors and the public must tolerate the mess.
In 1980, the PRP who voluntarily cleaned up had to rely on section 107(a)'s
right of reimbursement (cost recovery) remedy. Courts interpreted this provision to
permit a PRP who incurred cleanup costs in excess of its equitable share to sue
other PRPs to recoup some or all of the costs. This interpretation effectively
transformed a right of reimbursement into a right of contribution. It made one joint
and several tortfeasor liable to another.
In the seminal case, City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co.,8 3 a number of
chemical companies had dumped hazardous materials into a city-owned landfill in
contravention of state law. The illicit dumping had contaminated the groundwater,
adjacent soil, and the Delaware River. The EPA had placed the site on the NPL, but
had not yet ordered the city to clean up the site. Rather than wait for the EPA or the
state agency to clean up the mess, the city implemented a comprehensive cleanup
program at a cost of $30 million, which it sought to recover from the defendant
chemical companies. It relied on section 107(a)(4)(B) to establish that it could
82 Unless, of course, the PRP compelled to clean up the site believes it is solely responsible for the mess.
83 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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recover response costs notwithstanding its own liability as a current owner of the
landfill.
84
According to section 107, PRPs shall be liable for: "(A) all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian
tribe ... ; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person. 85
The city argued that "any other person" meant anyone other than the government
entities listed in subsection (A). In other words, subsection (B)s reference to "other
person" did not exclude the PRPs listed in subsections (1) through (4).
The court agreed. It reasoned that giving PRPs the same right as non-culpable
parties to sue other PRPs was not inconsistent with CERCLA's language, legislative
history, or purpose, particularly because the city had not voluntarily permitted the
illegal dumping for which it was potentially responsible.86 Although the Stepan
Chemical court seemed swayed in part by the equities of the case, courts in the four
years preceding the enactment of section 113(f) followed its lead.87
Congress enacted section 113(f) as part of SARA. SARA's legislative history
states that Congress intended section 113(f) to "clarify and confirm" the right of
contribution, to "encourage quicker, more equitable settlements, decrease litigation
and thus facilitate cleanups. 88 Unfortunately, the text of section 113(f) does not live
up to its legislative history. As one court put it, section 1 13(f)s "syntax is confused,
its grammar inexact, and its relationship to other CERCLA provisions
84 Id. at 1141; see Wichita v. Aero Holdings, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (D. Kan. 2000) (deciding action
pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) to recover response costs incurred cleaning up groundwater contamination);
Raytheon Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 979 F. Supp. 858, 864 n.7 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (rejecting defendant's
argurment that plaintiff's actions, particularly cleaning up site, should bar it from section 107(a) action).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (2000) (emphasis added); see United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 15-16
(1st Cir. 2001) (discussing action for past and future response costs under section 107(a)); Kalamazoo River
Study Group v. Menasha Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2000) (involving action seeking response
costs from PRPs under section 107(a)).
86 Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. at 1142-43; see Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 605
F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (D. Del. 1985) (citing Stepan Chemical and holding private parties may sue under
section 107(a) of CERCLA); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla.
1984) (relying on Stepan Chemical in its analysis of whether section 107(a)(4)(B) "empower[s] a private
party to seek compensation from other responsible parties for costs incurred cleaning up a spill site").
87 See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating former
owner may be liable under section 107 to current owner who cleaned up site, reversing district court's
holding that other necessary costs of response must be incurred pursuant to governmental order); Artesian
Water Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1356 (relying on Stepan Chemical, and permitting water utility to sue county
whose landfill contaminants polluted groundwater, even though the EPA and state government had not
compelled cleanup); Pinole Point Props., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (relying on Stepan Chemical, and holding plaintiff, current owner of pond purchased from defendant,
could sue for response costs because section 107 creates "separate and independent cause of action" not
requiring governmental action).
" H.R. REP. No. 99-253, at 79, 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861, 2841 (citing United States
v. Ward, 8 Chem. & Rad. Waste Litig. Rep. 484 (D.N.C. May 14, 1984), and United States v. S.C.
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 7 Chem. & Rad. Waste Litig. Rep. 674 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984)). Congress
emphasized that parties "may be more willing to assume the financial responsibility" for a cleanup "if they
are assured they can seek contribution from others." Id. at 80, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862.
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ambiguous."8 9
Section 113(f) provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 107(a), during or following any civil action under
section 106 or under section 107(a) .... Nothing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil
action under section 106 or section 107.
Section 113(f)s first sentence recognizes a right of contribution among PRPs
during or following any civil action for an abatement injunction (section 106) or
reimbursement of cleanup costs (section 107). It says nothing about a PRP cleanup
that takes place before any civil action, i.e., it says nothing about a PRP's voluntary
cleanup. Section 113(f)'s last sentence (the "savings clause") suggests a PRP's right
to contribution is not limited to lawsuits the PRP brings during or following civil
actions brought against it under section 106 or 107.
A recent case highlights section 11 3(f)'s interpretive difficulty. In Aviall
Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.,9° the plaintiff-current owner voluntarily,
i.e., not under section 106 compulsion, cleaned up property it had purchased from
the defendant. A panel of the Fifth Circuit denied the current owner contribution
from the former owner who had caused the mess. The court reasoned that the first
sentence of section 113(f) was an enabling clause. It created a cause of action
where "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person .... ." In an
enabling clause, "may" denotes "shall" or "must." In its view, Congress granted the
exclusive federal remedy in the first sentence, and included the last sentence only to
preserve state law contribution rights.91 To conclude otherwise would violate the
canon of construction which holds that the specific governs the general. The court
acknowledged the result was inconsistent with CERCLA's general policy goals, but
noted that policy arguments cannot supersede a statute's plain language.92
The Fifth Circuit, en banc, reversed. It permitted the plaintiffs contribution
action, reasoning that it would have been "arbitrary" for Congress to change the
89 Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 981 (2004). See generally William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose and Facts: The Relationship Between
CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 193, 224-26 (1996) (discussing limited usefulness
of SARA's legislative history and interpretive difficulties).
9 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981
(2004); see Derek J. Lisk, Passing the Hat For CERCLA Cleanup Costs, If You Clean Up, Will Others Chip
In?, 12 METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 1, 1-4 (Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Inc. 2004)
(comparing Fifth Circuit's holding in Aviall Services with District Court of New Jersey and Ninth Circuit
decisions).
91 This argument is not without merit because some courts have interpreted CERCLA to preempt state law
remedies. See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1998) ("CERCLA preempts the state
law remedies of restitution and indemnification.").
92 Aviall Servs., 263 F.3d at 139-40 (holding CERCLA requires party seeking contribution to be, or have
been, defendant in section 106 or section 107 proceeding); see Rockwell Intl Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 1384, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating purpose of section 113(f) was to provide liable parties an avenue
for obtaining compensation from other responsible parties); S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 12-13 (1980) (stating
primary goal of CERCLA is to create a superfund for immediate cleanup and hold polluters responsible).
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standard of contribution existing in 1986 if it meant to "clarify" or "confirm"
anything. It also concluded that the plain language of section 11 3(f)'s first sentence
does not include any word clearly expressing an intent to create an exclusive federal
remedy. The panel decision had effectively read the statute as "[a]ny person may
only seek contribution... during or following any civil action under section 106 or
section 107." This reading of the first sentence eviscerated the last sentence and
conflicted with CERCLA's clear policy goals. Finally, it would be odd for
Congress to rely on state law contribution remedies to mitigate the effect of the first
sentence-which, if the exclusive remedy, would give PRPs the perverse incentive
not to clean up.
93
Under the en banc court's reasoning, Stepan Chemical would come out the
same way today. The last sentence of section 113(f) incorporated its holding that
section 107(a)(4)(B) creates an implied right of contribution among PRPs.
Most courts would permit a PRP's contribution action in the absence of a
pending or adjudged section 106 or 107 action against it. 94 But courts in the Third
and Seventh Circuits have taken a narrower view of section 113(f)'s last sentence.95
93 Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 685-90 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (explaining
why expansive reading of section 113(f), enabling PRP to seek contribution at any time during cleanup
process, better suits CERCLA's text than dissent's more restrictive reading); see also William D. Araiza,
supra note 89, at 214 (suggesting section 107 should be interpreted not according to its plain meaning but as
part of integrated whole); Brent. J. Horton, Note, CERCLA 's Contribution Provision: Must a PRP First Face
An Administrative Order or Cost Recovery Action? A Proposal for Amendment, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 209,
234 (2003) (noting interaction between section 113 and section 106 or section 107 potentially leads to
inequitable results).
94 See Aviall Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d at 679 (reversing earlier decision by divided panel holding Aviall could
not assert contribution claim because it had not been subjected to action under section 106 or section 107);
Waukesha v. Viacom, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977-78 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (denying polluter's motion to
dismiss city's claim for cleanup of landfill toxins, expressly holding that absence of "only" is significant, and
criticizing reasoning and strength of precedent to contrary); Coastline Terminals of Conn., Inc. v. USX
Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208 (D. Con. 2001) (interpreting Second Circuit decision in Bedford Affiliates
to mean "parties precluded from bringing cost recovery claims pursuant to § 107 may bring contribution
actions"); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 974 F. Supp. 684, 690-91 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(stating because Seventh Circuit had not held to the contrary, contribution action does not depend on current
or prior liability under sections 106 or 107); Johnson County Airport Comm'n v. Parsonitt Co., 916 F. Supp.
1090, 1095 (D. Kan. 1996) (granting leave to amend complaint for PRP to assert contribution claim); cf
Crofton Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. G&H P'ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2001) (permitting contribution
action to proceed without directly ruling on question); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424 (stating PRP who
entered into negotiated agreement with state DEP to rehabilitate contaminated site could only sue under
section 113(f), but court did not directly address question); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
118 F.3d 1298, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining once a PRP incurs response costs, it and all other PRPs
under section 107 become liable for the costs under section 113(f), independent of any liability to
government); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, 889 F.2d 664, 667-68 (5th Cir. 1989) (permitting contribution
action, but not directly ruling on question). But see E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 297 F.
Supp. 2d 740, 746 (D.N.J. 2003) (permitting "contribution" actions, i.e., those in which one party has been
adjudged liable, only under section 113); Rumpke, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th
Cir. 1997) (stating in dictum "a § 106 or § 107 action apparently must either be ongoing or already
completed" for contribution action to be permitted).
95 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (stating Third Circuit law requires prior suit to
seek section 113 contribution); Deby, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., No. 99-C-2464, 2000 WL 263985, at *1, 5
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2000) (dismissing contribution action because party must be found liable in earlier or
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They have essentially adopted the Fifth Circuit panel's position. The first sentence
is the exclusive federal contribution remedy.96 The last sentence recognizes actions
pursuant to other state and federal laws, but does not permit actions pursuant to pre-
SARA case law.
97
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Aviall and presumably will decide
the issue. The United States wants the Court to reverse the en banc decision.98 In
addition to the points made in the Fifth Circuit panel opinion, the United States has
emphasized another CERCLA goal: facilitating settlements through the EPA. 99
A compromise position, which shows due regard for the statutory text and
CERCLA's clear policy goals, is possible. A "contribution" action is a suit by one
joint and severally liable tortfeasor against another to recover the defendant's
proportionate share of liability. But a "potentially responsible party" is just that-
potentially liable-until a court has adjudged it liable. The cleanup does not trigger
liability. A judgment does. Therefore, both the first and last sentences of section
113(f) do not apply to a PRP's voluntary cleanup. Section 107, which permits cost
recovery by "any... person," authorizes such an action for PRPs and non-PRPs
alike. A court's equitable apportionment of some of the cost to a PRP-defendant
does not transform the cost recovery action into a "contribution" action.
Even if this is a hyper-technical interpretation of "contribution," recognizing the
lack of clarity would at least permit a court to resolve doubts in favor of CERCLA's
primary policy of encouraging prompt cleanups. Moreover, if Congress wanted
sole control over settlements, it would not have permitted any party to clean up and
pending action to receive "actual compensation"); Estes v. Scotsman Group, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 983, 989
(C.D. Ill. 1998) (noting dichotomy between section 113(f)s first and last sentences and relying on Rumpke
dictum); cf Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (reasoning
contribution is unavailable under federal law unless federal statute "expressly establishes" remedy, but
noting that "during or following" language does not limit but rather "recogniz[es] that actual payment of
damages cannot occur until such time").96 The Du Pont court relied on In re Reading, 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997), for the proposition that section
113(f) replaced (and to the extent it conflicted, superseded) pre-SARA case law. It then examined the
features of "contribution" actions at common law. It concluded that the savings clause permitted
"contribution" actions by allowing a party to sue another tortfeasor under other, non-CERCLA law.
Congress only modified the common law sense of "contribution" by permitting a contribution action during
a civil action under section 106 or 107. See E. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 742-50.
97 See E.l. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 746-47 (stating enactment of SARA
amendments means pre-SARA case law is no longer controlling legal authority); Reichhold Chems. Inc. v.
Textron Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1123-24 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (asserting once Congress addresses subject by
passing statute, role of courts is no longer to apply common law but to interpret the statute). Those courts
must still resolve whether an EPA administrative enforcement proceeding under section 104, not contested
in federal court, constitutes a "civil action" within the meaning of section 113(f), and if so, whether a PRP
who cleans up following such an order has a contribution remedy. Aviall Servs. Inc., 312 F.3d at 686-87.
98 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, No. 02-1192, 2004 WL 354181,
at *1 (Feb. 23, 2004).
9 See id. at 27-29. Section 113(f)(2) absolves a settling party of any contribution liability to any other
PRP, and reduces the potential liability of the other PRPs by the amount of the settlement. The EPA
manages the potentially complicated liability scheme by providing a strong settlement incentive; cf United
States v. Charles George Trucking Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1086 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating settlement is faithful to
CERCLA's goals because the "ultimate measure of accountability in environmental case is overall recovery,
not the amount of money paid by any individual defendant").
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seek reimbursement, spawning a minefield of litigation. Giving PRPs a hybrid
reimbursement-contribution right makes at least as much sense as allowing a
reimbursement right to local governments and neighbors.
h. Defenses to Liability
CERCLA provides three (extremely) narrow defenses to liability. These
include acts of God, acts of war, and acts or omissions of unrelated third parties. 00
In terms of the last defense, the defendant must shoulder the burden of proof. The
defendant must prove: (1) a third party was solely responsible for the
contamination; (2) the third party was not an employee or agent of the defendant;
(3) the contamination did not occur as the result of a contractual relationship with
the defendant; and (4) the defendant exercised due care with regard to foreseeable
acts and omissions of the third party.'01
Two groups may be exempt from CERCLA liability. Congress extended the
third-party defense in the 1986 SARA amendments to encompass innocent
landowners.10 2 The "innocent landowner" defense applies when: (1) the owner
acquired the property with no knowledge and no reason to know of the
contamination; (2) the government acquired the property by involuntary transfer; or
(3) the owner acquired the property by inheritance or bequest.' 03 In 2001, the Small
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act expanded the
"innocent landowner" defense. It added protections for adjacent landowners,
prospective purchasers, and small businesses."' 4 Secured parties may also be
'aoSee 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000) (establishing affirmative defenses to CERCLA liability); United States
v. Inwood Assocs. LLP, No. 96-CV-147DRHETB, 2004 WL 1801795, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2004)
(stating defendants are barred from asserting defenses not listed within section 107(b)); United States v.
Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 410 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting in keeping with broad liability scheme of CERCLA,
defendants are limited to defenses enumerated in section 107(b)).
101 Barr, supra note 9, at 985 (citing United States v. B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc., No. 85-C-6925, 1986 WL
1583 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1986)); see United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1263, 1273
(E.D. Cal. 1997) (declaring third party defense in CERCLA is affirmative defense and therefore defendant
bears burden of proof); Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642, 658 (D.D.C. 1996) (stating CERCLA's
affirmative defenses shift burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant).
102 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35A)); see
United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 198, 208-09 (D.R.I. 2003) (explaining
innocent landowner defense); Craig N. Johnston, Current Landowner Liability Under CERCLA: Restoring
the Need for Due Diligence, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 401, 401-02 (1998) (describing typical scenarios
involving innocent landowner provision).
103 See Barr, supra note 9, at 986; see also United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 (3d Cir.
1996) (explaining structure of innocent landowner defense); United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385,
409 (D.N.J. 2000) (listing elements defendant must prove to satisfy innocent landowner defense); Grand St.
Artists v. Gen. Elec. Co., 28 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295 (D.N.J. 1998) (listing elements defendant asserting
affirmative defense must prove to escape liability).
'04 Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356, 2372-73 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9607). The Amendments give further guidance for the adjacent landowner defense, prospective
purchaser defense, other liability exemptions, and de minimis settlements. See Lisa Spickler Goodwin,
Environmental Law, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 117, 118-21 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)). In addition, the
Amendments now require that a landowner: (1) "provide full cooperation, assistance, and facility access to
the persons that are authorized to conduct response actions;" (2) "not impede the effectiveness or integrity of
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exempt from liability under CERCLA because of the Asset Conservation, Lender
Liability, and Deposit Insurance Act of 1996.105 Generally, a lender will not be a
PRP if it did not participate in management of the property.
10 6
i. Challenges to EPA Actions
CERCLA limits a federal court's jurisdiction to review the EPA's broad powers
to remediate environmental harm. Thus, if the EPA cleans up a site, a potentially
responsible party may not challenge the EPA's actions in federal court until the EPA
sues that party to recover its costs. 10 7 The same is true if the EPA orders a PRP to
clean up under a unilateral administrative order. Congress barred such pre-
enforcement review to keep the EPA from having "to litigate each detail of its
removal and remedial plans before implementing them."10 8 To our knowledge, no
federal court has failed to uphold the bar on pre-enforcement review when a PRP
sought to challenge the EPA's statutory authority to enforce CERCLA. On the
other hand, several courts have held that a PRP may, pre-enforcement, challenge an
EPA lien or unilateral administrative order on due process grounds.' 9 In Reardon v.
United States, the First Circuit concluded a CERCLA lien unconstitutionally
deprived the owner of property without due process. 110 In Reardon, the EPA
any institutional control employed at the facility in connection with a response action;" and (3) take
"reasonable steps to ... stop any continuing release; ... prevent any threatened future release; and prevent
or limit any... exposure to any previously released hazardous substance." Id. at 118.
105 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-462-69 (1996); see Cruden, supra note 11, at 376
(discussing Act); see also In re DuFrayne, 194 B.R. 354, 362-63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating secured
lenders are statutorily excluded from "owner or operator" language of CERCLA).
106 Cruden, supra note 11, at 376; see United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (1 1th
Cir. 1990) (holding secured creditor may incur CERCLA liability "without being an operator, by
participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the
corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes"); Paul Stanton Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space,
Brownfields, and Justice, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 589, 600 (1998) (stating lenders are liable as PRPs if
they influenced management decisions of property owners).
0742 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2000).
No federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under section
1332 of title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law
which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating
to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected
under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of
this title, in any action except one of the following [exceptions] ....
Id. (emphasis added). Section 113(h) enumerates five exceptions, all actions filed by the government or by a
private citizen seeking to enforce CERCLA or to recover costs for its enforcement. Id.
108 Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc); see Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating ban serves other goals like avoiding
piecemeal litigation and avoiding inconsistent results).
109 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of... property without due
process of law.").
"0947 F.2d 1509, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc); see Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (agreeing with "plain text interpretation that... § 113(h) does not bar pre-enforcement review of
facial constitutional challenges to CERCLA"); Farmers Against Irresponsible Remediation v. EPA, 165 F.
Supp. 2d 253, 262 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) ("In Reardon, the First Circuit held that a due process challenge to
several CERCLA statutory provisions did not fall within the section 9613(h) jurisdictional prohibition.").
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removed hazardous substances from the plaintiffs' property. It then filed a notice of
lien on the property for the amount it had spent cleaning up the land. The owners
sued to have the notice of lien removed, arguing that the EPA's filing of the notice
without a hearing was a deprivation of property without due process. They also
made two statutory claims."' The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and dismissed their suit. 112 It concluded that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the statutory claims, and that, even though it had jurisdiction to
hear the constitutional claim, filing the notice of lien was not a taking of a
significant enough property interest to trigger the protection of the due process
clause. On appeal, a panel of the First Circuit affirmed.'" 3 The case was re-argued
en banc, and the full First Circuit reversed, concluding that CERCLA's lien
provisions violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 14
In reaching this conclusion, the court applied a standard two-part analysis for
deciding a property-based due process challenge: (1) does the statute authorize the
taking of a "significant" property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment, and
(2) if a significant property interest is involved, what process is due?".5 In
examining the first prong, the court concluded that, under Connecticut v. Doehr," 
6
a Supreme Court case decided after oral argument in the en banc rehearing, a
CERCLA lien "amounts to deprivation of a 'significant property interest' within the
meaning of the due process clause."' 1 7 The court then focused on whether the
process the CERCLA lien provided was adequate. It concluded that:
[T]he lien statute completely lacks procedural safeguards; that the
government has no recognized pre-existing interest in the property;
that the statute has no "exigent circumstances" requirement (nor
have any such circumstances been shown in this case) . . .As
applied in this case, the statute thus deprives persons of property
with far less process than the State of Connecticut provided in the
attachment law found unconstitutional in Doehr. Thus, we are
constrained to find that the CERCLA lien provisions, by not
providing, at the very least, notice and a pre-deprivation hearing to
Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 559-61 (D. Mass. 1990) (arguing they were not liable
because they were "innocent landowners," and even if they were liable, lien was over-extensive because it
affected parcels not involved in cleanup), aff'd, 922 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1990) (withdrawn), rev'd en banc, 947
F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991).
1121d. at 559.
113 Reardon v. United States, 922 F.2d 28, 28-32 (1st Cir. 1990) (withdrawn), rev'd en banc, 947 F.2d
1509 (1st Cir. 1991).
114 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1510 (en banc) ("[T]he district court correctly decided that it did not have
jurisdiction to consider the Reardons's statutory claims, but we find that the CERCLA lien provisions do
violate the fifth amendment due process clause.").
..1d. at 1517 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
116 501 U.S. 1 (199 1) (discussing due process attack on state statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of
real estate which did not require preattachment hearing or notice or some showing of exigent circumstances).
1
7 Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1518.
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a property owner who claims that the property to be encumbered is
not "subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action," violate
the fifth amendment due process clause. 
1 8
The court also concluded that any "additional procedural requirements [were]
likely to place significant, but not overwhelming, administrative burdens on the
government."" 9 In other words, the government had no significant interest to
balance against the Reardon 's property interest and the procedural defects of
CERCLA.
Little fallout has resulted from Reardon. No other reported case has used it to
allow a constitutional challenge to the EPA's ability to file a pre-enforcement lien
under CERCLA. On the other hand, a court recently extended Reardon's logic to a
constitutional challenge to an EPA unilateral administrative order.' 20 In General
Electric Co. v. EPA, General Electric (GE) sought a declaratory judgment that the
EPA's power under CERCLA to order cleanup of contaminated properties violated
an owner's due process rights.' 21 The EPA moved to dismiss. It argued that
CERCLA, section 113(h), bars judicial review of EPA actions until the EPA seeks
to enforce its remedies in court. The district court, concluding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over General Electric's suit, granted the EPA's motion.
The D.C. Circuit reversed. 22 The court, relying on Reardon, narrowly
construed section 113(h). Its "any challenges" language only barred challenges to
EPA removal or remedial actions under section 104 or EPA orders under section
106(a). 123 Aside from Reardon, the court relied primarily on cases dealing with
veterans' affairs and immigration. In fact, the court dismissed a series of post-
Reardon environmental cases that had dismissed constitutional challenges to section
.
8 Id. at 1523-24.
"Id. at 1523.
120 Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing claim by potentially responsible
party challenging CERCLA's unilateral administrative order regime as facially violative of due process).
121 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Whitman, 257 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd, Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d
188 (D.C. Cir. 2004). GE argued:
[T]he [section 106] regime thus imposes a classic and unconstitutional Hobson's
choice: Either do nothing and risk severe punishment without meaningful recourse or
comply and wait indefinitely before having any opportunity to be heard on the legality
and rationality of the underlying order.
Id. at 15.
122 Gen. Elec. Co., 360 F.3d at 189 ("[T]he plain text of § 113(h) does not bar GE's facial constitutional
challenge to CERCLA and accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the district court."); see
Berriochoa Lopez v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 22, 28 (D.D.C. 2004) ("The D.C. Circuit
emphasized... that the apparently broad 'any challenges' language was not 'without qualification.");
Michael B. Gerrard, Courts Enforce Consent Orders, Question Unilateral Orders, N.Y. L.J., May 28, 2004,
at 3, col. 1 (noting importance of D.C. Circuit's decision on unilateral orders).
123 Gen. Elec. Co., 360 F.3d at 191 ("Congress... enumerated only two types of challenges over which
federal courts lack jurisdiction--challenges to § 104 actions and § 106(a) orders. Although § 113 (h) refers
broadly to 'any challenges,' the plain language does not bar 'any challenge,' without qualification."); see
Hoosier Envtl. Council, Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. WL 2011470, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May
21, 2004) (discussing construction of section 113(h) by D.C. Circuit).
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113(h):
To the extent that other courts have concluded a constitutional
claim is barred by § 113(h), they have done so in cases involving
challenges to specific EPA orders and actions, see Oil Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int7 Union v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47
F.3d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1995); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091,
1094 (7th Cir. 1990); Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly,
889 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1989), or they have not focused on
the plain text of § 113(h), see Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly,
927 F.2d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 1991); Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1094; South
Macomb Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 681 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (E.D.
Mich. 1988).124
Yet, the EPA had, in fact, ordered GE to clean up specific, environmentally
challenged sites. Thus, GE's suit, in effect, challenged specific EPA orders. The
court seemed to ignore that fact.
Assuming neither the full D.C. Circuit nor the Supreme Court reverses the
panel opinion, it is hard to imagine how any PRP faced with a cleanup order would
fail to ask a federal court in the District of Columbia to enjoin further enforcement
of the cleanup order pending resolution of General Electric.
Taken together, Reardon and General Electric provide a debtor-in-possession
with the possibility of avoiding a pre-petition EPA lien or enjoining enforcement
actions against property of the estate.
4. Settlement
One of CERCLA's professed purposes is to encourage prompt settlements
because that, in turn, encourages prompt cleanups. Congress enacted section 122
("Settlements") as part of SARA. Section 122 codified many of the settlement
procedures the EPA had followed for the prior six years. 25 The EPA has always
preferred to settle disputes. 126 However, the most important terms of the
124 Gen. Elec. Co., 360 F.3d at 193.
125 Lee, supra note 12, at 312 (acknowledging section 122 was codification of prior EPA settlement
practices and noting importance of consulting section 122 before settling CERCLA case); see Georgoulis v.
Allied Prod. Corp., 796 F. Supp. 986, 989 (N.D. Tex. 1991) ("The language of CERCLA clearly indicates
that EPA's allocation of the responsibilities for cleanup to PRP's, under §§ 104 and 122, is meant to 'expedite
effective remedial actions and minimize litigation."); Alfred R. Light, Superfunds Second Master: The
Uneasy Fit of Private Cost Recovery Within CERCLA, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97, 121 (1993) (stating
CERCLA section 122(e)(6) "requires a private party to obtain EPA's permission before proceeding with a
remedial action at a site where EPA has an RI/FS under way.").
126 See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (1985) (discussing EPA's original
policy); see also United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 639, 653 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(noting EPA's stated policy favoring early settlement with municipalities); Profl Rental, Inc. v. Shelby Ins.
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settlement-the type of remedial action the EPA will pursue, the proportion of the
harm allocated to the settling party-are often non-negotiable. 127 Moreover, section
122(f) prescribes strict guidelines for issuing a covenant not to sue. For example, it
must be in the public interest. If later information about risks makes a settlement no
longer in the public interest, the covenant is no longer valid. The covenant must
also provide an exception for unknown conditions that are later discovered.
Liability remains even after a "settlement," rendering negotiation a waste of time
and money. A party might prefer to wait for the EPA to issue an administrative
order before discharging its obligation.
Often, several PRPs contribute small amounts of contamination to a site. Each
PRP's individual contribution is barely significant. The costs of settling with each
might outweigh the benefits. Section 122(g) provides special procedures in these
cases ("de minimis settlements.").128
Like administrative orders, EPA settlements often include stipulated penalties
for failure to comply. The EPA often insists that penalties continue to accrue while
any dispute is pending. 129 If the EPA wins, the settling party loses the accrued
amount.
CERCLA's settlement provisions do not deviate from its singular focus: to
encourage prompt cleanups paid for by those responsible for the mess. PRPs may
be no better off settling with the EPA than they would be litigating-but they are
likely to be no worse off. Given the judicial propensity to construe broadly almost
every element of CERCLA, a PRP is not likely to find a loophole. A settlement
may be the most cost-effective option. Moreover, settlement gives the EPA a pre-
petition claim should the settling PRP subsequently petition for bankruptcy relief.
Co., 599 N.E.2d 423, 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("Generally, the EPA's first move is to issue administrative
notices to one or more PRPs to initiate the settlement process.").
127 Lee, supra note 12, at 312 ("While it is EPA's policy to settle, increasingly it has demonstrated
inflexibility both with regard to the remedial action selected and with the terms of the settlement
agreement."); see United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1086 (1 st Cir. 1994) (stating
"the ultimate measure of accountability in an environmental case is the extent of the overall recovery, not the
amount of money paid by any individual defendant"); United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 872
(D.N.J. 1990) ("It is not our function to determine whether a better settlement could be calculated, but only
whether the existing settlement is reasonable.").
128 A de minimis settlement is appropriate either when (A) the amount and toxicity of the substance a party
contributed is minimal compared to other substances at the site, or (B) a current owner did not conduct or
permit generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of the hazardous substance, and did not
contribute to the release of a hazardous substance through any act or omission. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (2000).
129 Lee, supra note 12, at 317 ("One of the policy's more disturbing features to settlers is EPA's insistence
that stipulated penalties continue to accrue during any delay cause by a dispute under the consent decree.");
see 42 U.S.C. § 9622(1) (outlining civil penalties for potentially responsible parties). See generally United
States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining different settlement
agreements and contingency plan of government when United States enters into settlement agreement).
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B. RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)130 establishes a
statutory scheme for monitoring solid wastes and their disposal, with a focus on the
disposal of hazardous wastes. This "cradle to grave" regulatory scheme is intended
to prevent the types of untreated releases that CERCLA is designed to clean up.
RCRA stringently regulates the disposal of solid waste. It creates a complex
monitoring and reporting program that seeks to create accountability for solid waste
through every step of its life cycle. RCRA also imposes strict standards for the
handling and treatment of solid waste. These standards are even stricter if a solid
waste qualifies as "hazardous" under the Act.'
3 1
RCRA prohibits treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes without a
permit. The first step of RCRA monitoring, therefore, requires a permit to operate a
treatment, storage and disposal facility (TSD). 32 A facility can only obtain a permit
if it can show it has adequate financing and insurance to comply with RCRA's
requirements.133 The government may require permit applicants to take corrective
action to remediate past releases of hazardous waste on the facility site. 134 Once a
permit is in place, RCRA imposes standards the TSD must meet to ensure
compliance, e.g., specific record keeping, use of a manifest system to list wastes,
operating criteria, site requirements, contingency planning, financial responsibility,
and other permit requirements.135 The EPA can assess civil, criminal and
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (2000); see, e.g., Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994)
(noting "cradle to grave" regulatory scheme of RCRA); Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 444 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (discussing comprehensive safeguards and waste management procedures of RCRA).
131 The term hazardous waste means:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may: (A) cause, or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious, irreversible,
or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard
to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2000).
132 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(7) (2000); see S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control v. Commerce & Indus. Ins.
Co., 372 F.3d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 2004) (addressing RCRA requirement of permit to treat, store, or dispose of
certain enumerated "hazardous wastes"); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1416 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (acknowledging statutory requirements of RCRA which require permit be obtained before certain
wastes are treated, stored, or disposed).
133 John A. Barrett, Jr., The U.S. Approach to Resolving the Tension between Environmental Liability and
Bankruptcy Debt Forgiveness, in ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 141 (John A.
Barret, ed., 1998); see 42 U.S.C. § 6924(t) (indicating requirement of financial responsibility); see also S.C.
Dept. of Health and Envtl. Control, 372 F.3d at 251 n.4 (explaining meaning of "guarantor" under financial
responsibility provision of RCRA).
1 4 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(1); see Miriam Feder, The Permit Application Process Under RCRA-A Lament,
18 ENVTL. L. 671, 677-78 (1988) (explaining necessity of correcting deficiencies during lengthy application
process). But cf Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating primary goal of RCRA is to
prevent creation of hazardous waste, not promote its cleanup).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a); see Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of
the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10254 n.160 (1991) (providing overview
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administrative penalties for failure to comply with RCRA's requirements. 136
Congress intended regulations under RCRA to occur through a partnership
between the federal and state government with the state assuming primary
responsibility for enforcement. 37 The EPA may authorize a state program to
substitute for the federal program, but the state requirements must be at least as
stringent as the federal requirements. 38 Once a state program is in place, it is
federally enforceable. 1
39
RCRA, like CERCLA, authorizes citizen suits to enforce its provisions.
Citizens who are substantially endangered by a hazardous release may bring suit for
an injunction to stop certain activities, or to require a party to take certain steps. A
citizen suit is not available to recover the costs of a cleanup.140 Moreover, a citizen
suit is not available if CERCLA proceedings have been undertaken, or if the EPA is
engaged in a RCRA enforcement action. 1
41
Citizens may file three types of suits under RCRA: (1) actions against any
person in violation of a RCRA permit or regulation; (2) actions against any person
to compel abatement of imminent or substantial endangerment; and (3) actions
against the EPA to compel duties under RCRA.1
42
C. Other Federal & State Laws
Parties can incur environmental liability under other statutory schemes in
addition to CERCLA and RCRA. These include the Federal Water Pollution
of operating requirements within section 3004 of RCRA); see also Empire Energy Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v.
Roche, 362 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (identifying operating criteria within RCRA).
136 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000). These fines run between $25,000 a day for civil fines, and $50,000 per day
for criminal penalties. If anyone is subjected to bodily injury or death, a fine of $250,000 for individuals or
$1,000,000 for entities may be assessed. Id.
137 Hill, supra note 135,'at n.348-53; see Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp. 2d 988, 996 (W.D. Mo.
1998) (defining responsibilities of state and federal governments with respect to hazardous waste
regulation); Orange Env't., Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1020 (S.D.N.Y 1994) (explaining
integration of federal and state hazardous waste programs).
" 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2000); see also Hill, supra note 135, at n.353 (citing section 6929).
'"942 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3); see also Hill, supra note 135, at n.351 (citing section 6928(a)(3)).
'40 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000); see Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc. 516 U.S. 479, 486 (1996) ("[Section] 6972(a)
was designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the risk of future 'imminent' harms,
not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup efforts."); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170
F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding RCRA is not directed at providing compensation for past cleanup
costs).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C); see Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486 (stating citizen suit may not be brought
against defendant if EPA or state has commenced and is pursuing some other enforcement action); Waste,
Inc. Cost Recovery Group v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (disallowing
plaintiff's citizen suit on grounds that no citizen suit can proceed if either the state or EPA is involved in
separate enforcement action).
4 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a); see Orange Envt., Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1020 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (noting RCRA provides for three different types of citizen suits); cf Susan Verdicchio, Environmental
Restoration Orders, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 171, 197 (1985) (categorizing most federal environmental
laws providing civil enforcement provisions into three types---civil actions by EPA, civil actions by citizens,
and civil emergency provisions).
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Control Act (widely known as the Clean Water Act), 143 the Clean Air Act,'44 and a
host of state regulatory schemes. Common law theories of contract and tort can
also create liability.
145
CERCLA and state environmental laws have played the biggest role in
bankruptcy proceedings. Often the line between federal and state will blur because
a state will seek reimbursement for cleanup costs under CERCLA.
II. ABANDONMENT
A. Abandonment Power
Section 554(a) authorizes the trustee to "abandon any property of the estate that
is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate."'146 The abandonment power was obvious, innocuous, and non-controversial
until a chapter 7 trustee tried to abandon a toxic waste site.
In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection,47 the Supreme Court had to decide whether a trustee could abandon
contaminated property. That was in 1986. To this day, there is no consensus on
what Midlantic actually held and when a trustee can abandon contaminated
property.
B. Midlantic
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) operated two waste oil facilities, one in
New Jersey, the other in New York. The New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (NJDEP) discovered that Quanta's New Jersey site had accepted 400,000
gallons of waste oil containing PCB, a toxic carcinogen. During cleanup
negotiations, Quanta petitioned for chapter 11. The case was later converted into
chapter 7. Subsequently, NJDEP discovered 70,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated
waste oil at Quanta's New York site. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's
motion to abandon because the property was burdensome and of inconsequential
value to the estate. The court did so "over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by the hazardous
waste."' 148 Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the guard service and fire-
suppression system that protected the New York property. The State of New York
143 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
145 Breach of contract liability can arise pursuant to violation of an environmentally related contract. Tort
law encompasses environmental liability under both nuisance and trespass actions. For a further discussion
of these causes of action, see Barrett, supra note 133, at 136-38.
146 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000); see Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.),
856 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1988) (recognizing right of abandonment); see also Midlantic Natl Bank v. N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) (holding trustee could not exercise abandonment power in
violation of state and federal laws).
1 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
141 Midlantic Nat 7 Bank, 474 U.S. at 498-99.
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spent approximately $2.5 million to decontaminate the facility.
On appeal, the district court affirmed. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that
Congress, in enacting section 554, did not intend to pre-empt pre-Code, judge-made
restrictions on a trustee's ability to abandon property. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Third Circuit.
According to the Court, pre-Code, courts had limited the abandonment power
"to protect legitimate state or federal interests." At the time Congress enacted
section 554, "there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment
power."1 49 When Congress enacted section 554, it "presumably included the
established corollary that a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in
violation of certain state and federal laws."'15 0 The Court pointed to 28 U.S.C. §
959(b) to bolster its conclusion that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to
pre-empt all state laws: "Section 959(b) commands the trustee to 'manage and
operate property in his possession.., according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the State."51
The Court continued:
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately
protect the public's health and safety. Accordingly, without
reaching the question whether certain state laws imposing
conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to interfere with
the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold that a trustee may not
abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 1
52
The Court qualified its holding in footnote nine:
This exception ... is a narrow one. It does not encompass a
speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may
stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be
fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect
the public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm.153
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stevens and OConnor, criticized the majority's assertion that Congress, in enacting
section 554, had codified well-recognized restrictions on the trustee's abandonment
power. The majority's reasoning "rests on a misreading of three pre-Code cases, the
149 Id. at 501.
o
50 Id.
' Id. at 505.
152 Id. at 506-07.
113 Id. at 507 n.9.
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elevation of that misreading into a Well-recognized' exception to the abandonment
power, and the unsupported assertion that Congress must have meant to codify the
exception (or something like it).'
154
The dissent also pointed out that section 959(b) did not directly apply to chapter
7 cases. 155 The majority did not explain how it applied indirectly. Even if it had, the
dissent disagreed that section 959(b) precluded abandonment: "[A] trustee's filing of
a petition to abandon, as opposed to continued operation of a site pending a decision
to abandon, does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'opera[tion]' under thatprovision." '156
By any standard, the Court's "holding" is elastic. It has spawned several
different interpretations of when a trustee can abandon contaminated property.
C. No Abandonment in Contravention of State Statutes Reasonably Designed To
Protect Public Health or Safety from Identified Hazards
Some courts have interpreted Midlantic to prohibit abandonment if
abandonment would violate a state statute or regulation designed to protect public
health or safety. 57 This interpretation means a trustee cannot abandon contaminated
property unless and until it complies with state or federal environmental regulations.
If the trustee cannot abandon, and 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) requires the trustee to comply
with all valid state laws, the trustee must remediate the property (with estate assets)
or let someone else do it as an administrative expense.
58
For example, in Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v.
154 Id. at 507-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see cases cited infra note 156.
156 Midlantic Nat7 Bank, 474 U.S. at 514 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Ala. Surface Mining Comm'n v.
N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.), 963 F.2d 1449, 1460 (11th Cir. 1992) (canvassing cases
establishing section 959(b) does not apply when business operations have ceased and trustee is merely
liquidating); In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 157 B.R. 442, 448 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (citing decisions
which declined to apply section 959(b) to chapter 7 cases); In re Corona Plastics, Inc., 99 B.R. 231, 236
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (stating section 959(b) only applies when trustee is "conducting business").
157 See, e.g., Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir.
1987) (discussing how trustee cannot abandon property when it would result in economic health hazard); In
re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 780-81 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (denying abandonment because contaminated waste
oil threatened public safety and abandonment would contravene state law); In re Peerless Plating, 70 BR.
943, 946 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) ("[A] trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state
statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards." (quoting Midlantic Nat7 Bank, 474 U.S. at 507)); cf In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. 283, 286-90
(Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (deciding debtor's landlord not entitled to administrative expense for cleanup costs to
remove printer because printer did not pose imminent identifiable harm and landlord did not specify any
particular law which abandonment would violate); In re Mahoney-Troast Constr. Co., 189 B.R. 57, 59
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (holding landlord's cleanup costs were not entitled to administrative expense priority
because landlord could not specify any state law requiring remediation of the contaminated property).
"8 For instance, in In re Microfab, 105 B.R. 161, 166 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989), the court stated: "[i]n effect,
Midlantic requires a Chapter 7 trustee to bring contaminated estate property into compliance with state
environmental laws on an administrative basis." Nevertheless, the court denied the state's request to order the
trustee to remediate the site because expenditure of all estate assets would not make any appreciable
difference. Id.
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Conroy,159 the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER)
discovered drums of hazardous waste left on a site that was operated by printing
company Frank Conroy. 160 The DER considered the site a danger to public health
and safety. 161 The Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act prohibited the
"release" of a hazardous substance. 162 "Abandonment of a hazardous substance
constitutes a 'elease'.... Therefore, Pennsylvania law effectively prohibited the
Conroys from abandoning the hazardous wastes located on the printing facility
premises."'163 As in many abandonment cases, the issue in Conroy was not really
about the trustee's right to abandon, but who would pay for the cleanup costs. For
many courts, the starting premise is the trustee's inability to abandon. As noted, if
the trustee cannot abandon, then he or she must clean up or otherwise remediate the
property. If a third party cleans up and thereby performs the trustee's duties, that
third party is entitled to recover its costs as an administrative expense. And so
Conroy held. 164
D. Narrower Readings of Midlantic
Most courts do not give Midlantic such a broad reading.
1. No Imminent & Identifiable Harm
Several courts have interpreted Midlantic to prohibit abandonment only when
the property poses an imminent and identifiable harm to the public health or
safety. 65 Absent an imminent and identifiable harm, abandonment is permitted
even though it contravenes (violates) a state law or regulation reasonably designed
to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. Some courts permit
abandonment if there is no imminent, identifiable harm and there are no
unencumbered estate assets to remediate the problem.166 Others do not decide what
1'924 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1994).
161d. at 569.
161 id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 570; see Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 124 (6th
Cir. 1987) (awarding state of Tennessee compensation for cleanup as administrative expense); In re Stevens,
68 B.R. 774, 783-84 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (awarding DEP compensation as administrative expense).
165 See infra note 180; see also In re Doyle Lumber, Inc., 137 B.R. 197, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992)
(finding lumber treatment plant contaminated by chromium and arsenic not imminent threat when plant
complied with state waste management regulations and only ground for objection was plant had not been
closed down); cf In re S. Int'l Co., 165 B.R. 815, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) (stating "very fact" it took six
weeks for spill to occur proves threat was not imminent); In re Sheffield Oil Co., 162 B.R. 339, 341 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 1993) (holding trustee not required to spend estate funds to assess underground petroleum tanks
when no evidence of contamination existed); In re H.F. Radandt, Inc., 160 B.R. 323, 328 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1993) (stating DNR inaction was proof problem was not imminent).
166 See, e.g., Borden v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir.
1988) (permitting abandonment when estate had no unencumbered assets and site did not pose serious public
health or safety risk); In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) (permitting
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Midlantic means or requires because the situation involves an imminent,
identifiable harm and abandonment would violate a state statute reasonably
designed to protect the public health and safety. 1
67
2. No Unencumbered Estate Assets
Some courts allow abandonment even in the face of an identified, imminent
threat to public health and safety if the estate has no unencumbered assets. In re
Oklahoma Refining Co.,168 is a case in point. The environmental problems were
"the culmination of 65 years of crude oil refining at this site."'169 The estate owed
secured claims in excess of $40 million. The estate's assets had a value of about $4
million. There were no unencumbered assets. The trustee sought to abandon the
property. Once cleaned up, the land would have been worth about $100,000. The
cleanup cost was estimated to be $2.5 million. The court noted:
The trustee thus finds himself confronted with a formidable
dilemma. On one hand he has no funds which are not cash
collateral but, under a strict reading of Midlantic, he could be
required to comply with State laws and regulations which is
impossible because of section 363(c)(2) .... We do not believe the
Supreme Court intended to place bankruptcy trustees in such a
predicament but rather Midlantic requires the bankruptcy court, in
determining whether to permit abandonment, [to] take state
environmental laws and regulations into consideration ....
... For all purposes the difference between denying abandonment
and allowing abandonment produces the same result. Under either
scenario there are no funds available to finance the closure plan or
post-closure monitoring ....
To require strict compliance with State environmental laws under
the facts of this case could create a bankruptcy case in perpetuity
and fetter the estate to a situation without resolve. This trustee, with
the consent of the secured creditors, has done what is reasonable
under the circumstances. To pre-empt the administration of this
abandonment because estate did not possess enough unencumbered assets to fund cleanup; there was no
evidence of imminent harm or danger to public); see also In re FXC, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1989) (following Smith-Douglass).
167 See, e.g., Guterl Special Steel Corp. v. Econ. Dev. Admin. (In re Guterl Special Steel Corp.), 198 B.R.
128, 133 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (noting neither view would permit abandonment on facts of case).
168 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
6
9 Id. at 563.
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estate would derogate the spirit and purpose of the bankruptcy laws
requiring prompt and effectual administration within a limited time
period .... The Oklahoma laws regarding environmental
protection are not unreasonable but juxtaposed to the Bankruptcy
Code cannot be reconciled to satisfy the strict compliance sought
by the State agencies.
1 70
The court granted the trustee's motion to abandon.
3. Abandonment Subject to Conditions
Some courts understand Midlantic to focus on the trustee's act of abandonment.
Will the act of abandonment itself pose an imminent, identifiable harm? Under that
strand of thinking, if abandonment will not aggravate the threat to public health and
safety, the court will allow it. 17 1 Other courts permit abandonment if the trustee
takes steps to protect the public's health and safety. 172 Yet others condition
abandonment on setting aside estate funds for the cleanup,' 73 or ordering that the
proceeds from a sale of the decontaminated property go first to satisfy the EPA's
cleanup costs. 
174
4. Multi-Part Tests for Abandonment
Other courts have developed multi-part tests based on Midlantic's language and
the cases construing it. In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v.
Atkinson (In re St. Lawrence Corp.), 175 a district court considered a DEP appeal
from a bankruptcy court judgment allowing abandonment. The debtor leased real
property. In the course of preparing estate property for sale, the bankruptcy trustee
had ordered a site assessment. It indicated no serious environmental issues and no
imminent danger to the public. A prospective purchaser sought to modify its
170 Id. at 565-66.
71 See, e.g., N.J. Dep' of Envtl. Prot. v. N. Am. Prods. Acquisition Corp., 137 B.R. 8, 12 (D.N.J. 1992)
(stating abandonment permitted if it "will not aggravate the threat of harm to the health and safety of the
public or create some additional harm"); In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 B.R. at 998 (noting exception in
Midlantic requires trustee to take adequate precaution to ensure public is not threatened by imminent danger
resulting from abandonment); In re Okla. Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986)
(emphasizing "abandonment will not aggravate the existing situation.").
17 In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d at 16 ("According to the teachings of Midlantic, where the public
health or safety is threatened with imminent and identifiable harm, abandonment of the contaminated
property must be conditioned on the performance of procedures that will adequately protect public health
and safety."). See generally Leavell v. Kames, 143 B.R. 212, 218 (S.D. 111. 1990) (comparing broad and
narrow approaches to placing conditions on abandonment).
7 In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding trustee can abandon pesticide
production site despite immediate threat to public from buried pesticides if he sets aside $250,000 for
cleanup).
174 In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (giving EPA's cleanup costs
administrative expense priority).
11 248 B.R. 734, 736 (D.N.J. 2000).
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purchase offer, claiming possible contamination. The sale of the property fell
through. The trustee ultimately moved to abandon it. The DEP objected to the
abandonment arguing the site assessment was not satisfactory under the New Jersey
Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) and the DEP did not have enough information
about the rest of the site.
In agreeing that the trustee could abandon the property, the court articulated a
four-part test. 176 First, the court had to determine if the property posed a risk of
imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety. 177 According to the
court, the only evidence of contamination was a letter from an environmental
consultant stating there was possible contamination on site. 178 The DEP did not
prove there was an imminent risk of any kind. 179 Moreover, even direct proof of
contamination would not, in itself, mean the site posed an imminent and identifiable
hazard. 80
The court could have stopped here. Instead, it went on to consider whether
abandonment of the property would violate a state statute or regulation, and if so,
whether that statute was reasonably designed to protect the public health and safety
from imminent and identifiable harm.' 8' The court assumed, arguendo, that the site
violated ISRA. Was ISRA reasonably designed to protect the public health and
safety from imminent and identifiable harm? 182 The court concluded ISRA's
purposes were much broader. Moreover, the DEP did not allege violations of
particular sections of ISRA specifically intended to protect the public health and
safety. Therefore, that prong was not satisfied. Because no exception to
abandonment was present, the trustee could abandon the property. The court did
176/d. at 739-40.
177 Id. at 739. Most courts who narrowly construe the exception to abandonment power permit
abandonment because no imminent and identifiable harm to public health or safety exists. See In re Smith-
Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d at 16 (permitting abandonment when estate had no unencumbered assets and
property did not pose serious public health or safety risk); In re Sheffield Oil Co., 162 B.R. 339, 341 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 1993) (finding trustee was not required to spend estate funds to assess underground petroleum
tanks absent evidence of contamination); In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1989) (allowing abandonment because estate did not possess enough unencumbered assets to fund
cleanup and no evidence existed of imminent harm or danger to public).
178 In re St. Lawrence Corp., 248 B.R. at 742.
"
79 1d. at 743.
"0 See N.M. Envtl. Dep't v. Foulston (In re L.F. Jennings Oil Co.), 4 F.3d 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating despite oil contamination, there was no immediate threat to public health or safety because site was
not listed on state contaminated site list and state's expert could not state positively if threat existed); In re
Anthony Ferrante & Sons, Inc., 119 B.R. 45, 50 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting despite bacterial contamination of
public water supply system, no imminent danger existed because public knew of danger and had means to
protect itself); In re Brio Ref., Inc., 86 B.R. 487, 489 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding trustee could abandon site
listed on NPL because no evidence showed imminent identifiable risk to public); In re Purco, Inc., 76 B.R.
523, 533 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (finding no evidence drums of cut-back asphalt and thinners were hazardous, and
even if they were, no evidence they presented risk of harm or threat to public safety).
181 In re St. Lawrence Corp., 248 B.R. at 743-44.
182 Id. at 743. Other cases hold state law only needs to be considered. See In re Okla. Ref. Co., 63 B.R.
562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (taking position Supreme Court did not intend to put bankruptcy trustees
in position where they could not comply with state law: rather Court simply wanted bankruptcy courts to
consider state environmental laws when ruling on abandonment).
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not reach the question of whether the statute was so onerous as to interfere with
administration of the bankruptcy case.183
Another court posited a five-part inquiry for abandonment: "(1) the imminence
of danger to the public health and safety; (2) the extent of probable harm; (3) the
amount and type of hazardous waste; (4) the cost to bring the property into
compliance with environmental laws; and (5) the amount and type of funds
available for cleanup." 184 Yet another court stated a presumption against
abandonment subject to three exceptions:
1. the environmental law in question is so onerous as to interfere with the
bankruptcy adjudication itself; or
2. the environmental law in question is not reasonably designed to protect the
public health or safety from identified hazards; or
3. the violation caused by abandonment would be merely speculative or
indeterminate. 
185
Finding that none of the exceptions applied, the court denied the trustee's
motion to abandon. The trustee's compliance with CERCLA might deplete the
estate, preclude any distribution to the unsecureds, and vastl3T reduce the payout to
other administrative claimants, but exhaustion of estate assets would not make
compliance with the law so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy
adjudication. After all, "the normal course of affairs in any chapter 7 is to deplete
the estate by liquidating it and distributing it to creditors as required by law." 186 The
harm was immediate and of the kind Congress intended to prevent by enacting
CERCLA. Finally, the presence of the hazardous materials was not a speculative or
indeterminate violation but an ongoing violation of CERCLA. Because the estate
was the owner of the site and could not abandon it, it was liable under CERCLA as
an owner. "[T]he trustee had a duty to expend all the unencumbered assets of the
183 In re St. Lawrence Corp., 248 BR. at 744. Some courts have concluded that an environmental statute is
so onerous as to interfere with bankruptcy administration when the estate has no assets to effect a cleanup.
See, e.g., Borden v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1988)
(noting abandonment permitted in part because there were no unencumbered assets to fund cleanup); In re
Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 BR. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) (finding abandonment permitted in
part because estate did not possess enough unencumbered assets to fund cleanup).
'84 In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
185 In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); see, e.g., Anthony Ferrante &
Sons, Inc., 119 BR. at 49 (asserting trustee may not abandon property in contravention of state law unless
one of three exceptions applies); In re Microfab, Inc., 105 BR. 161, 169 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (discussing
full compliance with state environmental laws is subject to these three limits).
186 In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. at 947; see New York v. Quanta Res. Corp. (In re Quanta Res.
Corp.), 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) (describing purpose of chapter 7 proceeding); Richard B. Paige, In
re Quanta Resources Corp.: Bankruptcy Policy v. Environmental Interests; A Polluted Judicial Theory, 59
AM. BANKR. L. J. 357, 357 (1985) (asserting chapter 7 liquidation's paramount purpose is expeditious
reduction of estate assets into cash to distribute to creditors).
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estate in remedying the situation, as required by Midlantic."187
E. Significance ofAbandonment Issue: Much Ado About Nothing?
As noted, when all is said and done, the debate about the trustee's abandonment
power is really a debate about who will pay for the cleanup. If the trustee cannot
abandon a site, it remains part of the estate. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) requires those who
operate and manage property to comply with all valid state laws. 188 Courts have
understood this to require the trustee to remediate the property or accord
administrative expense priority to the party who fulfills the trustee's obligations. 1
89
But, as one court remarked, abandonment of the property does not mean the
estate is "abandoning" or shedding its environmental liability. 90 The estate is a
person under CERCLA. 19 1 The estate owns the debtor's pre-petition assets. All
persons who currently own or operate property containing hazardous substances are
PRPs. 192 All persons who are former owners of property during the time of a
disposal are also PRPs. 193 Therefore, the estate is a PRP and it remains liable as
187 In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. at 948-49.
188 Section 959(b) of the United States Code provides:
[e]xcept as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager
appointed in any case pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in
possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee,
receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in
which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof
would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2000); see In re Quanta Res. Corp., 739 F.2d at 919 (asserting section 959(b) embodies
Congress's implicit goal of preserving state regulatory laws); Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Me. Dept. of Envtl.
Prot., 128 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (deciding section 959(b) evidences Congress'intent that debtors in
possession comply with state environmental laws).
189 See In re Guterl Special Steel Corp., 198 B.R. 128, 135 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding cleanup costs
were administrative expense because trustee must comply with section 959(b) and cleanup preserved estate);
In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 781-82 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (deciding cleanup costs are administrative expense
because trustee may not abandon hazardous waste and section 959(b) requires trustee to comply with
environmental laws); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (asserting
estate cannot escape liability by abandoning, hence EPA is entitled to administrative expense priority for its
cleanup).
190 See In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. at 284-85 (stating "[s]ubsequent abandonment or transfer of
drums does not transfer estate's liability"); see also In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 781 (holding cleanup of
hazardous waste remains responsibility of estate even if property is abandoned).
191 See In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 779 (stating "the debtor, and hence the debtor's estate, is a person as
defined under CERCLA") (quoting In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. at 284); see also 42 U.S.C. §
9601(21) (2000) (defining "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.").
192 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2000); see also Kathryn R. Heidt, Product Liability, Mass Torts and
Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: Suggestions for Reform, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 117, 139
(1995) ("Environmental law presently requires the current owner or operator, or the debtor to clean up the
property."); Kathryn R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay In Environmental Bankruptcies, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69,
110 (1993) ("The obligation to cleanup is a new obligation that arises every day because the current owner
or operator of the property is liable for cleanup.").
193 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2); see also In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1145 (7th Cir.
1992) (describing language of section 107(a)(2)); John P. Berkery, Comment, The Dischargeability of
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such even if the trustee abandons property. As one court explained:
Mere abandonment by the trustee is not the ultimate goal sought by
the trustee. The ultimate goal is to escape the estate's obligation to
the E.P.A. under CERCLA. Abandonment is viewed as a means to
this end ....
If the drums were abandoned, they would cease to be the property
of the estate and the estate's interest therein would revert to the
debtor. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the estate's
liability for the environmental damage caused by the drums would
also be transferred to the debtor. Although the drums are the source
of the estate's liability under CERCLA, that liability cannot simply
be transferred with the drums ....
[O]nce the drums became property of the estate, the estate became
potentially liable under CERCLA. This liability is based on the
estate's relationship to the drums, but is independent of the drums
themselves. Subsequent abandonment or transfer of the drums does
not transfer the estate's liability.'
194
A bankruptcy estate is a separate judicial entity. Therefore, it is a person under
CERCLA. A bankruptcy estate owns all property the debtor owned as of the
commencement of its case.1 95 As an owner of a contaminated site, the estate is a
PRP under CERCLA in its own right. Therefore, isn't the abandonment debate
much ado about nothing? Even if an estate can abandon toxic property, doesn't it
remain liable under CERCLA as a PRP?
The answer depends on the legal significance of the abandonment of property.
If title to abandoned property "revests ... retroactively to the date of the
commencement of the case," 196 the estate is deemed never to have owned the
property. If the estate never owned the property, the estate cannot be a PRP in its
own right. According to the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Romadka,1 97 "the
abandonment relates back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy,
CERCLA Cleanup Costs Incurred After Bankruptcy, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 417, 420-21 (1992) (discussing
potential liability of PRPs).
194 In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. at 284-85.
195 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000) (stating "estate is comprised of... all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"); see also Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Moffett (In re
Moffett), 356 F.3d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting section 541(a)(1)'s broad scope reflects Congress's desire
to facilitate a debtor's financial rehabilitation); In re Commodore Bus. Machines, Inc., 180 B.R. 72, 82
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing difference between legal and equitable interests in property for purposes
of section 541).
196 In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
'9' 145 U.S. 29 (1892).
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and the title stands as if no assignment had been made."198 Sessions held that title
revests retroactively into the debtor upon abandonment. It establishes that if
property is abandoned, the estate would not be an owner for purposes of CERCLA.
The estate would not be a current owner, and would not be a former owner, because
legally, it is treated as if it never owned the property at all. Therefore, the estate
would not incur independent liability under CERCLA if abandonment were
permitted.
Few courts consider the legal significance of abandonment in their analysis. Is
that because it is so obvious that it does not bear repeating? One thinks not. If it
were a given, we would not have cases like T.P. Long Chemical in which the court
concluded that abandonment of the property would not eliminate the estate's
liability under CERCLA.1 99
Assuming the Supreme Court's pronouncement in 1892 remains valid today, the
issue of abandonment is, in fact, much ado about a lot. If a debtor, as of the
commencement of its case, has an ownership interest in the toxic site, the estate
becomes an owner. As an owner, the estate incurs its own separate CERCLA
liability. This means the EPA or other environmental claim holder has two claims:
one against the (pre-petition) debtor and another against the estate. The claim
against the estate may qualify as an administrative expense because it only arises
post-petition and it is an actual, necessary expense of preserving the estate. If the
estate is permitted to abandon the property, and abandonment retroactively revests
the property in the debtor, the EPA or other environmental claim holder has one
claim-against the debtor-and it is a pre-petition, nonpriority, typically unsecured
claim entitled to pennies on the dollar on a lucky day.
With the exception of the two opinions noted above,2°° courts have not
discussed an estate's CERCLA liability. No one has considered whether an estate
can assert the innocent owner defense.
III. TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Introduction
Ironically, many trees have died in the name of determining whether a
governmental unit [hereinafter "government" or "State"] holds a claim in a debtor's
bankruptcy and if so, the nature of that right to payment-is it a pre-petition claim,
and hence dischargeable, or a post-petition right to payment entitled to
administrative expense priority, or both? It is very easy to get confused in and by
this case law. We do our best to shed a little light onto this dark comer of the law.
198 Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added). The Peerless court cited to In re Tarpley, 4 B.R. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1980), for the proposition that abandonment retroactively revests title in the debtor as of the
commencement of the case. In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 BR. at 948. The Tarpley court, in turn, cited to
Sessions. In re Tarpley, 4 B.R. at 146.
199 In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. at 284-85.
200 See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. at 948; In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 BR. at 284.
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We begin with the Supreme Court's pronouncements (or lack thereof) on the
issue.
B. Ohio v. Kovacs
The question presented in Ohio v. Kovacs20 1 was easy. The Court left all the
hard questions unanswered.
1. What Kovacs Decided
Mr. Kovacs was the CEO and stockholder of Chem-Dyne Corporation which,
along with other companies, operated an industrial and hazardous waste disposal
site in Ohio.2 °2 The State of Ohio sued him and the companies "for polluting public
waters, maintaining a nuisance, and causing fish kills. ' 20 3 The parties settled the
lawsuit. Mr. Kovacs signed a stipulation that enjoined all the parties from further
pollution, prohibited them from bringing additional wastes to the site, and required
them to remove the wastes. The stipulation further ordered a $75,000 compensatory
payment for injury to wildlife. 204 The defendants did not comply with their
obligations. The State of Ohio had a receiver appointed. The receiver was to take
possession of all property and assets of all the defendants and clean up the site. Mr.
Kovacs petitioned for bankruptcy relief after the receiver took possession but before
the receiver had completed the tasks assigned.
The State wanted to attach Mr. Kovacs'post-petition income to help pay for the
cleanup. It filed a motion in state court to discover his income and assets. The
bankruptcy court, pursuant to Mr. Kovacs' request, stayed those proceedings. 20 5 The
State then asked the bankruptcy court to declare that "Kovacs' obligation under the
stipulation and judgment order to clean up the Chem-Dyne site was not
dischargeable in bankruptcy because it was not a 'debt.'
20 6
The State argued that "debt" is defined as liability on a claim. "Claim" is
limited to rights to payment or rights to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. 207 According to the
State, Kovacs' cleanup obligation was not a claim because: (1) Kovacs' default
201 469 U.S. 274 (1985)
22d. at 276.
203 Id.
204 id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 277.
211 1 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000). At the time, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)defined "claim." Today, section 101(5)
controls. The statute states: "'claim' means-(A) right to payment... ; or (B) right to an equitable remedy
for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment." See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 278-79
("Congress desired a broad definition of a 'claim" that could include statutory remedies that required clean
up of waste sites); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990)
("A claim exists only when the pre-bankruptcy relationship between the debtor and third party contained all
the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation under the relevant substantive non-bankruptcy
law.").
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breached a statute, not a contract; and (2) breach of his statutory obligation did not
give rise to a right to payment.
The Court gave short shrift to the first argument. The definition of "claim" does
not limit a debtor's breach of performance to contractual arrangements. A debtor
can fail to perform, i.e., "breach," a statutory obligation just as it can breach a
contract obligation. Among other things, the State had ordered Mr. Kovacs to pay
$75,000 for injury to wildlife. The order to pay $75,000 was to remedy Mr.
Kovacs' failure to perform his statutory duties. The State freely admitted that
Kovacs' failure to pay the $75,000 gave rise to a dischargeable debt; thus, there was
no reason to treat the clean up order to remedy the statutory violation any
differently.
20 8
Moreover, Kovacs' breach gave rise to a right to payment even though it was
not stated as a monetary obligation. The only performance sought from Kovacs was
"the payment of money: "
20 9
The injunction surely obliged Kovacs to clean up the site. But when he failed
to do so, rather than prosecute Kovacs under the environmental laws or bring civil
or criminal contempt proceedings, the State secured the appointment of a receiver,
who was ordered to take possession of all of Kovacs' nonexempt assets as well as
the assets of the corporate defendants and to comply with the injunction entered
against Kovacs. As wise as this course may have been, it dispossessed Kovacs,
removed authority over the site, and divested him of assets that might have been
used by him to clean up the property. Furthermore, when the bankruptcy trustee
sought to recover Kovacs' assets from the receiver, the latter sought an injunction
against such action. Although Kovacs had been ordered to "cooperate" with the
receiver, he was disabled by the receivership from personally taking charge of and
carrying out the removal of wastes from the property. What the receiver wanted
from Kovacs after bankruptcy was the money to defray the cleanup costs. At oral
argument in this Court, the State's counsel conceded that after the receiver was
appointed, the only performance sought from Kovacs was the payment of money.
Had Kovacs furnished the necessary funds, either before or after bankruptcy, there
seems little doubt that the receiver and the State would have been satisfied. On the
facts before it, and with the receiver in control of the site, we cannot fault the Court
of Appeals for concluding that the cleanup order had been converted into an
obligation to pay money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy.
210
What does Kovacs teach us then? The State was seeking the payment of money
208 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279; see In re Norwesco Dev. Corp., 68 B.R. 123, 129 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986)
(quoting Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279); In re S. Indus. Banking Corp., 46 B.R. 306, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1985) (quoting same).
209 Kovacs, 469 U.S at 283; In re Indus. Salvage, 196 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. S.D. 111. 1996) (citing Kovacs,
469 U.S. at 283); In re Norwesco Dev. Corp., 68 B.R. at 128 (pointing to Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283).
210 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 282-83; see Baker, supra note 4, at 389 (discussing once "Kovacs' cleanup duty
had been reduced to a monetary obligation, the monetary payment obligation sought from Kovacs was a
liability on a claim that was dischargeable under the bankruptcy statute."); Kristy Kutz, Who Is Going To
Pay: CERCLA v. Bankruptcy, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 573, 586 (1992) (explaining Kovacs could only comply
with cleanup order by paying state because appointment of receivor dispossessed Kovacs of property).
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from Mr. Kovacs even though it was not expressed as such. The right to payment
was a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes even though it sprang from violating a
statutory duty. Because the right to payment arose pre-petition, it was
dischargeable in Mr. Kovacs'bankruptcy case.21
2. What Kovacs Did NOT Decide
The Court was careful to spell out what it had not decided. It had not held that
Kovacs' discharge would shield him from prosecution for violation of Ohio's
environmental laws. The discharge did not shield him from criminal contempt for
not performing his obligations under the pre-bankruptcy injunction. The discharge
did not discharge fines for violations of environmental laws because section
523(a)(7) excepted such fines from discharge. The Court went on:
Third, we do not address what the legal consequences would
have been had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been
appointed and a trustee had been designated with the usual duties of
a bankruptcy trustee. Fourth, we do not hold that the injunction
against further toxic wastes on the premises or against any conduct
that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the State's waters
is dischargeable in bankruptcy; we here address ... only the
affirmative duty to clean up the site and the duty to pay money to
that end. Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is Kovacs or another in the event the
receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or
a vendee from the receiver or the bankruptcy trustee - must comply
with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that
person or firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions.2 2
The Supreme Court left it to the lower courts to decide what would happen if a
state ordered a debtor to clean up, no receiver was appointed, and the debtor
211 As Thomas Salerno has noted, the Court could have reached the same result through a straightforward
application of the definition of "claim." Salerno & Miller, supra note 22, at § 26.64. The State of Ohio had a
right to a mandatory injunction and a right to payment of its cleanup costs. Therefore, it had a right to
payment in the alternative for breach of its equitable remedy. See River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld
(In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1994) (defining rights to payment which arise before debtor's
bankruptcy as pre-petition debts and thus dischargeable); In re Jimmo, 204 B.R. 655, 660 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1997) (discussing how Kovacs determined "where the state essentially seeks from a debtor monetary
payments to clean up a hazardous waste disposal site for the debtor's prepetition violation of state
environmental laws, such payments are a liability on a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and (12) and
dischargeable under the bankruptcy statute.").
212 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284-85; see In re Alongi, 272 B.R. 148, 156 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001) (citing Kovacs,
469 U.S. at 284); see also Francis E. Goodwyn, Claims Estimation and the Use of the "Cleanup Trust" in
Environmental Bankruptcy Cases, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 769, 776-77 (2001) (discussing Kovacs and
how Court limited its holding to facts of particular case, rather than disposing of potential issues).
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petitioned for bankruptcy relief. It suggested that injunctions to abate further
pollution would not be claims and whoever possessed a toxic site would have to
comply with state environmental laws.
C. Injunctive Relief
1. Injunctive Relief: Does It Give Rise to a Claim?
The Court in Kovacs did not "hold that the injunction against further toxic
wastes on the premises or against any conduct that will contribute to the pollution of
the site or the State's waters is dischargeable in bankruptcy., 213 So, does injunctive
relief regarding environmental matters give rise to a dischargeable claim? The
courts disagree, just as they do on most issues involving environmental and
bankruptcy law. The Sixth Circuit has held that injunctive relief gives rise to a
dischargeable claim unless the debtor can comply without expending any funds.2 14
The Third Circuit would likely hold that an injunction to prevent future harm does
not give rise to a dischargeable claim, even if compliance with the injunction
required the debtor to expend funds.215
The Second Circuit's answer depends on the nature of the injunctive relief
sought. If the entity obtaining injunctive relief has an alternative right to payment, a
claim exists. 216 This reasoning tracks the Bankruptcy Code's definition of claim.
213 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285; see Goodwyn, supra note 212, at 776-77 (discussing how in Kovacs, Court
limited its holding and did not fully address issue of whether injunction against further pollution is
dischargeable); Kevin J. Saville, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When Does a Claim Arise,
76 MrNN. L. REv. 327, 337 n.56 (1991) (writing Court in Kovacs "hinted that a debtor may not always be
discharged from the responsibility to clean up environmental contamination").
214 In re Daniels, 130 B.R. 239, 240-41 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1991) (discussing "an injunction requiring a
person to reclaim a mining site was a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy to the extent that the party would
have to expend money"); see United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
"to the extent that fulfilling his obligation to reclaim the site would force the defendant to spend money, the
obligation was a liability on a claim as defined by the Bankruptcy Code"); see also Kennedy v. Medicap
Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S. v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147, 150-51 (6th
Cir. 1988)).
215 Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 278 (3d Cir. 1984).
We believe that the inquiry is more properly focused in the nature of the injuries
which the challenged remedy is intended to redress-including whether plaintiff seeks
compensation for the past damages or prevention of future harm-in order to reach the
ultimate conclusion as to whether theses injuries are traditionally rectified by a money
judgment and its enforcement.
Id.; see Torwico Elec., Inc., v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. (In re Torwico Elec., Inc.), 8 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding state's concern regarding present and future leaking of hazardous wastes was correct in
forcing debtor to comply with applicable environmental laws by remedying existing hazards, rather than
right to payment); In re Norwesco Dev. Corp., 68 B.R. 123, 128 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (questioning
whether certain obligations imposed upon companies by state, such as providing water supply systems, are
actually equivalent to money judgments).
216 See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991)
(explaining EPA injunction under CERCLA gives rise to claim because CERCLA gives EPA alternative
right to payment); see also Downtown Athletic Club of N.Y.C. v. Kremer, No. M-47, 2000 WL 744126, at
*3 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating "order giving rise to injunctive relief is not a 'claim' if creditor has no
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Thus, injunctive relief the EPA obtains under CERCLA gives rise to a
dischargeable claim because CERCLA gives the EPA an alternative right to seek
reimbursement of cleanup costs expended.217 In contrast, injunctive relief the EPA
obtains under RCRA will never give rise to a claim because RCRA only authorizes
injunctive relief. It does not recognize an alternative right to payment.
The Second Circuit further distinguishes between injunctions that impose an
obligation as an alternative to a right to payment and cleanup orders that seek to
prevent future harm as well as to remedy past harms. The latter "dual objective"
injunction does not constitute a claim:
It is true that, if in lieu of such an order, EPA had undertaken
the removal itself and sued for the response costs, its action would
have both removed the accumulated waste and prevented continued
pollution. But it is only the first attribute of the order that can be
said to remedy a breach that gives rise to a right to payment. Since
there is no option to accept payment in lieu of continued pollution,
any order that to any extent ends or ameliorates continued pollution
is not an order for breach of an obligation that gives rise to a right
of payment ... 218
In the Second and Third Circuits, then, injunctive relief ordering the debtor to
stop further pollution or contamination will not give rise to a dischargeable claim.
Moreover, in the Second Circuit, no claim arises even when the injunctive relief
seeks redress of past harms so long as it also orders future contamination to cease.
At first blush, these case law niceties appear to give environmental agencies an
easy way to skirt the impact of bankruptcy. The question then becomes why the
case reporters are not filled with courts minutely examining the entrails of specific
orders for injunctive relief. One possible answer is that the strategy does not get the
environmental agency very far. The specter of open-ended liability post-
option to accept payment in lieu of enforcement of order" (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at
1008)); In re Mitchell, 249 B.R. 55, 59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("An equitable remedy, such as an
injunction will 'give rise to a right to payment,' and therefore be discharged, if payment of a monetary
obligation is an alternative to the equitable remedy" (quoting Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 282-83)).
21See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1008 (" []f EPA directs LTV to remove some wastes that are
not currently causing pollution, and if EPA could have itself incurred the costs of removing such wastes and
then sued LTV to recover the response costs, such an order is a 'claim' under the Code."); Stephen P. Ferrey,
Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund: A Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 36, 43 (1994) (discussing how government acquires right to seek imbursement from
PRPs for costs incurred and paid for cleanup); Saville, supra note 212, at 337 ("If the EPA eliminates
environmental contamination and then seeks reimbursement for its efforts, the EPA's rights clearly represent
a Yight to payment' that can be discharged in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code Section 101 (5)(A).").
In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1008; see Baker, supra note 4, at 396-97 (describing Second
Circuit's decision as one which would render most environmental injunctions as non-claims, because they
are not breaches of obligations, but orders to end pollution); Cahalane, supra note 92, at 273-74 (discussing
injunctions which order cleanup and abatement of ongoing waste as not embodying alternative right to
payment and therefore not constituting claim).
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confirmation will prevent many debtors from "getting to confirmation." Moreover,
the environmental agency wants the debtor to clean up or pay up. The latter creates
a claim-a right to payment. Furthermore, a claim is also created if the debtor's
choice is to "clean-up-or-in-the-alternative, pay-up."
2. Injunctive Relief: Does It Violate the Stay?
Surprisingly, the courts mostly agree in this area. An injunction is exempt from
the stay even if it orders a debtor to remediate a site and compliance with the order
will require the debtor to expend funds. 219  The primary issue is whether the
governmental unit is enforcing its police or regulatory powers to collect a money
judgment. Section 362(b)(4) excepts from the automatic stay the commencement or
continuation of actions or proceedings by governmental units to enforce police or
regulatory powers. Section 362(b)(5) reins in this exception by establishing that the
stay does apply (or the exception does not) if the governmental unit is seeking to
enforce a money judgment.
What does "enforcement of a money judgment" entail? The Code does not
define the phrase. In Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources, the Third Circuit inferred that Congress meant to
incorporate the commonly understood meaning of the term "money judgment., 220 A
"money judgment" involves "(1) an identification of the parties for and against
whom judgment is being entered, and (2) a definite and certain designation of the
amount which plaintiff is owed by defendant." 221 Enforcement of a money judgment
219 See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 278 (3d Cir. 1984); accord New
York v. Mirant N.Y., Inc., 300 B.R. 174, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (determining consent decree between
state and power plant was not subject to stay despite possible future expenditures); N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
& Energy v. Madison Indus., Inc. (In re Madison Indus., Inc.), 161 B.R. 363, 366 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993)
(finding N.J. DEPE injunction excepted from stay against chemical manufacturer); In re Laurinburg Oil Co.,
49 BR. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984) (holding stay did not protect debtor from state injunction to abate
violations of state water laws). But see Kathryn R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay in Environmental
Bankruptcies, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 90-91 (1993) (criticizing principle as perversion of Code). See
generally Janette Brimmer, Environmental Issues in Bankruptcy: An Overview, 3 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 159,
163-66 (1996) (providing overview of section 362 automatic stay provision and effect of Penn Terra
precedent on it).
220 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 274-75; see NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 328-30 (1981)
(presenting principle of inferring commonly understood meaning as definition of Code term); Mirant, 300
B.R. at 179-82 (adhering to Penn Terra interpretation of "money judgment."); Eaves v. Cape May, 239 F.3d
527, 532-33 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating "money judgment" is term of art with clear inference). But see Kovacs,
469 U.S. at 283 n. 11 (purporting to distinguish Penn Terra despite holding clean up order was dischargeable
in bankruptcy); Douglas P. Demoss, Note, The Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An
Examination of the Policy Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 165, 181-82 (1985) (arguing Penn Terra
holding broad and inappropriate).
221 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 275; see Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 125 B.R. 69, 71-72 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1991) (quoting Penn Terra and applying definition); Michael Bentley Guss, Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict
Between Federal Bankruptcy Laws and State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1263, 1292-94
(1985) (analyzing judicial development of injunction and equitable remedy). But see Associated Gen.
Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 250 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 2001) (characterizing continued reliance on
Penn Terra holding as puzzling).
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involves a proceeding in which the plaintiff tries to seize the defendant's assets to
satisfy the judgment.222
The Department of Environmental Resources (DER) order required the debtor,
the operator of coal surface mines, to rectify its violations of state environmental
laws. The debtor was required to backfill, remove water from pits, restore and
revegetate land.223 According to the Third Circuit, the DER brought its action in
equity. It did not seek payment or compensation, and, therefore, the proceeding
could not have resulted in "adjudication of liability for a sum certain, an essential
element of a money judgment. 2 24 Moreover, the government did not intend to
obtain a money judgment in fact. According to the court, an important factor in
identifying whether a proceeding is one to enforce a money judgment is "whether
the remedy would compensate for past wrongful acts resulting in injuries already
suffered, or protect against potential future harm. 225 It is not possible to liquidate
damages yet to be suffered or calculate such sums with the requisite certainty.226 If
the court were to hold that any order requiring the expenditure of money were a
money judgment, then the government police action exception would be narrowed
"into virtual nonexistence. ',227 The court observed that "almost everything costs
something. ' 228 Moreover, the court held that
Congress recognized that in some circumstances, bankruptcy policy must yield
to higher priorities. Indeed, if the policy of preservation of the estate is to be
invariably paramount, then one could not have exceptions to the rule. Since
Congress did provide for exceptions, however, we may assume that the goal of
222 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 275. But see Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283 n. Il (finding requested relief
indistinguishable from enforcement of money judgment). See generally Roger D. Colton et al., Seven-Cum-
Eleven: Rolling the Toxic Dice in the U.S. Supreme Court, 14 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 345,352-66 (1987)
(analyzing treatment of enforcement of money judgment under Penn Terra and Kovacs).
221 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 270; see Mirant, 300 B.R. at 174, 179-80 (finding automatic stay did not
apply to post-petition consent decree); In re Madison Indus. Inc., 161 B.R. at 364-67 (holding open fertilizer
pilc was danger to health, safety and welfare of public and not subject of stay); Friends of the Sakonnet, 125
B.R. at 70 (holding analysis also applied to injunction coupled with modified attached order to garnish
debtor's income).
224 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 275. But see Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 281 n.9 (affirming bankruptcy court's
finding that debt is dischargeable if debtor cannot perform without paying money). See generally Guss,
supra note 221, at 1292-97 (providing overall view of struggle to define term).
221 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 277; see Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (In re
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. Inc.), 805 F.2d 1175, 1187-88 (5th Cir. 1986) (compelling debtor to comply
with EPA laws despite injunction's action); Patterson v. Newspapers & Mail Deliverers' Union, 138 B.R.
149, 153-54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding contributions toward Administrator's Fund were not remedies
for past injury). See generally Jill Thompson Losch, Bankruptcy vs. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the
Titans, 52 LA. L. REV. 137, 153-56 (1991) (analyzing distinction between future and past injury).
226 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 277. But see Jeffrey S. Theuer, Aligning Environmental Policy and
Bankruptcy Protection: Who Pays for Environmental Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code?, 13 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 465, 494-96 (arguing in many situations, no functional distinction exists between past and
future harm). See generally Guss, supra note 221, at 1271-75 (articulating basics of chapter 7 liquidation).
227 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 277-78; see In re Commonwealth Oil Ref Co., 805 F.2d at 1186 (citing
Penn Terra); Mirant, 300 B.R. at 180 (quoting Penn Terra).
211 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 278; see In re Commonwealth Oil Ref Co., 805 F.2d at 1186 (citing Penn
Terra); In re Madison Indus., Inc., 161 B.R. at 367 (quoting Penn Terra).
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preserving the debtor's estate is not always the dominant goal. 229
The court emphasized that a remedy attempts to enforce a money judgment if it
seeks compensation for past damages. It is not, however, an attempt to enforce a
money judgment if it seeks to prevent future harm: 230
Here, the Commonwealth Court injunction was, neither in form nor
substance, the type of remedy traditionally associated with the conventional
money judgment. It was not intended to provide compensation for past injuries.
It was not reducible to a sum certain. No monies were sought by the
Commonwealth as a creditor or obligee. The Commonwealth was not seeking a
traditional form of damages in tort or contract, and the mere payment of money,
without more, even it if could be estimated, could not satisfy the
Commonwealth Court's direction to complete the backfilling, to update erosion
plans, to seal mine openings, to spread topsoil, and to implement plans for
erosion and sedimentation control. Rather, the Commonwealth Court's
injunction was meant to prevent future harm to, and to restore, the
environment.
231
The distinction between an equitable action to prevent future harm and one to
compensate for past damages is a slippery one. Moreover, one injunction may
possess both components. For example, an order to stop further contamination and
to remediate a site involves both. Will the stay apply to enjoin its enforcement?
Arguably, the case law analyzing whether an injunction gives rise to a claim would
also determine if the stay enjoins enforcement of the injunction.
D. When Does Environmental Liability Arise?
Assuming a claim-a right to payment--exists, the next critical question is
when does the claim arise? If it arises pre-petition, the claim holder is a creditor
and the debt is discharged 2 Debts that arise pre-confirmation against a chapter 11
229 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 278. See City of New York v. Quanta Res. Corp. (In re Quanta Res.
Corp.), 739 F.2d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1984) (articulating need to balance state and federal concerns when
considering abandonment); Guss, supra note 221, at 1296-99 (explaining why courts must balance state and
federal interests when deciding whether bankruptcy policy should yield); Joseph F. Lafleur, Hazardous
Waste Removal, State Court Injunctions, and the Bankruptcy Code: Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S.Ct. 705 (1985),
54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1101, 1108-10 (arguing Kovacs is flawed because Court failed to balance state and
federal concerns).
230 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 275; see In re Commonwealth Oil Ref Co., 805 F.2d at 1187-88 (finding
action to compel compliance with environmental laws is not attempt to enforce money judgment). But see
Losch, supra note 225, at 153-56 (arguing remedy in Penn Terra actually redressed past harm).
231 Penn Terra Ltd., 733 F.2d at 278.
232 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2000); see Buckmaster de Wolf, Note, Strange Things are Afoot at the Circle K:
Agency Action Against Leased Sites in Environmental Bankruptcy, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 145, 151-
52, 161-64 (1993) (analyzing claims arising pre-petition); Losch, supra note 225, at 171-72 (discussing
resulting discharge).
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debtor are discharged upon confirmation of the plan.233
The ability to discharge debt is the principal reason debtors seek bankruptcy
relief. CERCLA's primary goals are to preserve the right to collect and to actually
collect environmental debts. In this area, the irresistible force of environmental
aims meets the immovable object of bankruptcy goals.
In addition to the pull and tug of competing policies, two other factors are at
work here. First, courts are concerned with fairness. Those with rights to payment
are entitled to fair notice--due process-before their rights are taken away, i.e.,
discharged. Second, many courts are trying to heed the Supreme Court's directive
to harmonize, when possible, bankruptcy and environmental laws. Today, many
courts seem to agree. A claim exists when the debtor's conduct gives rise to the
claim and a relationship exists between the parties which indicates that the right to
payment, even for future response costs, was in the parties' contemplation.234 If the
conduct and the requisite relationship both exist pre-petition, the environmental
obligor holds a pre-petition, dischargeable claim.
The following briefly recounts the evolution of "claims jurisprudence"
regarding environmental obligations in bankruptcy.
1. Claim Exists When Right to Payment Exists
United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal235 illustrates one extreme. The court
held "a claim exists only when the pre-bankruptcy relationship between the debtor
and third party contained all the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation
under the relevant substantive non-bankruptcy law., 236 Under this view, a claim
does not exist until the claimant has an enforceable right to payment under
applicable non-bankruptcy law.237 In Union Scrap, the government brought an
233 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2000); see Hon. LeifM. Clark, Chapter 11-Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 167, 192 n. 152 (1996) (reciting three conditions necessary for confirmation to operate
as discharge). But see Shapiro v. Gherman (In re Gherman) 103 B.R. 326, 330 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989)
(denying discharge to debtor who attempted to defraud system).
234 In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397,407 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
True, EPA does not yet know the full extent of the hazardous waste removal costs that
it may one day incur and seek to impose upon LTV, and it does not yet even know the
location of all the sites at which such wastes may yet be found. But the location of these
sites, the determination of their coverage by CERCLA, and the incurring of response
costs by EPA are all steps that may fairly be viewed, in the regulatory context, as
rendering EPA's claim "contingent," rather than as placing it outside the Code's
definition of "claim."
Id.; see Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 280 (1991) (finding debtor's obligation to clean hazardous waste
disposal site gave rise to claim); Goodwyn, supra note 212, at 775-80 (2001) (analyzing what constitutes
claim under Bankruptcy Code).
235 123 BR. 831 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
236 Id. at 835.
237 Id.; see Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.) 744 F.2d 332, 337-38 (3d Cir.
1984) (illustrating Third Circuit's position third party defendant's claim, as well as its cause of action, arose
post-petition because creditors' suit began fourteen months after debtor's involuntary chapter 7 was
commenced). But see Grady v. A.H. Robins Co. 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating all courts outside
Third Circuit have declined to follow Frenville's limited definition of claim).
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action to recover response costs it had incurred to clean up a site the debtor had
used but did not own. The debtor sought to dismiss the action arguing its chapter
11 proceeding had discharged the government's CERCLA claim. The debtor's plan
preserved from discharge "allowed claims of all governmental units... arising out
of alleged violations by the Debtor of federal or state environmental statutes and
regulations in connection with the Debtor's operations at any of its facilities." '238 All
other claims not filed and not allowed or scheduled were discharged.239
The EPA had not filed a claim in the debtor's bankruptcy, and the debtor's plan
did not acknowledge its potential liabilities at the site concerned (Washington
Avenue site). Notably, the EPA did not know the debtor had any relationship to
that site.
The court analyzed the timing as to when a legal relationship existed between
the debtor and the EPA under CERCLA, the relevant substantive non-bankruptcy
law. A legal obligation under CERCLA involves four elements: "(1) there must be
a facility; (2) there must be a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
at the facility; (3) there must be a responsible person; ... and (4) the United States
must have incurred necessary costs in responding to the release at the facility. ' 40
Because the EPA had not incurred any response costs at the time the debtor's plan
was confirmed, the EPA did not have a claim in the debtor's bankruptcy
proceedings, i.e., the debtor did not have a legal obligation to the EPA under
CERCLA.24'
The debtor maintained the pre-petition release gave rise to a contingent claim.
The court disagreed. According to the court, a contingent claim requires a right to
payment that is triggered by the occurrence of a future event "within the actual or
presumed contemplation of the parties at the time the original relationship of the
238 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835. See generally Dale Ellen Azaria, When Is A Claim A Claim? Bankruptcy
Code Riddle, 62 TENN. L. REV. 205, 215 (1995) (noting issue before court was whether debtor's discharge in
bankruptcy barred EPA from asserting post-petition response cost claim for pre-petition pollution); Jason V.
Stitt, Note, The Dischargeability of Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: Resolution to Diametrically
Opposed Goals, 17 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 27, 36 (2003) (summarizing debtor's argument
alleging its CERCLA liabilities were discharged when reorganization plan was confirmed because release of
hazardous pollution occurred prior to plan confirmation).
239 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 833-34. See generally John C. Ryland, Note, When Policies Collide: The
Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 739, 763 (1994) (stating
debtor argued its CERCLA liabilities were discharged under its chapter 11 reorganization); Stitt, supra note
238, at 36 (stating although debtor's bankruptcy reorganization plan was confirmed in 1985, debtor
unsuccessfully argued its CERCLA liabilities were discharged when reorganization plan was confirmed).
240 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835; see, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,
1378-79 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating same); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
(stating same).
241 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 836. See generally Ryland, supra note 239, at 763-64 (summarizing EPA's
argument and court's eventual holding, and stating CERCLA liability did not arise until cleanup costs were
incurred, and these costs were not dischargeable because they were not incurred until after debtor's
bankruptcy); Stitt, supra note 238, at 37 (stating court attempted to balance goals of bankruptcy and
environmental law by providing claims only arise when EPA expends funds).
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parties was created. ''242 The debtor maintained that the EPA had actual or presumed
knowledge of the environmental hazards at the Washington Avenue site because the
EPA had negotiated with the debtor regarding hazards at other sites. According to
the court:
That the EPA can imagine hazards at [Debtor's] many facilities
does not give rise to a presumption of knowledge of the hazards at
the Washington Avenue site, especially when the debtor did not
operate that site and the EPA did not know the debtor was in any
way involved with that site ....
The court noted that adopting the debtor's position that release or threatened
release alone would establish a dischargeable claim would undermine CERCLA's
goals. Furthermore, the court held that the policies underlying CERCLA supported
preserving the debtor as a PRP:
First, Congress intended that the federal government be
immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective
response to the problems of national magnitude resulting from
hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the costs and responsibilities for remedying the
harmful conditions they created. 2 "
The court explained that adopting the debtor's position would require the
government to reverse the CERCLA scheme:
If the EPA is forced to expend its resources on preserving its rights
to eventual recovery against any [potentially responsible party] the
EPA will have less ability to pursue its primary mission of cleaning
the sites ... Congress has directed the courts to be especially wary
242 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 836 (quoting In re All Media Props., Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1980)); see, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating contingent claim must be within parties' contemplation at time of their original relationship); see
also Big Yank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (In re Water Valley Finishing, Inc.), 139 F.3d 325 (2d Cir.
1998) (citing standard set forth in In re Chateaugay).
243 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 836; see Patrick D. Shaw, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: Discharging CERCLA
Claims in Bankruptcy Without Notice, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 127, 137 (1992) (quoting Union Scrap "imagine"
language); see also Marion M. Walsh, The Dischargeability of Post-Confirmation CERCLA Liability in
Bankruptcy: In re Chateaugay and Beyond, 1 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 116 (1992) (paraphrasing Union Scrap
court's "imagine" language).
244 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 837 (quoting U.S. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112
(Bankr. D.C. Minn. 1982)); see Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1112 (summarizing CERCLA's
congressional legislative history); Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and Fairness of Superfund's Judicial
Review Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 273 (1995) (quoting Reilly's enumeration of
Congress's CERCLA goals).
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of interfering with CERCLA work.., in part because toxic waste
sites threaten the public health and must be eradicated quickly.
245
The Union Scrap definition of when a claim arises was too extreme. In a
subsequent opinion, the Minnesota District Court itself discarded the "response
costs" rule, focusing instead on when the party asserting the CERCLA claim had
notice of the claim.
246
Making "claim" and "cause of action" coterminous would also give CERCLA
plaintiffs enormous power to manipulate the situation. Because a right of
reimbursement does not exist under CERCLA until cleanup costs are incurred, a
party could postpone any cleanup until after the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy
relief. That would set the stage for administrative expense priority for the cleanup
costs.
2. Claim Exists When Conduct Giving Rise to Liability Occurs
At the other extreme, a claim arises when the conduct giving rise to the liability
occurs. If the debtor's conduct occurs pre-petition, the claim holder is a creditor and
its right to payment is discharged even if the claim holder does not know it has a
right to payment.247 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's opinion in In re
245 Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 838 (quoting In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir.
1988)); see In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d at 40 (discussing negative ramifications of EPA
expending its resources preserving its right to eventual recovery based on bankruptcies as opposed to
pursuing its primary mission). See generally Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986)
(stating Congress did not want to burden EPA with court proceedings that delayed its response to potential
environmental disasters).
246See Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) ("When
the debtor has not disclosed its potential [environmental] liabilities in long-since closed bankruptcy
proceedings, and the governmental agency has not had actual knowledge of the potential claim in sufficient
time to file a claim in those proceedings, the potential claim is not discharged."). See generally Kerry H.
Mithalal, Note, Balancing CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code: The Legitimacy of Discharging Contingent
Claims for Unincurred Response Costs in Chapter 11, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 241, 247 n.48 (1993)
(stating Union Scrap court shifted its attention from whether response costs had been incurred to whether
creditor knew of claim's existence prior to close of debtor's bankruptcy); Stanley M. Spracker & James D.
Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 85, 98 n.97
(1995) (stating Seventh Circuit did not follow Union Scrap test because rule hinged on whether response
costs had been incurred would frustrate both bankruptcy court's interest in having all claims before it and
CERCLA's goal of encouraging speedy cleanups).
247 See generally Gull Indus., Inc. v. John Mitchell Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386, 389 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1994) (holding although oil continued post-petition to passively leach into the soil, all environmental
damage was deemed to occur pre-petition because acts giving rise to alleged liability, namely petroleum
leaks, had occurred pre-petition); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005 (holding EPA's response costs
under CERCLA were pre-petition claims dischargeable in bankruptcy, regardless of when they were
incurred); In re Biocoastal Corp., 147 B.R. 258, 260 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding if debtor, as of
petition date, had no interest in property allegedly contaminated, claim must be pre-petition, and thus, pre-
petition purchaser of property held pre-petition, dischargeable claim); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc., 65
B.R. 521, 531 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1986) (holding state's reclamation claim for pre-petition damages was
pre-petition claim).
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Jensen24 8 best explains the rationale for this approach.24 9 In Jensen, the Jensens
owned a lumber company where they engaged in the process of dipping logs in
fungicide tanks. The state water quality board inspected the site and declared it a
hazardous waste problem. Shortly thereafter, the Jensens petitioned for chapter 7
relief. They did not list any claim for cleanup costs, and the state did not incur any
cleanup costs during the proceeding. The Jensens received their discharge in 1984.
The state came after them in 1989. They filed an adversary proceeding to
determine if the state's claim for cleanup costs had been discharged. °
The court framed the issue as when the state's claim arose for purposes of
bankruptcy. 251 It quoted the definition of claim and noted the legislative history
establishing Congress's intent to give "claim" an expansive reading. 2  It further
noted that neither Kovacs nor Midlantic discussed the issue.
2 53
It criticized the Frenville-Union Scrap approach for not recognizing the
possibility of a contingent right to payment even though the definition of "claim"
expressly includes contingent rights to payment.25 4 Applying the Union Scrap
248 127 B.R. 27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991).
249 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33 (holding threatened release of hazardous wasted occurred pre-petition,
making state government's claim dischargeable in debtor's bankruptcy). Given the facts, it is entirely
possible to reach the same result using the more modem tests of conduct plus relationship and reasonable
contemplation. See generally In re Ritter Ranch Dev., L.L.C., 255 B.R. 760, 765 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000)
(stating fair contemplation test is equivalent of "conduct plus pre-petition relationship" test); Lemelle v.
Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing Jensen's assertion that not only must
claimant and debtor have pre-petition relationship but claim must have been within parties' fair
contemplation at time of debtor's bankruptcy).
250 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 28; see Baker, supra note 4, at 400 n.151 (summarizing facts of Jensen);
Myron A. Eng, Summary, In Re Jensen: Determining When A Bankruptcy Claim Arises in the Context of
Environmental Liability, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 259, 260-61 (1993) (summarizing facts of Jensen).
251 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 29 (indicating further claim is one arising under CERCLA); Cal. Dep't of
Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1993) (naming lower court in Jensen as
one of many courts to consider when claim arises for bankruptcy environmental purposes); In re Chi.,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. 974 F.2d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing possibility CERCLA claim
arises at time of release or threatened release of hazardous substance in response to question of whether
parties had pre-petition claim).
252 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 29 (determining breadth of "claim" by examining intent of both House of
Representatives and Senate); In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (explaining
Congress's intent to interpret "claim" broadly so "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or
contingent will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case"). For a general discussion on how various
courts use the broad definition of "claim" in their holdings, see J. Ricky Arriola, The Life & Times of a
CERCLA Claim in Bankruptcy: An Examination of Hazardous Waste Liability in Bankruptcy Proceedings,
67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 55 (1993).
253 For discussion of Kovacs and Midlantic and why courts have not followed them, see In re Jensen, 127
B.R. at 29-30, and see also Eng, supra note 250, at 262-63, which explained that Jensen departed from
Kovacs or Midlantic because neither addressed when bankruptcy claims arise. See generally Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
254 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31 (stating section 101(4) applies not only to rights vested in judgments, but
also to contingent and unmatured rights to payment); see In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114, 118 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994) (referring to Jensen's disagreement with Frenville 's interpretation of "claim" because it neglects to
include contingent and unmatured rights); see also Philippe J. Kahn, Bankruptcy Versus Environmental
Protection: Discharging Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter 11, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2020 n.106
(1993) (indicating CERCLA claim becomes analogous in its elemental structure to tort claim in Union Scrap
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definition of claim to CERCLA obligations would always mean a claim would only
exist after a party had incurred response costs because a party seeking
reimbursement under CERCLA has no right to payment until that point. Moreover,
adoption of such a narrow definition would undermine the goal of the fresh start and
encourage creditor manipulation to the detriment of the debtor's other creditors. On
the Jensen facts, if the state only had a claim after it incurred cleanup costs, it could
pursue the Jensens while the Jensens' other pre-petition claimants could not.
The court also refused to hold that a claim arises only when a relationship exists
between the debtor and creditor. It reasoned that such a conclusion would favor the
state because it did not become involved until after the Jensens had filed
bankruptcy. 5
The court concluded a claim arises when the conduct giving rise to the liability
occurs. Such an approach implements bankruptcy's goal of providing debtors with
a fresh start while also discouraging manipulation of the bankruptcy process.2
56
The court found itself powerless to treat environmental obligations specially
despite the important policy objectives and social concerns underlying• ... 257
environmental laws. Congress, not the courts, fixes priorities.
3. Claim Exists When Conduct Plus Relationship Exists
Another approach holds a claim only arises when the conduct has occurred and
the debtor has a relationship with the claim holder. The bankruptcy court in Piper
Aircraft adopted this approach outside of an environmental context.258 Courts in the
because release or threatened release [of hazardous substances] establishes contingent right to payment in
much the same way as debtor's conduct does in Union Scrap).
255 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31 (explaining state's claims would not be discharged because state only
became involved post-petition in Jensens' individual bankruptcy); see Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R.
690, 699-700 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (illustrating relationship test can disadvantage creditor by
discharging creditor's claim if relationship existed pre-petition). For a further discussion of the consequences
of concluding a claim arises when a debtor-creditor relationship exists, see generally Saville, supra note 213,
at 353.
256 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31 ("The creditor, aware of a debtor's precarious financial situation, will delay
expenditures in anticipation of the debtor's bankruptcy, thereby preventing discharge of the. creditor's
claims."); see Eng, supra note 250, at 264 (suggesting if bankruptcy claim arose based on statutory right to
payment, bankruptcy process would be manipulated, contravening Bankruptcy Code's goal of providing
fresh start to debtors); see also I William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 10.09 MB (7th ed. 2003) (explaining manipulation of bankruptcy proceeding
is discouraged if claim is deemed to arise when actual or threatened release of hazardous waste occurs rather
than when plaintiff regulatory agency incurs cleanup costs).
257 In re Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33 (discussing generally power of Congress and limitations of courts); see
Gull Indus., Inc. v. John Mitchell, Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386, 390 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging Congress alone fixes priorities). See generally Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc.
(In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining how states can protect their
interests in enforcement of environmental laws without impinging on Congress's authority).
258 In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 625-28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), affd sub nom. Epstein v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 168
B.R. 434 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), affd, 58 F.3d 1573 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding pre-petition relationship test
finds claim when there is "contact, exposure, impact, or privity between the debtor's pre-petition conduct and
claimant."); In re Agway, Inc., 313 B.R. 31, 42 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004) (indicating Piper court used pre-
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environmental arena have modified the Piper Aircraft approach to meet due process
concerns.
4. Claim Exists When Conduct, Relationship & Fair Contemplation of Liability
Exist
Several courts, including the Ninth Circuit in In re Jensen,259 have adopted an
approach first posited by a Texas district court in In re National Gypsum.
260
According to the Seventh Circuit formulation:
when a potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor
to a known release of a hazardous substance which the potential
claimant knows will lead to CERCLA response costs, and when
this potential claimant has, in fact, conducted tests with regard to
this contamination problem, then this potential claimant has, at
least, a contingent CERCLA claim for purposes of Section 77.261
All courts adopting this approach stress that "it is not a question of which
statute should be accorded primacy over the other, but rather what interaction
between the two statutes serves most faithfully the policy objectives embodied in
the two separate enactments of Congress., 262 The Ninth Circuit in Jensen noted that
the Union Scrap-Frenville approach did not properly account for the Bankruptcy
Code's broad definition of claim and its critical role in implementing the
petition relationship test and fashioned it to apply to product liability claims for which debtor would be
directly liable); see Donald J. Quigley, Treating Latent Medical Tort Claims in Bankruptcy, 11 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 1, 18 (July/Aug. 2002) (explaining application of pre-petition relationship test to products liability
case requires two things: debtor, pre-petition, must introduce defective product into stream of commerce and
creditor, pre-confirmation, must have involvement with product which results in harm).
259 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993).
260 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (examining pre-petition conduct fairly within parties'contemplation at
time of debtor's bankruptcy to determine when claim arose); In re CD Realty Partners, 205 B.R. 651, 656
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (referring to what it believed was Gypsum's proper use of fair contemplation test).
Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 156 B.R. 113, 118 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) (referring to Gypsum's use of fair
contemplation test).
261 In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 786 (7th Cir. 1992); see 11 U.S.C. §
103(a)(8) (1976) (repealed 1978) (indicating "contingent debt" or "contingent contractual liability" exists for
bankruptcy purposes even if no CERCLA response costs have been incurred); Cal. Dep't of Health Servs. v.
Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating Seventh Circuit has held potential claimant
has contingent CERCLA claim for purposes of section 77 when it can tie debtor to act and has conducted
tests with regard to damage caused by debtor's act).
262 In re Nati Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 404 (explaining to best serve goals of CERCLA, court must
"recognize the circumstances particular to bankruptcy proceedings and provisions of the Code .... "); see
also In re Chic., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing how purposes
of environmental and bankruptcy laws create conflicting objectives that require reconciliation). For further
discussion on CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code and their interaction with each other, see generally Revere
Copper & Brass Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Revere Copper & Brass Inc.), 172 B.R. 192, 197 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Bankruptcy Code's policy of giving debtors a fresh start.263 The conduct test was
also flawed because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code suggested "that Congress
intended to discharge a creditor's rights before the creditor knew or should have
known that its rights existed. ''264 In addition, according to the court, "discharging
liability solely because a release of hazardous substances occurred pre-petition may
conflict with CERCLA's goal of cleaning up the environment quickly.
26 5
Moreover, a broad definition of relationship that fails to require some
interaction between the debtor and potential claimant suffers from the same
infirmities as the conduct test. The Ninth Circuit, following National Gypsum's
lead, adopted the "fair contemplation test." Future response costs and damages
based on pre-petition conduct are pre-petition claims and hence dischargeable only
if they are fairly in the contemplation of the parties.
266
The court in In re National Gypsum gave examples of when a right to future
response costs would be fairly contemplated: knowledge by the parties of a site for
which the debtor might be liable, listing on the National Priorities List, EPA
notification of liability, or an EPA investigation or clean up.267
The "fair contemplation" test balances a debtor's interests in bankruptcy relief
with the environmental agency's interest in knowing of the potential problem and
the ability to assert its rights.
Although the "fair contemplation" test seems to indicate when an environmental
obligation arises, it does not resolve all questions related to the treatment of
environmental obligations in bankruptcy. Currently, courts are struggling to
determine if an environmental claimant is entitled to administrative expense
priority.
Is it possible for one environmental claimant to have two different rights to
263 In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 928; see Reynolds Bros., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 647 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (Mass.
1995) (noting courts have widely criticized Union Scrap's "right to payment" approach as inconsistent with
broad statutory definition of "claim" and Bankruptcy Code goal of providing debtors with a "fresh start.");
see also Signature Combs, Inc. v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1038 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (holding
fair contemplation standard is only test that tries to accommodate bankruptcy's fresh start goal).
264 In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 (quoting Saville, supra note 213, at 349); see Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v.
Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (indicating CERCLA liability is not
discharged when debtor has not disclosed CERCLA liabilities and creditor has no actual knowledge of claim
with sufficient time to file claim in those proceedings); Deborah E. Parker, Environmental Claims in
Bankruptcy: It's a Question of Priorities, Comment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 221, 236 (1995) (explaining
creditor's knowledge of potential claim is important factor to consider in applying the debtor's conduct test).
265 In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 (quoting Saville, supra note 213, at 350); see In re Nat 7 Gypsum Co., 139
B.R. at 407-08 (criticizing Chateaugay for failing to give enough importance to CERCLA's objective of
environmental cleanup); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 836-37 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990) (rejecting Chateaugay because it undermines CERCLA's goals).
266 In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930; see Graham Stieglitz, Stuck in the Middle Again! How to Treat Straddle-
Year Income Taxes in a Corporate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 467, 488
(2001) (explaining why court developed narrower view of pre-petition relationship test). See generally
Spracker & Barnette, supra note 246, at 97 (discussing "fair contemplation test" generally and its
consequences on parties in bankruptcy proceedings).
267 See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 (discussing In re Nat7 Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 408). See Goodwyn,
supra note 212, at 782 n.79 (discussing fair contemplation indicators futher); see also Spracker & Barnette,
supra note 246, at 96.
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payment based on the same environmental problem? According to the case law,
yes. One environmental claimant can have both a pre-petition, dischargeable claim
and an administrative expense. For example, assume a contaminated site that
becomes property of a debtor's estate. The trustee cannot abandon the property.
The trustee must comply with all valid state laws including state environmental
laws. The estate would be liable for the clean up. The clean up costs, as an estate
liability, would be an administrative expense even though the environmental agency
would also have a pre-petition, dischargeable claim against the debtor.
5. Post-confirmation Liability
Assume a company successfully reorganizes. Its chapter 11 plan describes its
pre-petition environmental liability and that liability is discharged. The company is
still not necessarily home free. If the company, post-confirmation, still owns
contaminated property, it is an owner, and therefore, a PRP under CERCLA.268 It is
liable. As one court explained, bankruptcy affects claims based on damages for
past releases of hazardous substances. It does not affect claims for remediation of
present and future threats.269
If a company cannot abandon contaminated property during its reorganization,
its best hope is to negotiate a reasonable and feasible settlement with environmental
claimants. Otherwise, its reorganization would seem doomed. Needless to say,
dooming a company's reorganization does not clean up the property. It just kills the
company and thereby removes one potentially responsible party from the scene.
6. Post-petition Creation & Perfection of Superlien: Violation of the Automatic
Stay?
Some states permit the state to obtain a superlien to secure reimbursement of
cleanup costs. 27° Does post-petition creation and perfection of a superlien violatethe stay? The First Circuit concluded "no" within an uncooperative statutory
268 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000); see CMC Heartland Partners v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 92-C4449, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12228, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1994) (referring to potentially responsible parties, or,
PRP's); William B. Johnson, Annotation, Equitable Considerations in Allocating Response Costs to Owner
or Occupant of Previously Contaminated Facility in Action Pursuant To § 113 69 of Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(F)), 148 A.L.R.
FED. 203 at 6(a) (2002) (discussing current owner's situation when it succeeded to ownership of property as
result of predecessor's bankruptcy reorganization).
269 CMCHeartland Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *13-*14; see In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966
F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th. Cir. 1992) (paying for damage done does not immunize reorganized company from
responsibility for preventing future harm); Boston & Me. Corp. v. Chi. Pac. Corp., 785 F.2d 562, 565 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("Bankruptcy draws a line between the existing claims to a firm's assets and newly-arising
claims.").
270 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (2002); (stating debt constitutes lien on property); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (2003) (stating same). See generally Cahalane, supra note 92, at 285
(discussing constitutionality of superlien statutes).
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framework.27'
Section 362(b)(3) excepts from the stay "acts to perfect ... an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b)." This exception seems limited to the post-petition
perfection of pre-petition liens. For example, it excepts post-petition perfection of
liens that were in existence pre-petition. Statutory liens are often created and
perfected simultaneously. The First Circuit, like Procrustes, did a little sawing and
stretching to fit a post-petition superlien into the section 362(b)(3) exception.
The court's initial premise was the state had a pre-petition interest in the
property. According to the court, the term "interest" is broader than "lien., 272 The
debtor was liable to the state for past and future cleanup costs. The state had a
present right to record a lien on the property. That present right to record a lien on
the property gave it an interest in the property.273 Section 362(b)(3)'s language "any
act to perfect ... an interest in property" meant the stay did not enjoin perfection of
a lien. That language had to encompass statutory liens that were created and
perfected simultaneously. Otherwise, the statute would lead to an absurd result. A
single act creates and perfects an environmental lien. Read literally, section
362(b)(3) would both stay the act (creation of the lien) and not stay it (perfection of
the lien). The court "decline[d] to indulge in so schizophrenic a reading of the
Bankruptcy Code.,
274
Despite the First Circuit's strained reading, one suspects other courts will follow
its lead. As Justice OConnor observed in Kovacs, "a State may protect its interest
in the enforcement of its environmental laws by giving cleanup judgments the status
of statutory liens or secured claims. 2 75 When a state chooses to do so, presumably
271 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. Envtl. Prot. Agency (In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship), 262 F.3d 1, 9
(1st Cir. 2001); see In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 152, 160 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (concluding state can
record lien against property without violating automatic stay); Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental
Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-Backed Securitization, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 127, 151 n.96
(2002) ("[Clourts have held that the state's action in filing a superlien falls within an exception to the
automatic stay.").
272 In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P 'ship, 262 F.3d at 7. For cases supporting the court's use of plain meaning
statutory construction, see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2000) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522
U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997) ("It is well settled that where Congress includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.")); Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 67-68
(1 st Cir. 1994) (refusing to undertake extra-textual measures when law is clear and unambiguous).
273 In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship, 262 F.3d at 7; see In re Perona Bros., 186 B.R. 833, 839 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1995) (analyzing state's pre-petition interest in property in context of environmental superlien). For general
discussion of Massachusetts' superlien statute, see Acme Laundry Co. v. Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs, 575 N.E.2d
1086 (1990).
274 In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P Ship, 262 F.3d at 9. See generally Leonard P. Goldberger, Who's On First?
Retroactive Lien Priority Meets the Automatic Stay, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J., at 24-27 (Dec./Jan. 2002)
(analyzing court's treatment of simultaneous creation and perfection under section 362(b)(3)). For general
analysis of section 362(b)(3) post-petition perfection of interest in property, see 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY. T 362.05, at 4 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997).
275 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (OConnor, J., concurring); see Richard B. Paige, In Re
Quanta Resources Corp.: Bankruptcy Policy v. Environmental Interests; A Polluted Judicial Theory, 59 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 357, 380 (1985) ("States can [protect themselves] by enacting statutes classifying their claims,
2004]
ABI LA WREVIEW
courts will bend over backwards to give them effect.
E. Environmental Obligations as Administrative Expense?
1. Significance of Administrative Expense Issue
The tension between environmental and bankruptcy policies is most palpable
when an environmental claimant seeks administrative expense priority for its claim.
Generally, every unsecured claimant would like its right to payment to enjoy
administrative expense status. Holders of environmental claims are no different in
that regard, but environmental obligations are distinguishable because they are often
huge, sometimes in the millions of dollars. Granting administrative expense
priority to an environmental obligation in a chapter 1 1 effectively gives the holder
control of the case. Confirmation requires a plan to pay each administrative
expense in cash in full on the effective date of the plan unless the holder agrees to
less favorable treatment.276 If the administrative expense holder insists on cash on
the effective date of the plan, and the debtor does not have the requisite cash, the
court cannot confirm the plan. The chapter 1 1 is over. In most chapter 7 cases, a
large administrative expense will preclude any distribution to unsecured creditors.
It will also dwarf the distribution to other administrative expense holders.
Essentially, granting administrative expense priority to environmental obligations
can upset the bankruptcy game plan. It can undermine a debtor's opportunity to
reorganize, and it can redistribute most of the "wealth" to a single party contrary to
bankruptcy's "equality is equity" creed.
On the other hand, treating an environmental obligation as a lowly general, pre-
petition, unsecured claim means bankruptcy will discharge the claim for pennies on
the dollar, if that. Discharging the unpaid environmental liability subverts
CERCLA's goal of requiring those responsible for the contamination to clean it up.
And that can undermine CERCLA's other goal-prompt cleanup. As a policy
matter, creditors of the debtor benefited from the debtor's failure to comply with
environmental laws. The question therefore becomes shouldn't those creditors have
to stand in line behind the environmental claim?
The two policies conflict. Congress has sat silently on the sidelines, with a
blanket over its head. Once again, courts have had to make their own way. The
case law generally277 seems to accord the environmental obligation administrative
for amounts spent cleaning up hazardous waste sites belonging to a bankrupt's estate, as perfected security
interests or liens on the property itself."); Morris G. Shanker, A Bankruptcy Superfundfor Some Super
Creditors From Ohio to Midlantic and Beyond, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 185, 190 (discussing potential
implications of Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Ohio v. Kovacs).
It U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (2000); see In re Cheatham, 78 B.R. 104, 106-07 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987)
(discussing same); First State Bank v. Advisory Info. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. (In re Advisory Info. & Mgmt.
Sys., Inc.), 50 B.R. 627, 630 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (quoting In re Briggs Transp. Co., 47 B.R. 6, 8
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) ("Since § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires that all of the priority administrative expenses be
paid in full on the effective date of confirmation, such creditors could effectively veto any plan.")).277 The word "generally" is italicized because generalizations are dangerous in this area of the law.
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expense priority if the debtor owned the contaminated property as of the
commencement of the case. Courts do so on a variety of theories, ranging from the
timing of the cleanup, to 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which requires a trustee to comply
with all state laws, to a Reading v. Brown fairness exception, or some combination.
If the debtor did not own the property at the commencement of the case (for
example, if the debtor was a gas station-lessee), courts tend to characterize the
environmental obligation as a pre-petition claim.
2. Reading v. Brown: The Fairness Exception
The tension between bankruptcy law and other public policies is hardly new. In
Reading Co. v. Brown,278 an Act case, the I.J. Knight Realty Corporation petitioned
for an arrangement. A receiver was appointed and authorized to conduct the
debtor's business "which consisted principally of leasing the debtor's only
significant asset, an eight-story industrial structure. '2 79 A fire broke out, destroying
the building and adjacent property. The fire victims filed claims for administrative
expenses, based on the receiver's negligence. The claims exceeded $3.5 million and
the total assets of the debtor's estate.
The parties agreed that "the words 'preserving the estate' included the larger
objective, common to arrangements, of operating the debtor's business with a view
to rehabilitating it.",280 According to the trustee, the negligence claims were not
entitled to first priority-they were not actual and necessary costs of operating the
debtor's business. Furthermore, giving them first priority was "not necessary to
encourage third parties to deal with an insolvent business," because it would
"reduce the amount available for the general creditors," and it would "discourage
general creditors from accepting arrangements.,
28 1
According to a majority of the Court, the negligence claims were entitled to
administrative expense status as a matter of fairness:
[Flairness to all persons having claims against an insolvent...
... At the moment when an arrangement is sought, the debtor is
insolvent. Its existing creditors hope that by partial or complete
278 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
279 Id. at 473.
280 Id. at 475; see In re Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1984) ("It is well settled that expenses
incurred by the debtor-in-possession in attempting to rehabilitate the business during reorganization are
within the ambit of § 503."); In re N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 137 B.R. 568, 572 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(rehabilitation expenses incurred by possessing debtor during reorganization fall within expense of
"preserving the estate" of 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)).
281 Reading, 391 U.S. at 477. The Court's rejection of the trustee's arguments is further discussed in In re
Cont'l Airlines, 148 B.R. 207, 214 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) and In re Chi. Pac. Corp., 773 F.2d 909, 913-14
(7th Cir. 1985).
2004]
ABILA WREVIEW
postponement of their claims they will, through successful
rehabilitation, eventually recover from the debtor either in full or in
larger proportion than they would in immediate bankruptcy. Hence
the present petitioner did not merely suffer injury at the hands of an
insolvent business: it had an insolvent business thrust upon it by
operation of law. That business will, in any event, be unable to pay
its fire debts in full. But the question is whether the fire claimants
should be subordinated to, should share equally with, or should
collect ahead of those creditors for whose benefit the continued
operation of the business... was allowed.
... [T]he business [was] operating under a Chapter XI arrangement
for the benefit of creditors and with the hope of rehabilitation. That
benefit and that rehabilitation are worthy objectives. But it would
be inconsistent both with the principle of respondeat superior and
with the rule of fairness in bankruptcy to seek these objectives at
the cost of excluding tort creditors or the arrangement from its
assets, or totally subordinating the claims of those on whom the
arrangement is imposed to the claims of those for whose benefit it
is instituted.282
The Court held that the phrase "actual and necessary costs" includes the costs
ordinarily incident to operation of a business. Such costs are not limited to those
expenses "without which rehabilitation would be impossible.
2 83
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented. He believed the
Court's holding frustrated the underlying purposes of chapter 11, and gave an
unwarranted preference to claimants who were lucky enough to incur their injury
post-petition. The Chief Justice argued that tort claimants would "exhaust the estate
to the exclusion of the general creditors as well as of the wage claims and
government tax claims for which Congress has shown an unmistakable
preference." 284 Further, the dissent argued that it was not equitable to impose the
282 Reading, 391 U.S. at 478-79. For a general discussion of the exception created in Reading, and the
courts' treatment thereof, see Karen Cordry, Administrative Expenses, Criminal Law and the Code, 18 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 1, 8, 46 (Dec./Jan. 2000); William L. Medford, Post-petition Claims and Administrative
Expense Authority: Timing Alone Does Not Entitle You to Payment, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 24-25 (June
2002).
283 Reading, 391 U.S. at 483 (identifying what constitutes "actual and necessary costs."); see Joanne
Gelfand, The Treatment of Employment Discrimination Claims in Bankruptcy: Priority Status, Stay, Relief
Dischargeability, and Exemptions, 56 U. MIAMI. L. REv 601, 607-08 (2002) (discussing interpretation of
"actual and necessary costs" in Reading); Stephen D. Hurd, Re-reading Reading: "Fairness to All Persons"
in the context ofAdministrative Expense Priority for Postpetition Punitive Fines in Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L.
REv. 1459, 1468-71 (1998) (analyzing facts of Reading).
284 Reading, 391 U.S. at 486-87 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). For a further discussion of Warren's dissent,
see Hurd, supra note 283, at 1483-84; see also Susan R. DeSimone, Note, The Price of Doing Business:
Environmental Criminal Fines and the Administrative Expense Solution, 17 BANKR. DEV. J 489, 513-14
n. 123 (2001) (illustrating Justice Warren's interpretation of Bankruptcy Code).
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loss on the unsecured creditors because they had thrust the insolvent business upon
the tort claimants:
An economically distressed businessman seeks an arrangement for
his own and not for his creditors' benefit. Of course, the creditors
will benefit if the arrangement is successful, just as they would
have benefited if the businessman had been successful without
resorting to an arrangement. But a business in arrangement is no
more thrust upon the public than is any other business enterprise
which is conducted for the mutual prosperity of the owners, the
wage earners and the creditors. Realistically, the only difference is
that a business administered under Chapter XI has not been
prosperous. If the arrangement is successful, the owners, wage
earners and creditors will all benefit; if it is not, they will all be
injured. Thus, I would not distinguish in this case between
petitioner and the other general creditors, none of whom was
responsible for the catastrophe for which all of them must sustain
some loss. Instead, . . . I would adhere to the Act's basic theme of
equality of distribution.285
Chief Justice Warren concluded his dissent by stating that he saw no basis in
law or policy to make the unsecured creditors involuntary insurers.286
The Eleventh Circuit relied on Reading and 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) to accord
administrative expense status to punitive civil penalties the estate had incurred in
287operating. According to the court, "a policy of ensuring compliance by trustees
with state law is sufficient justification to place civil penalties assessed for post-
petition mining operations in the category of the "some cases" in which "costs
ordinarily incident to operation of a business.., are accorded administrative
285 Reading, 391 U.S. at 487-88 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation,
Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.
399, 424-25 (1986) (reiterating Justice Warren's opinion that this result upsets bankruptcy's pro rata
distribution policy); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91
COLUM. L. REV 717, 783-86 (quoting Justice Warren in his dissent in Reading).
286 Reading, 391 U.S. at 489 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See generally David W. Allard, Personal Liability
of Trustees and Debtors in Possession: Review of Varying Standards of Care in the United States, 106 CoM.
L.J. 415, 435 (2000) ("In the Reading case ... the court reasoned that ... tort claims would lie in favor of
pre-petition creditors against the trustee... if the trustee negligently failed to procure insurance."); James K.
McBain, Environmental Impediments to Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 68 IND. L.J. 233, 241-44 (1992)
(discussing Justice Warren's dissent in Reading).
287 See Ala. Surface Mining Conm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.), 963 F.2d 1449-59 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (holding civil penalties assessed post-petition against debtor as punishment for environmental
violations qualified as administrative expenses to extent incurred as consequences of ongoing business
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)); see also In re Lickman, 273 B.R. 691, 704 n.13 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002)
(examining court's holding in In re N.P. Mining Co.); Parker, supra note 264, at 275-79 (identifying 28
U.S.C. § 959's role in determining administrative priority).
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expense priority." 288 The Court reasoned that a contrary holding would give debtors
in possession an unfair advantage over non-bankrupt competitors. 289 The court
excluded any post-petition penalties assessed for the trustee's failure to abate pre-
petition violations of state mining laws because that would "deprive the estate of its
'new day' beginning and frustrate the purpose of the bankruptcy statute."
29 °
3. Midlantic Corollary
Most courts rely on Midlantic to give the environmental obligation
administrative expense priority. Sometimes, the court's "reasoning" is mystifying.
In Midlantic, the Court held that "a trustee may not abandon property in
contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect
the public health or safety from identified hazards.",29' To bolster its conclusion
"that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws,,
292
the Court noted 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) requires trustees to comply with state laws in
managing and operating estates.293 Moreover, in Kovacs, the Court had stated:
[W]e do not question that anyone in possession of the site-
288 In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d at 1459; see also Hurd, supra note 283, at 1478-79 (discussing court's
assessment of punitive fines as administrative expense priority in In re N.P. Mining); Seth M. Mandelbaum,
Pennsylvania v. Conroy: Expanded Administrative Expense Priority for State-Funded CERCLA Cleanups,
12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 319, 332 (1995) ("In In re N.P. Mining Co., punitive penalties were not given
priority because there was no threat to public health or safety; thus, the fines were not part of the actual,
necessary expenses of preserving the estate.").
2s9 See In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d at 1458 (holding debtors must not receive preferential treatment).
For further discussion of administrative expense status in In re N.P. Mining, see Parker, supra note 264, at
278-79. Spracker & Barnette, supra note 246, at 102 (analyzing administrative expense status of
environmental claims arising after filing of bankruptcy petition).
290 In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d at 1459; see In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827, 830 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1991) (suggesting fine for violating environmental laws is cost incidental to operation of business and
penalty for post-petition conduct is entitled to administrative priority); Hurd, supra note 283, at 1475
(identifying court's reasoning in In re Bill's Coal Co. as "punitive fines are ordinarily incident to regulated
mining operations and should therefore receive administrative expense priority.").
291 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Depl of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986); see Joseph P. Cistulli,
Striking a Balance Between Competing Policies: The Administrative Claim as an Alternative to Enforce
State Clean-Up Orders in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 581, 590-96 (1989)
(discussing Midlantic's recognition of "importance of a safe environment as reason enough to allow
administrative expense status for clean-up orders"); Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. ORourke,
Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. REv. 777, 824 (2001)
(acknowledging abandonment power is not meant to be impeded by laws that do not protect public health or
safety).
292 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505; see Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign
Immunity, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1381, 1423 (2003) (noting role of section 959(b) in deciding this case); Thomas
E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 633, 636 (2004) (noting federal
courts in bankruptcy must apply state law).
293 See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2000) (stating debtors in possession should operate property according to state
law requirements); Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505 ("Section 959(b) commands the trustee to 'manage and
operate the property in his possession.., according to the requirements of the valid laws of the state."); see
also Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 73 (2001) (stating
trustees must adhere to local health and safety laws).
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whether it is Kovacs or another in the event the receivership is
liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from
the receiver or the bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the
environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or
refuse to remove the source of such conditions.294
If a trustee cannot abandon property because abandonment would violate a state
law reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards and the trustee must comply with all valid state laws when managing and
operating property of the estate, the trustee must expend estate funds to comply with
state environmental laws. That rationale effectively accords administrative expense
status to environmental obligations.
In re Laurinburg Oil Co.295 is illustrative. The debtor operated a waste disposal
facility which was filled beyond capacity and leaking. The state informed the
bankruptcy court that the debtor's wastewater lagoon constituted a threat to public
health and safety. The state did not seek a money judgment.296 Instead, it sought to
compel the debtor to clean it up-to restore it to a condition that would no longer
violate environmental pollution laws. The court stated: "The provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 959(b) require a debtor in possession to manage and operate the property
according to the valid laws of the state in which the property is situated. This
provision is applicable to the matter before the court." 29 7 Moreover, "the reasonable
and necessary expenses... [the debtor incurs] should be considered administrative
expenses necessary to preserve the debtor's estate .... ,98
Other courts have followed a similar path.299 In Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re
294 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985). See generally Arriola, supra note 252, at 68 (analyzing
implication of Kovacs on environmental claims in bankruptcy); Cistulli, supra note 291, at 590-96
(discussing facts of case).
29 49 B.R. 652 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984).
296 Id. at 654 ("The state's proposed action seeks traditional injunctive relief, not the payment of a money
judgment."). For a discussion of the facts in In re Laurinberg Oil Co., see In re Harmar Coal Co., 548 A.2d
1224, 1227 (Pa. Super. 1988). See also Parker, supra note 264, at 277 (suggesting based on case law,
"penalties for violations of state and federal law are entitled to administrative expense priority as necessary
costs of the continued operation of Chapter 11 debtor's business.").
297 In re Lauringburg Oil Co., 49 B.R. at 654; see 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2000) (giving debtor in possession
responsibility to manage its property); see, e.g., Margaret E. Juliano, Stalemate: The Need for Limitations on
Regulatory Deference in Electric Bankruptcies, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 265 (assessing section 959(b)'s role
in trustee or debtor's operation of property).
298 In re Lauringburg Oil Co., 49 B.R. at 654; see DeSimone, supra note 284, at 518-19 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 959(b) explaining "[flollowing this logic, courts have held that because bankrupt corporations cannot cut
business expenses by ignoring health, safety, environmental, or other relevant state laws, any fines incurred
by a bankrupt business for violation of these laws, or § 959, deserve administrative expense priority status");
David Van Epps, A Fiduciary's Liability Under CERCLA: The Collision of Fundamental Policies-Beyond
Ohio v. Kovacs and Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 21 N.
KY. L. REv. 585, 597-98 (1993) (arguing clean-up expenses could be allowable administrative expenses).
299 See, e.g., Guterl Special Steel Corp. v. Econ. Dev. Admin. (In re Guterl Special Steel Corp.), 198 B.R.
128 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996); White Front Feed & Seed v. State Nat'l Bank of Platteville (In re Ramaker),
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Wall Tube & Metal Products Co.),300 the debtor manufactured automobile bumpers,
outdoor furniture, steel tubes and other metal products. Its manufacturing process
generated hazardous substances. It leased its premises. It ceased operating. State
environmental authorities inspected the premises, issued a notice of violations and
recommended that the debtor immediately and properly dispose of the wastes at the
site. The debtor did not comply and eventually petitioned for chapter 7 relief. The
state notified the chapter 7 trustee of the violations. Ultimately, the state filed a
request for administrative expense treatment for its response costs. The bankruptcy
court denied the request because the costs were not actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate within the meaning of section 503(b).3° 1
Moreover, the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) did not apply to a chapter 7 trustee
liquidating an estate. It was limited to those who manage and operate. 30 2 Because
"the State's activity neither benefited the estate nor fulfilled a legal obligation under
State law, the State's recovery costs could not be accorded administrative expense
status.
3 03
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit relied on Midlantic to conclude that the efforts of
the trustee "'to marshall and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to the
governmental interest in public health and safety. 3 04 The trustee could not abandon
the property because abandonment would pose a threat comparable to that in
Midlantic, "a continuing, potentially disastrous environmental health hazard with no
one clearly responsible for remedial action. 30 5 If the trustee could not abandon the
117 B.R. 959 (N.D. Iowa 1990); United States v. Ilco, Inc. (In re Ilco, Inc.), 48 B.R. 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ala
1985).
300 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987). See generally McBain, supra note 286, at 242 n.61 (discussing
implications of case, "the leading example of administrative expense priority for CERCLA § 107 claims.");
Losch, supra note 225, at 162-64 (explaining case espouses majority view among circuits by granting
administrative priority to environmental claims).
301 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 121 (explaining lower court denied request for
administrative expense); see In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 56 B.R. 918, 924 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986) rev'd, 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Ala. Surface Mining Comm'n, v. N.P. Mining Co., Inc.,
(In re N.P. Mining Co.), 963 F.2d 1449, 1452 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating section 503(b)(1)(a) administrative
expenses include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate ....").
302 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 121 (noting lower court did not apply section 959(b)
to trustee liquidating estate); In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 56 B.R. at 925-26 (concluding that
omission of term in section 959(b) that appears in section 959(a) indicates Congressional intent to limit
scope of liability for trustee who merely liquidates estate under section 959(b)); see Walker v. Maury County
(In re Scott Hous. Sys., Inc.), 91 B.R. 190, 195-96 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988) (deciding section 959(b) excepts
trustees who liquidate but do not manage or operate estate).
303 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 12 1; In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 56 B.R. at
925 (finding no liability under section 959(b)); see Lynn Tadlock Manolopoulos, A Congressional Choice:
The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73, 90-91
(1990) (stating lower court decision to exempt liquidating trustee from section 959(b) implied environmental
claims did not warrant priority status in bankruptcy).
304 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 122 (quoting Midlantic Nati Bank v. ONeill, 474
U.S. 494, 507 (1986)); see In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d at 1457 (relying on same quote to support
administrative expense claim); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 56 n. 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (stating Sixth
Circuit interpreted Midlantic exception more broadly than other circuits).
305 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 122; see In re Unidigital Inc., 262 B.R. 283, 286-87
(Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (stating "imminent and identifiable threat" finding was important to In re Wall Tube
[Vol. 12: 331
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS INBANKRUPTCY: 2004
property, then he could not maintain or possess it in continuous violation of that
same state law. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) applied
whether the trustee was liquidating or reorganizing. 30 6 The court relied on Reading
v. Brown's expansive reading of what constitutes an actual, necessary expense to
conclude that the cleanup costs were administrative expenses. 307 It emphasized the
importance of complying with laws designed to protect the public's health and
safety.30 8 It concluded that if an estate cannot avoid CERCLA liability, "the cost
incurred... in discharging this liability is an actual, necessary cost of preserving
the estate entitled to administrative expense priority.
In In re Stevens, 31 the court stated that Midlantic altered the criteria for
determining allowance of administrative expenses. 311 For example, a trustee cannot
abandon hazardous waste. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) requires the trustee to
comply with valid state laws. Thus, cleanup responsibility remains the
responsibility of the estate:
The trustee was obligated to comply with valid Maine law
regulating the disposal of hazardous waste. Since the trustee did not
holding). But see In re Shore Co. 134 B.R. 572, 578 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991) (rejecting broad reading of
Midlantic to allow abandonment when estate violated environmental laws but no imminent harm existed).
306 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 122 (stating liquidating trustee had duty under state
law); see Windolph Trust v. Leitch (In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc.), 125 B.R. 493, 500
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991) ("[T]hat the trustee in this case is liquidating the estate, rather than reorganizing it
is inconsequential, especially in the critical context of the public's welfare."). But see Mo. Dep't of Natural
Res. v. Valley Steel Prods. Co., (In re Valley Steel Prods. Co.), 157 B.R. 442, 449 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993)
(rejecting contention that section 959(b) applies to trustee who merely liquidates estate).
307 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 123 (noting Reading justifies expansive reading of
administrative expense); see In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d at 1453 (citing Reading to support argument
for administrative expense for civil mining penalties). But see In re Mahoney-Troast Constr. Co., 189 B.R.
57, 62 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (declining to extend Reading to case where creditor removed contaminated soil
that did not pose ongoing threat to public health).
308 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 123; see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 10.04 (5]
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) ("[A]n overriding concern with public health and safety led
the Sixth Circuit to override the express language of section 959 .... "). But see Parker, supra note 264, at
264-65 (1995) (contending facts of In re Wall Tube do not support court's conclusion of "imminent and
identifiable threat" of harm to public safety).
309 In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d at 123-24 (quoting In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc. 45 B.R.
278, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)); see Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568, 569-70 (3d Cir.
1994) (following In re Wall Tube to hold Bankruptcy Code did not preempt state law prohibiting
abandonment of hazardous waste, and state's cleanup costs including administrative and legal costs were
administrative expenses); In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc., 125 B.R. at 500 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1991) (explaining In re Wall Tube holding that CERCLA liability led court to allow administrative
expense).
10 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). Compare In re Unidigital Inc., 262 B.R. at 286-87 (stating In re
Stevens was part of majority of courts who denied abandonment only when imminent and identifiable threat
existed), with Guterl Special Steel Corp. v. Econ. Dev. Admin. (In re Guterl Special Steel Corp.), 198 B.R.
128, 134 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (contending In re Stevens was part of minority of courts denying
abandonment if state law violation occurred, regardless of whether imminent and identifiable threat existed).
311 In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 780; see Cistulli, supra note 291, at 597 (stating In re Stevens court used
Midlantic to allow administrative expense, but different result would follow from pre-Midlantic
"benefit/burden" test); Ryland, supra note 239, at 755 (finding In re Stevens interpreted Midlantic broadly).
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arrange for its removal and disposal, the estate is liable for all costs
incurred by the state in removing the waste oil ....
... [T]he improper and illegal storage of waste oil containing
PCB's constitutes an imminent and identifiable danger, and ... the
costs of protecting the public from that danger are entitled to
treatment as costs of administration.
3 12
Other courts have adopted similar logic to reach a similar conclusion.313
4. Ongoing Duty; Ongoing Expense
Even when an estate is not operating and no hazardous substance is involved,
courts have held that post-petition reclamation costs are an administrative expense.
For example, in Coal Stripping, Inc. v. Claredon National Insurance Co. (In re
Coal Stripping, Inc),31 4 the debtor had ceased its surface coal-mining activities
before petitioning for bankruptcy relief. It had not reclaimed the land as it was
required to do, but no hazard to public health or safety existed. It was not operating
in the chapter 11. According to the court, a cleanup claim for nonhazardous waste
had to meet the definition of section 503(b) to qualify for administrative expense
status. It had to be an actual, necessary cost of preserving the estate. The court held
the state was entitled to an administrative claim to the extent it performed a post-
petition cleanup: "debtor-in-possession [status] carries with it certain obligations,
including an on-going duty to restore the land.
3 15
312 In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 782-83.
313 See, e.g., Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.), 151 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding state's
claim to plug oil well is administrative expense even though estate produced no oil and received no revenue
from well, because trustee must comply with state law and unplugged, unproductive wells operated as legal
liability on estate); In re Guterl Special Steel Corp., 198 B.R. at 135-36 (deciding threat to public health
precluded abandonment, and EPA was entitled to recover cleanup costs from estate funds including funds
paid to secured creditor from sale of non-toxic collateral, because trustee who cleans up hazardous waste on
property of estate is discharging legal obligation of estate); First Va. Bank of Tidewater v. Va. Builders, Inc.
(In re Va. Builders, Inc.), 153 B.R. 729, 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (noting courts construe section 503(b)'s
language broadly following Reading v. Brown, and grant environmental claims administrative status based
on three grounds: (I) the timing of the damage; (2) the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b); and (3) the
judicially created exception in Midlantic; bank's actual costs to clean up dumping ground qualified for
administrative expense priority on all three grounds).
314 222 B.R. 78 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1998); see Ala. Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P.
Mining Co.), 963 F.2d 1449, 1453 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (extending administrative expense costs to post-petition
civil mining penalties under section 503(b)); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc., 65 B.R. 521, 530 (Bankr.
N.D.W. Va. 1986) (stating debtor in possession's post-petition reclamation costs were clearly administrative
expense under section 503(b)).
In re Coal Stripping, Inc., 222 B.R. at 82; see In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc., 65 B.R at 528 (stating
Supreme Court has ruled debtor in possession must remove condition that violates environmental law). But
see In re G-1 Holdings, Inc., 308 B.R. 196, 207 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (distinguishing In re Coal Stripping to
deny administrative expense when private party, not state agency, performed cleanup and private party was
surety seeking subrogation).
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In United States v. LTV Corporation (In re Chateaugay Corporation),316 the
Second Circuit characterized a debtor's unincurred CERCLA response costs for pre-
petition releases as a dischargeable claim.317 According to the court, the EPA, pre-
petition, held a contingent right to payment.318 That right to payment was "within
the actual or presumed contemplation of the parties at the time the original
relationship between the parties was created. 3 19 But the EPA also had an
administrative expense for costs assessed post-petition on LTV properties involving
a pre-petition release or threatened release. 320 The issue became how the pre-
petition conduct creating a pre-petition claim also created post-petition
administrative expense liability. The court held that the "EPA. . . is acting, during
the administration of the estate, to remedy the ongoing effects of a release of
hazardous substances. 3 2 A trustee cannot abandon property in contravention of a
316 944 F. 2d 997 (2d. Cir. 1991).
317 Id. at 1005; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (2000) (defining "claim" as "a right to payment, whether or not
such right is ... contingent .... ); see also Jensen v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27,
33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991) (concluding broad definition of "claim" supports "fresh start" bankruptcy goal).
But see In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 407-08 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (favoring CERCLA's
environmental cleanup objective over Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" objective by narrowing definition of
"claim" and emphasizing "fair" contemplation of parties).
318 In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F. 2d at 1004-05; see In re Michaelsen, 74 B.R. 245, 249 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1987) (accepting definition of contingent claim as defined in In re All Media Prop., Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), affd mem., 646 F. 2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981)); In re All Media Props., 5 B.R. at 133
(concluding claim is contingent if debtor will be called upon to pay it only upon occurrence or happening of
triggering extrinsic event and parties reasonably contemplated such triggering event or occurrence at time
event giving rise to claim occurred).
319 In re Chateaugay, 944 F. 2d at 1004 (concluding claim is contingent if debtor will be called upon to
pay it only upon occurrence or happening of triggering extrinsic event and the parties reasonably
contemplated such triggering event or occurrence at time event giving rise to claim occurred (quoting In re
All Media Props., Inc., 5 B.R. at 133)); see also In re Mavellia, 149 B.R. 301, 304 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991).
[t]he statement of what constitutes a contingent debt which has received universal
acceptance by the bankruptcy courts ... is "Ic]laims are contingent as to liability if the
debt is one which the debtor will be called upon to pay only upon the occurrence or
happening of an extrinsic event which will trigger the liability of the debtor to the
alleged creditor and if such triggering event or occurrence was one reasonably
contemplated by the debtor and creditor at the time the event giving rise to the claim
occurred."
Id. citing In re All Media Props., Inc., 5 B.R. at 133).
In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F. 2d at 1010; see 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(A) (2000) (providing actual
necessary costs and expenses of preserving estate are entitled to administrative expense priority); see also
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep' of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (ruling bankruptcy trustee
cannot abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety);
In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (holding trustee could not abandon hazardous waste
and had to comply with state environmental law).
321 In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F. 2d at 1010; see Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 (ruling bankruptcy trustee
cannot abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety
and expenses to remove threat are necessary to preserve estate); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube &
Metal Prods., Co.), 831 F. 2d 118, 123-24 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding trustee could not abandon property in
contravention of state statute designed to protect public health and response costs were actual and necessary
to preserve estate in compliance with state law); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 783 (holding trustee could not
abandon hazardous waste and had to comply with state environmental law and costs were entitled to
administrative expense priority).
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state law reasonably designed to protect the public's health and safety.32 2 If the
trustee cannot abandon the property, the expenses to remove the threat are
323necessary to preserve the estate.  Both the debtor and the estate incurred
environmental liability leading to both a pre-petition claim and an administrative
expense.
5. Cleanup Costs Are Not Administrative Expense
Although several cases deny the environmental claimant administrative expense
status for post-petition cleanup, most of these cases involve a nondebtor-lessor.
324
All of the cases involve property that was not property of the estate,325 i.e., the
debtor did not own the property as of the commencement of the case.
For example, in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re
Dant & Russell),326 the debtor-lessee rejected a lease containing contaminated
property. The landlord contended it was entitled to administrative expense priority
because it was jointly liable with the debtor under CERCLA for the cleanup costs
caused by the debtor's use of the premises.3 27 Denying the landlord's request, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished the landlord's expenses from costs that preserved or
322 In re Chateaugay, 944 F. 2d at 1010; see Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 (ruling bankruptcy trustee cannot
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety and
expenses to remove threat are necessary to preserve estate); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. at 783 (holding trustee
could not abandon hazardous waste and had to comply with state environmental law with costs to do so
entitled to administrative expense priority); In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods., Co., 831 F. 2d at 123-24
(holding trustee could not abandon property in contravention of state statute designed to protect public health
and response costs were actual and necessary to preserve estate in compliance with state law).323 See supra note 322.
324 See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 709
(9th Cir. 1988) (denying non-debtor lessor administrative expense status for its post-petition contamination
cleanup costs caused by debtor-lessee's operation of wood treatment facility); Gull Indus., Inc. v. John
Mitchell, Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386, 390-91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (denying adjacent landowner
administrative expense priority for its costs to clean up debtor's pre-petition contamination of groundwater);
In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. 283, 288-89 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (denying landlord administrative expense
priority for its costs to remove lessee's 30,000 pound printer and fluids); In re McCrory Corp., 188 B.R. 763,
770 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying nondebtor-lessor administrative expense priority for its clean-up costs
of debtor-lessee's truck terminal); In re Biocoastal Corp., 147 B.R. 258, 260-61 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)
(denying plaintiff administrative expense priority because debtor no longer owned property).
32 ee generally In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d at 700 (involving debtor-lessee who had rejected
leased premises); In re Hanna, 168 B.R. at 386 (pertaining to clean-up costs of adjacent landowner's
property and not debtor's property); In re McCrory, 188 B.R. at 763 (denying administrative expense priority
because lease was not currently property of estate); In re Biocoastal, 147 B.R. at 258 (denying plaintiff
administrative expense priority).
326 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
327 Id. at 708; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000) (defining "person" to include "firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture [and] commercial entity .... ). But see Midlantic, 474
U.S. at 507 (reserving question of priority status of environmental clean-up costs while holding trustee could
not abandon property in contravention of state statute or regulation reasonably designed to protect public
health or safety from identifiable hazards); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d. at 1010 (holding debtor's
unincurred response costs for pre-petition releases were general unsecured claim dischargeable in its
bankruptcy).
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328benefited the estate. According to the court, the landlord's prospective claim for
cleanup costs and its claim for reimbursement of costs already expended arose from
pre-petition activities. 329 Therefore, its right to payment was a general, pre-petition,
unsecured claim. The court rejected the landlord's appeal to public policy and
concern for the environment: "Congress alone fixes priorities... Courts are not free
to formulate their own rules of super or sub-priorities within a specifically
enumerated class.
330
Similarly, in In re Unidigital, the court denied administrative expense priority to
a landlord who had to remove a 30,000 pound printer and then dispose of its
chemicals.33 1 Because the printer posed no imminent threat of harm,332 the court
authorized the debtor to abandon the printer. The landlord argued the estate was
still liable for its removal even if the debtor could abandon it.333 The court adopted a
narrow view of what qualifies as an administrative expense. The expense had to
arise from a post-petition transaction between the estate and the creditor and it had
to be necessary to preserve the estate.334 According to the court, a narrow view of
328 In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F. 2d at 709; see 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2000) ("[T]here should be
allowed, administrative expenses ... including... the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate .... ). Compare Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 282-83 (1985) (holding state of Ohio's injunction
directing hazardous waste clean-up was general unsecured claim) and S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758
F.2d 137, 141 (denying lessor administrative expense priority against debtor in possession and sublessee for
hazardous clean-up costs because lessor had general unsecured contract indemnity claim) with In re Wall
Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d. at 124 (granting administrative expense priority to state for CERCLA
response costs) and In re Stevens, 68 BR. at 783 (granting administrative expense priority to state for costs
incurred removing waste from property of estate).
329 In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d at 709; see Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway
Transp., Inc.) 73 B.R. 494, 503 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (granting administrative expense priority when
liability for CERCLA costs arose post-petition). But see In re Chateaugay, 944 F. 2d at 1010 (granting
administrative expense claim for post-petition costs from pre-petition activity when costs incurred to
preserve estate).
330 In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d. at 709 (citing 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 507.02[3], at 507-15
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 507 (a) (1-7) priorities); see
Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 286 (OConnor, J., concurring) ("[A] state may protect its interests in the enforcement of
its environmental laws by giving cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or secured claims.").
131 In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. 283, 285 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
332 Id. at 287; see Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 (holding trustee may not abandon property in contravention
of state statute or regulation reasonably designed to protect public health or safety from identified hazards);
see, e.g., Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir.
1988) (allowing abandonment because violations of state environmental laws did not pose serious imminent
public health risks); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 271-72 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (holding
trustee could abandon fourteen drums of various chemicals only if trustee took adequate precautionary
measures to ensure no imminent danger to public).
133 In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. at 288; see Pa. Dept of Envtl. Res. v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568, 569-70 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding costs necessary to remedy contamination were necessary to preserve estate given trustee
could not abandon property under Midlantic). But see In re Mahoney-Troast Constr. Co., 189 B.R. 57, 61
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (denying non-debtor landlord administrative expense priority for cleanup costs when
no imminent public harm existed and landlord acted voluntarily).
114 In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. at 288; see Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus., Inc. (In re DAK Indus.,
Inc.), 66 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying administrative expense priority when debt arose pre-
petition and no post-petition consideration was provided); Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. Martin (In re Mid
Region Petroleum, Inc.), 1 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir. 1993) (affirming disallowance of administrative
expense priority for post-petition rent when debtor did not receive benefit from leased railcars).
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administrative expense minimized administrative costs, preserved the estate's scarce
resources and maximized the distribution to creditors. 335 Because the debtor had
rejected the lease, all claims associated with the rejection were pre-petition,
unsecured claims.336 Moreover, the landlord had failed to prove how its removal
had conferred a substantial benefit to the estate.3 37 According to the court, it was
"not enough to simply assert that the expense was incurred post-petition with regard
to estate property to protect public health and welfare. 3 38
The court also rejected the landlord's tort claims of trespass and nuisance.
Reading v. Brown did not apply: "[T]he tort, if, in fact, there was one, did not arise
from the operation of the Debtors'business.
3 39
6. The Compromise Position: Some Administrative Expense, Some Not
Some courts have taken a middle ground. For example, the cleanup cost is an
administrative expense to the extent the debtor in possession or the estate caused the
environmental harm. 340 So, too, to the extent the estate must remedy the harm, the
335 In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. at 288; see Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 645, 617 (1918) (describing
bankruptcy system's general goal as giving debtors fresh start after fair property distribution for benefit of
creditors); In re Mid Region Petroleum, Inc., 1 F.3d at 1134 (identifying chapter 11 goal as keeping
administrative costs at minimum to preserve debtor's scarce resources and encourage rehabilitation).
336 In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. at 288; see 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (2000) (providing
"rejection... of... unexpired lease of debtor.., shall be determined the same as if such claim had arisen
before the date of the filing of the petition"); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant
& Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding rejection of lease containing contaminated
property was pre-petition conduct).
337 In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 BR. at 288; see In re Mid Region Petroleum, Inc., 1 F.3d at 1134 (affirming
disallowance of administrative expense priority for post-petition rent when debtor did not receive benefit
from leased railcars); United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d. 997, 1010 (2d Cir.
1991) (finding administrative expense priority when obligation in question arose from transaction with
debtor in possession and resulted in direct benefit to estate).
... In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. at 289 (quoting In re Allen Care Ctrs., Inc., 163 BR. 180, 186 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1994) (holding costs of closing operation are not administrative expenses)); see also Gull Indus., Inc.
v. John Mitchell, Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386, 390-91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (denying adjacent
landowner administrative expense for cleanup costs caused by debtor's pre-petition oil leakage, when post-
petition contamination was passive and cleanup did not benefit estate); In re McCrory Corp., 188 B.R. 763,
770 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying non-debtor lessor administrative expense and holding debtor could
abandon lease because there was no imminent public harm, the estate no longer owned the property and the
cleanup did not benefit estate).
339 In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. at 290; see Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 US 471, 482 (1968) (favoring
those injured by operation of business in bankruptcy by permitting them to recover ahead of creditors who
would have benefited but for the tort); see also In re Motel Invs. of Christiansburg L.L.C., 307 B.R. 536,
538-39 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2004) (following Unidigital in denying administrative expense priority when no
injuries arose from post-petition operation of debtor's business); Heidt, supra note 219, at 134-35 (noting
bankruptcy policy requires claim to arise when wrongful act is committed).
340 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2000) ("After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative
expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including -the actual, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after
the commencement of the case."); see, e.g., Reading, 391 U.S. at 485 (holding damages resulting from post-
petition negligence by manager of estate property should constitute administrative expense); In re Pierce
Coal & Constr., Inc., 65 B.R. 521, 530 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1986) (expenses incurred to operate estate are
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving estate and therefore, damages chapter 7 trustee caused in
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expenditure is an administrative expense.34'
7. Post-petition Fines & Penalties as Administrative Expense
Most courts rely on Reading v. Brown to hold post-petition compensatory civil
fines are "actual and necessary" costs to preserve the estate, and therefore, they are
entitled to administrative expense treatment. In the words of Spunt v. Charlesbank
Laundry, Inc. (In re Charlesbank Laundry Inc.):342
The debtor in this case deliberately continued a violation of law
month after month presumably because it was more lucrative for
the business to operate outside the zoning ordinance than within it.
If fairness dictates that a tort claim based on negligence should be
paid ahead of pre-reorganization claims, then, a fortiori, an
intentional act which violates the law and damages others should be
so treated.343
Reading's and Charlesbank ' reasoning seems to support similar treatment for
noncompensatory fines. The Eleventh Circuit was the first to rule on this issue. In
Alabama Surface Mining Commission v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining
Co.), 344 the court held that noncompensatory, punitive civil fines for post-petition
operating estate are entitled to administrative expense status: pre-petition expenses occasioned by pre-
petition debtor are not); Heidt, supra note 219, at 149 (stating costs entitled to administrative expense status
only if debtor continues to own or operate contaminated property or estate is liable for some post-petition
environmental wrongdoing).
'4' See Torwico Elecs., Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. (In re Torwico Elecs.), 8 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding cleanup obligation unavoidable, wastes at issue must present an ongoing hazard (citing In re
Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008)); In re Mahoney-Troast Constr. Co., 189 B.R. 57, 63 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995)
(explaining claim for reimbursement would enjoy administrative expense priority if contamination posed
imminent threat to public, but no imminent threat found); Heidt, supra note 219, at 149 (stating
administrative expense priority applies because estate must comply with applicable environmental law to
retain property or continue in business). But see Daniel Klerman, Earth First? CERCLA Reimbursement
Claims And Bankruptcy, 58 U. CM. L. REv. 795, 798 (1991) (stating courts have liberally interpreted
"imminent and substantial endangerment" requirement when approving administrative orders).
342 755 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1985); see Ala. Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining
Co.), 963 F.2d 1449, 1453 (1 1th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e find that punitive, civil penalties assessed for post-
petition mining activities qualify as an administrative expense .... ); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 B.R. 827,
829 (D. Kan. 1991) ("The court agrees that penalties assessed for pre-petition misconduct or the continuing
effect of pre-petition misconduct should not be considered an administrative expense.") (emphasis added).
But see In re Motel Invs. of Christiansburg L.L.C., 307 B.R. at 538 (declining to follow holding in Spunt).
343 In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc., 755 F.2d at 203; see Reading, 391 U.S. at 482 (stating tort claims
arising during an arrangement are actual and necessary expenses because it is more natural and just to allow
those injured by operation of business during arrangement to recover ahead of those for whose benefit the
business is carried on); see also In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting
administrative expenses are given first priority so businesses otherwise wary of dealing with chapter 11
businesses will provide goods and services); Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing
Reading, 391 U.S. at 482-84, and holding "those injured during administration of estate by Trustee entitled
toprionty claim as administrative expense.").
4 963 F.2d 1449 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
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violations of environmental regulations were entitled to administrative priority. In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)'s requirement that
the trustee manage and operate the property in compliance with state law:
345
We find that a policy of ensuring compliance by trustees with
state law is sufficient justification to place civil penalties assessed
for postpetition mining operations in the category of [costs that] are
accorded administrative-expense priority... Even though these
civil penalties are not compensatory, it makes sense that when a
trustee or debtor in possession operates a bankruptcy estate,
compliance with state law should be considered an administrative
expense. Otherwise, the bankruptcy estate would have an unfair
advantage over non-bankrupt competitors. A mining operation
could, under the protection of chapter 11, cut costs by ignoring
safety and environmental violations.346
As another court noted, debtors in possession "do not have carte blanche to
ignore" state and local environmental laws.347 The Third Circuit, however,
apparently disagrees.348
34' 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2000); see Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d
118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) applied whether trustee was liquidating or reorganizing
and emphasizing importance of complying with laws designed to protect public health and safety); In re
Laurinburg Oil Co., 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984) ("The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)
require a debtor in possession to manage and operate the property according to the valid laws of the state in
which the property is situated."); Heidt, supra note 219, at 141 (stating section 959(b) of title 28 reinforces
need to comply with all applicable state rules so debtors do not gain competitive advantage).
346 In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d at 1458; see Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 116
F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding "it would be fundamentally unfair to allow Cumberland Farms to
flout Florida's environmental protection laws and escape paying a penalty for such behavior"); In re
Chateugay Corp., 112 B.R. at 525.
To the extent that [the debtor] continues to own and operate sites post-petition where
there has been a release or threatened release of hazardous waste, [the debtor] is, under
the law, under a continuing obligation to comply with the environmental laws ... In
addition, for the same reasons, civil penalties for post-petition violations would also be
entitled to be treated as administrative expenses.
Id.; see also Utah Div. of Oil, Gas & Mining v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 87 B.R. 662,
665 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (concluding chapter 11 debtor must comply with Utah environmental laws in
conduct of post-petition mining operations).
347 Cumberland Farms, Inc., 116 F.3d at 20; see Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474
U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (holding debtor cannot abandon contaminated property in violation of state law
designed to protect public safety); see also In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F. 2d at 121-22
(referring to Midlantic); Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Conroy (In re Conroy), 24 F.3d 568, 569 (3d Cir. 1994)
(following holding in Midlantic); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1010 (following holding in
Midlantic); Denise M. Schuh, The Cents of it: Dischargeability and Environmental Claims Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 191, 218 (1993) (noting Congress expressed legislative
determination that trustee does not have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law but must yield to
governmental interest in public health and safety).
348 Pa. Dept of Envtl. Res. v. Tri-State Clinical Labs., Inc., 178 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1075 (2000); see John W. Ames & Lisa H. Thomas, Criminal Fines as Administrative Expenses? Don't
Count on It..., 18 AM. BANK. INST. J. 8, at 8 (Oct. 1999) (stating Third Circuit in Tri-State Clinical Labs
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Tri-State Clinical Laboratories filed chapter 11 on August 14, 1990.14 9 Shortly
thereafter, two city workers were sprayed with human blood while emptying trash
dumpsters behind Tri-State's lab. The blood came from test tubes that Tri-State had
illegally placed in the dumpsters. In 1994, Tri-State was prosecuted and convicted
for violating Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act. It was fined $10,000
for pre-petition and $20,000 for post-petition violations.
The bankruptcy court and the district court refused to give the post-petition fine
administrative priority. The Third Circuit affirmed. It concluded that neither
Congress in drafting section 503(b)(1)(A), nor Reading in interpreting its
predecessor statute, intended a broad reading of "actual and necessary" expenses:
"[W]e believe Congress intended only for those "actual necessary costs and
expenses" that arise in the context of, or compensate for, legitimate business
activity, or the losses resulting therefrom, to be treated as expenses of preserving
the estate, and accorded priority as an administrative expense. 35°
In its view, "it does not follow that criminal fines and the conduct they attempt
to punish are ordinarily incident to operating a business. ' 35' The court scoffed at the
notion that a "legitimate" business might choose to violate laws because it was
cheaper to do so. 352 Yet why else would the debtor in Tri-State have done what it
did? Unless we assume that the debtor dumped the blood to harm others, it could
only have done so because it was the cheapest way to dispose of it. Therefore,
unless such a fine is treated as an administrative expense, debtors will have an
economic incentive not to comply with environmental regulations, and will thereby
gain an economic advantage over their law-abiding competitors. Indeed under Tri-
State's reasoning, the worse the behavior, the less appropriate administrative
held punitive criminal fines arising from post petition conduct are not administrative expenses); see also
DeSimone, supra note 284 at 526 (stating Tri-State Clinical Labs "continued the bleak trend away from
allowing post-petition environmental fines as administrative expenses.").
149 Tri-State Clinical Labs., Inc., 178 F.3d at 687; see also Ames & Thomas, supra note 348, at 526
(discussing Third Circuit in Tri-State Clinical Labs); DeSimone, supra note 284, at 526 (referring to facts of
Tri-State Clinical Labs).
350 Tri-State Clinical Labs., Inc., 178 F.3d at 693; see Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re
Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating section 503(b)(1)(A)'s clear intent that
administrative expenses be actual, necessary costs of preserving estate); In re Nat'l Refractories & Minerals
Corp., 297 B.R. 614, 617 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting under section 503(b)(1) terms "actual" and
"necessary" are construed narrowly); In re Unidigital, Inc., 262 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (noting
statutory provisions granting administrative expense priorities must be narrowly construed).
... Tri-State Clinical Labs., Inc., 178 F.3d at 692. But see In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d at 1458
(concluding fine for violating environmental regulations is cost ordinarily incident to operation of business);
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 209 B.R. at 793 (holding debtor in possession violated state environmental laws
and compliance with state law should be considered administrative expense); In re Bill's Coal Co., 124 BR.
827, 830 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) ("[Al fine for the violation of environmental regulations should be
considered a cost ordinarily incident to operation of a business.").
352 Tri-State Clinical Labs., Inc., 178.F.3d at 693; see DeSimone, supra note 284, at 534 ("Given Tri-State,
why not simply lower overhead by ignoring burdensome and expensive environmental regulations? And if
convicted of such misconduct, the violator need not fear any substantial criminal sanction."); Heidt, supra
note 219, at 140 (permitting debtor to disregard environmental obligation would give debtor in bankruptcy
competitive advantage over others because debtors could manufacture their products at cheaper cost because
they would not be required to comply with applicable regulations).
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priority treatment for the noncompensatory fine.353
Given the clear split in the circuits, it is somewhat surprising that the Supreme
Court denied certiorari,354 but the First and Eleventh Circuits have the better
arguments based on both bankruptcy and environmental policy.
F. Contingent Claims for Reimbursement or Contribution against Debtor: Section
5 02 (e) (1) (B)
11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B) provides:
Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section and
paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall disallow any claim
for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with the
debtor on or has secured the claim of a creditor, to the extent that -
.. (B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent
as of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for
reimbursement or contribution.
This language suggests disallowance of a PRP's contribution claim against a
debtor-PRP for future, i.e., unincurred, response costs. Bankruptcy discharges a
disallowed claim every bit as much as an allowed claim. 355 How does disallowance
of contingent claims for contribution square with Congress's goal of equitable
allocation of the cleanup costs among responsible parties? In a word, not very well.
Judge Cyr wrote an especially thoughtful opinion on the subject. In Juniper
Development Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transport, Inc.),356 the debtors
owned and operated a trucking business. They petitioned for bankruptcy relief in
July, 1982. A local developer, Juniper, purchased the facility from the debtor in
353 In distinguishing In re N.P. Mining Co., Inc., the court stated: "[w]e are not convinced the court's
holding [in N.P. Mining] would be the same if it were faced with the kind of reckless conduct in which Tri-
State engaged." Tri-State Clinical Labs., Inc., 178 F.3d at 698; see also DeSimone, supra note 284, at 534
(concluding Third Circuit has condoned excusing corporation for its hazardous criminal violations in interest
of creditor compensation).
354 Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Tri-State Clinical Labs., Inc., 178 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1075 (2000).
311 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (2000) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order confirming
the plan, the confirmation of a plan -
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such
confirmation, and any debt of a kind specific in section 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i) of this
title, whether or not -
(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed under section 501
of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title ....
Id. (emphasis added). See generally Schuh, supra note 347, at 218 (stating congressional concern over public
health and safety should extend to consider whether to enact dischargeability exception).
356 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993).
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possession in April, 1983 for $1.6 million.357 In April 1985, drums containing
hazardous substances were found at the facility. The EPA notified Juniper, the
purchaser, that it was a potentially responsible party under CERCLA. It ordered
Juniper to remove the substances from the facility. Juniper incurred $92,088 to
comply with the EPA administrative order. It instituted an adversary proceeding
against Hemingway Transport's estate for CERCLA response costs already incurred
and future response costs to complete the remediation.358 Judge Cyr wrote:
Juniper finds itself stranded at the increasingly crowded
"intersection" between the discordant legislative approaches
embodied in CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code .... CERCLA's
settled policy objectives, reemphasized in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"),
prominently include the expeditious cleanup of sites contaminated
or threatened by hazardous substance releases which jeopardize
public health and safety, and the equitable allocation of cleanup
costs, among all potentially responsible persons ("PRPs") ... To
foster CERCLA's primary objective-promotion of spontaneous
private cleanup initiatives-all PRPs are deemed strictly liable for
the total response costs required to remediate the contaminated
facility.
359
Moreover, CERCLA permits equitable allocation of liability by permitting
PRPs to sue other PRPs for contribution. This encourages quick responses because
one PRP, who takes the initiative and pays for the remediation, knows and can hold
other PRPs liable. 360 But section 502(e)(1)(B) seems to preclude CERCLA's
intended equitable allocation of responsibility: "There can be little doubt that but for
section 502(e)(1)(B), the [debtor's estate] would share some measure of financial
responsibility for the anticipated $6.2 million in future response costs on which the
Juniper claim is based.
3 61
Judge Cyr carefully dissected section 502(e)(1)(B). It disallows a "claim of a
codebtor who is liable with the debtor on the 'claim of a creditor."' 362 He assumed
... Id. at 919.
... Id. at 920.
359 Id. at 921.
360 Id. at 922; accord Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 951 F.2d
246, 248 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting CERCLA private right of action encourages quick voluntary action because
it allows private parties to recover their cleanup costs from PRPs). See generally H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt.
1, at 80 (1985) (noting CERCLA should make private parties more willing to bear costs of cleanup because
they can attempt to recover part of their expenses from other PRPs through contribution litigation).
361 In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d at 922.
362 Id. at 925; see Syntex Corp. v. Charter Co. (In re Charter Co.), 862 F.2d 1500, 1503 (1I1th Cir. 1989)
(concluding contingent CERCLA contribution claims are the type excusable under section 502(e)(1)(B)).
But see In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 308 B.R. 196, 212 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (finding debtor's contribution
liability to another PRP under CERCLA was direct and therefore not subject to disallowance under section
502).
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the EPA was a creditor because its contingent right to payment accrued while the
debtor owned and operated the facility where the hazardous waste disposal had
occurred.363 Further, Juniper was co-liable with the debtor to the EPA, a creditor.
Concluding that Congress did not exempt CERCLA claims from disallowance,
he disallowed Juniper's claim for future response costs:
[S]ection 502(e)(1)(B) may impede CERCLA's subsidiary policy of
promoting equitable allocations of environmental cleanup costs
among responsible parties, [but] pre-"fixing" disallowance does not
conflict with CERCLA's primary goal--encouraging targeted PRPs
to initiate cleanup efforts as expeditiously as practicable in the
expectation that their contingent claims may become "fixed" in
time for allowance against the debtor estate.
But, relying on the policy underlying section 502(e)(1)(B), which is to prevent
double-dipping against the estate, Cyr further held that if the EPA did not file a
claim and no one filed a claim on behalf of the EPA, Juniper could file its own
claim for future response costs.
365
In another section 502(e)(1)(B) case,366 the Sixth Circuit held that section
502(e)(1)(B) might disallow the contingent claim of a party co-liable with the
debtor even though the bar date had passed and the EPA had not filed a claim.
According to the court, the debtor and the EPA were in negotiations and the EPA
still might file a claim. The bar date was not absolute. Therefore, the EPA's failure
to file a claim by the bar date did not mean the debtor and non-debtor PRP were not
co-liable.367
Chief Judge Martin concurred that it was premature to disallow the claim for
contribution. Nevertheless, he was concerned that the court's opinion and Pioneer
Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership S368 excusable
363 In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d at 926; see In re Harvard Indus., Inc., 153 B.R. 668, 671
(Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (recognizing EPA as creditor when it had fight to payment from debtor under
CERCLA).
3W" In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d at 924-25; see Goodwyn, supra note 212, at 811-12
(asserting section 502(e)(1)(B) should be read in harmony with CERCLA's goal of quick cleanup).
365 In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d at 928. Judge Cyr also noted that Juniper's claim arose post-
petition as a result of its post-petition purchase. If it qualified for the innocent landowner defense under
CERCLA, it would be entitled to administrative expense priority for incurred cleanup costs. There was no
evidence that the estate contracted away its obligation to contribute or bargained for a right of
indemnification. Id. at 930. The $1.6 million purchase price benefited the estate and presumably supported
the requisite baseline "consideration" for Juniper's right to contribution. Id. The court pointed out that section
502(e)(1)(B) is not limited to creditors. It disallows any contingent claim for contribution. That includes
post-petition claimants as well as creditors.
366 Norpak Corp. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. (In re Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc.), 131 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir.
1997).367 Id. at 1188-89.
368 507 U.S. 380 (1993), aff'g In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 943 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding courts
may accept late filings caused by. inadvertence, mistake, carelessness or intervening circumstances beyond
party's control).
408 [Vol. 12: 331
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS IN BANKRUPTCY: 2004
neglect rule could permit parties:
[T]o hide behind the shield of a bankruptcy claim to escape
responsibility for their lack of sound environmental
stewardship ....
The majority opinion requires the disallowance of contingent
claims against debtors when the debtor and claimant are potentially
co-liable to a third party. Debtors could, however, argue that if that
third party does actually bring a claim against the debtor, the
majority opinion still allows the debtor to raise its bankruptcy as a
defense. This is, in fact, what [the debtor] concedes it plans to do if
the [EPA] or the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection and Energy bring a claim against it. In doing so, [the
debtor] is clearly relying on the hope that [the purchaser's] claims
will be disallowed, its bankruptcy defense will be accepted, and it
will be able to walk away from the mess it made without bearing
any responsibility for it. This cannot be allowed.
3 69
To read this case as allowing such a scenario contravenes Congress's clear
intention in passing CERCLA. By passing CERCLA, Congress intended to respond
efficiently and expeditiously to toxic spills, and to hold those parties responsible for
the release of environmental toxins liable for the costs of the clean-
up... Interpreting Pioneer Investment Services or the majority's opinion as
allowing polluters to circumvent CERCLA's goals would be tantamount to turning a
blind eye to clear Congressional mandate. Such flagrant disregard for legislative
intent should not be tolerated.370
IV. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES &
ISSUES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
State governments are often intensely interested in bankruptcy proceedings
involving "environmentally challenged" property. Adjudicating a state's claim or
other interest in a debtor's bankruptcy implicates a state's Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity to suits in federal court.37 ' In 1994, Congress substantially
amended section 106(a) and (b) and added a new subsection (C)372 in an attempt to
369 In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 131 F.3d at 1191 (Martin, J., concurring).
370 Id. For a detailed discussion, see Kenneth W. Maxwell, Bankrupting CERCLA: Amending the
Bankruptcy Code to Allow CERCLA Contingent Claims for Contribution, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 431 (1993).
371 A detailed description of the origins and development of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is well
beyond the scope of these materials. For a recent study of those issues, see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign
Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002).
372 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)-(c) (2000), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, § 113, Pub. L. 103-
394, 108 Stat. 4117 (1994).
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eliminate sovereign immunity for both federal and state government units.37 3 In
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,3 74 the Supreme Court interpreted the reach of
the Eleventh Amendment's 375 grant of sovereign immunity to the states. Seminole
Waiver of sovereign immunity:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is
abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with respect to
the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 503, 505,
506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552,
553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944, 1107, 1141,
1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303, 1305, and 1327 of
this title.
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to the
application of such sections to governmental units.
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order, process, or
judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, including
an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not including an award of
punitive damages. Such order or judgment for costs or fees under this title or the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any governmental unit shall be
consistent with the provisions and limitations of section 2412(d)(2)(A) of title 28.
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process, or judgment against any
governmental unit shall be consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy law applicable to
such governmental unit and, in the case of a money judgment against the United States,
shall be paid as if it is a judgment rendered by a district court of the United States.
(5) Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of
action not otherwise existing under this title, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, or nonbankruptcy law.
(b)A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is deemed to have
waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against such governmental unit that
is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence out of
which the claim of such governmental unit arose.
(c) Notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity by a governmental unit,
there shall be offset against a claim or interest of a governmental unit any claim against
such governmental unit that is property of the estate.
Id.
373 Congress seemed to have intended these amendments to reject the Supreme Court's interpretation of
section 106 in United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30 (1992), and Hoffman v. Conn. Dept. of Income
Maint., 494 U.S. 96 (1989); see 140 Cong. Rec. H10752, H10766 (daily ed. October 4, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Brooks) ("This section would effectively overrule two Supreme Court cases that have held the States
and Federal Government are not deemed to have waived their sovereign immunity by virtue of enacting §
106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code."). Both Nordic Village and Hoffman concerned the applicability of former
section 106(c) to bankruptcy avoidance actions against governmental entities. In Nordic Village, the
bankruptcy trustee sought to recover a preference from the Internal Revenue Service under sections 54 9(a)
and 550(a). Hoffman involved two unrelated actions against agencies of the state of Connecticut under
sections 543(b) and 547(b).
374 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (analyzing whether Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress power to
abrogate States' sovereign immunity); see Brett E. Cooper, Note, Ageism, The ADEA, and the Ageless
Debate Over Statutory Interpretation, 74 ST. JoHNS L. REV. 175 n.2 (2000) (explaining "Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) ... overrul[ed] Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) and
announc[ed] a stringent two-part test to be utilized when analyzing legislation that abrogates Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity."); Kenneth N. Klee et al., State Defiance of Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 1527, 1549 n. 108 (1999) (noting Justice Stevens dissented in Seminole Tribe).
375 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stating "[tihe Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
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has cast doubt on section 106's constitutionality.
Seminole Tribe held that state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment extends to all suits against a state by any person, including its own
citizens. This immunity is not absolute. States can waive sovereign immunity and
Congress can abrogate it. Congressional abrogation requires Congress'
unequivocally expressed intent to abrogate the immunity pursuant to valid exercise
of a power rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.
376
In a paragraph with obvious relevance to section 106's continued viability, the
Court stated:
[T]oday, we reconfirm that the background principle of state
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not
so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area,
like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive
control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution
vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.
The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article
III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.377
In response to Justice Stevens' plaint that Seminole Tribe prohibited federal
jurisdiction over states in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as bankruptcy,
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State"); see Tanika Michelle Capers, The
Curtailment of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 24 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
109, 111 (1998) ("[T]he Supreme Court construed the [Eleventh] Amendment to embody a constitutional
right to sovereign immunity that arose from the structure of the Constitution itself and the spirit of the
Eleventh Amendment."); Michelle Lawner, Why Federal Courts Should Be Required to Consider State
Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CE. L. REV. 1261, 1265 (1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates a strong commitment to the principle of state sovereignty,
and... [t]he Supreme Court has applied.., the Eleventh Amendment expansively to guard state
sovereignty and to limit the reach of federal jurisdiction.").
376 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44, 47, 55 (determining whether Congress has abrogated the States'
sovereign immunity depends on "whether Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the
immunity," and "whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power" (citing Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)); see also Cooper, supra note 274, at 181 (recognizing Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe established two-part test to determine whether legislation successfully abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity. "A court must determine: (1) whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate the states' immunity; and (2) whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
... Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72, 73 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); see
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the
judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction." (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000) ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over
a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting States." (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72)).
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copyright, and antitrust, 378 the majority responded with words that chilled the blood
of many participants in the bankruptcy system: "it has not been widely thought that
the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the States'
sovereign immunity. This Court never has awarded relief against a State under any
of those statutory schemes.
3 79
Seminole Tribe precipitated a wave of bankruptcy litigation. In some cases,
states have directly challenged section 106's constitutionality, maintaining section
106 was based on an invalid exercise of congressional power.3 80 In others, states
have argued that states do not waive their sovereign immunity simply by filing a
proof of claim or by participating in a bankruptcy case or proceeding.381 In still
378 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting majority opinion "prevents
Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in
copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast
national economy"); see also Id. at 77 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing "the majority's conclusion that
the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being sued under them in federal court suggests that persons
harmed by state violations of federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws have no remedy"). See
generally H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero:
The Coming Clash With Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action Over Which the Federal Courts
Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645, 652 (1988) (contending Supreme Court's interpretation of
Eleventh Amendment has "threaten[ed] to undermine the federal antitrust and copyright laws," and has
threatened "to deprive citizens injured by unlawful state action of a forum in which they can vindicate their
federal rights").
379 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72, 73 n. 16 (describing Justice Stevens' conclusion there is "no remedy" for
state violations of federal bankruptcy, copyright, and antitrust statutes as "exaggerated both in its substance
and in its significance"); see Craig Peyton Gaumer, States 'Rights and the Bankruptcy Code, 22 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. at 8 (stating Chief Justice Rehnquist essentially agreed Seminole would adversely affect debtors'
ability to bring states into bankruptcy court); Kurt E. Springmann, The Impact of Seminole on Intellectual
Property Infringement by State Actors: The Interaction ofArticle I, Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 898 (1997) (hypothesizing "[t]he significance of [Chief
Justice Rehnquist's] comment regarding a lack of tradition in enforcing copyright actions against states
remains an open question").
380 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell ), 209 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2000)
(implicating section 106(a) was not remedial, "and thus was not an appropriate exercise of Congress'
enforcement powers (even if Congress intended it to be)" and stipulating "[u]ntil Congress makes findings of
a pattern of state violations and passes legislation that is proportional to its remedial claims, § 106(a) must be
viewed as an unconstitutional assertion of Congress' power" concluding "Congress did not act within the
scope of its abrogation power in enacting § 106(a)"); see also Murphy v. Mich. Guar. Agency (In re
Murphy), 271 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with court's reasoning in Mitchell and Greenwood,
and holding "that an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt constitutes a suit
within the ambit of the Eleventh Amendment"); Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re
Estate of Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding "Congress cannot constitutionally displace
State's immunity by § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code."); Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd. v. Greenwood
(In re Greenwood), 237 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. Tex. 1999) (noticing several lower courts, including United
States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit, relied on Seminole Tribe and held "that § 106(a), which purports to
abrogate sovereign immunity, violates the Eleventh Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional" declaring
"[i]t is clear that Congress may not constitutionally abrogate state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
proceedings").
381 See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths, Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1143, 1149 (4th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998) (concluding state did not waive its immunity when state "filed
an affirmative proof of claim in the debtor's bankruptcy to recover from the bankruptcy estate sales and
withholding taxes which the debtor collected for the state from third parties"). But see Gardner v. New
Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) ("When the State becomes the actor and files a claim against the fund it
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others, states have argued that Ex Parte Young 382 cannot be used for prospective
declaratory or injunctive relief against a state official in her individual capacity. In
effect, many states have argued, and many courts have agreed, that states are simply
not subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.
Five circuit courts concluded that Seminole Tribe barred Congress from
abrogating state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause.38 3 The Sixth
Circuit broke with this near unanimous reading of Seminole, concluding that
Congress could constitutionally abrogate state sovereign immunity. 384 Faced with a
waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had respecting the adjudication of the claim."); Ga.
Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Supreme
Court's decision in Gardner to establish "that, by filing a proof of claim in the debtor's respective bankruptcy
proceedings, the State [of Georgia] waived its sovereign immunity for purposes of the adjudication of those
claims," holding that such waiver included "the bankruptcy court's enforcement of the discharge injunction
and the automatic stay."); Stanley v. Student Loan Servs., Inc. (In re Stanley), 273 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 2002) ("The sovereign immunity afforded to States by the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution was waived when the lender, acting pursuant to the instructions of the State, filed proofs
of claim in [the] bankruptcy case.").
382 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see, e.g., Goldberg v. Ellett (In re Ellett), 254 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002) (referring to Ex Parte Young doctrine as "fiction" in which "a state
officer who violates federal law in his official capacity, pursuant to his authority under state law, is
nonetheless not a state agent for sovereign immunity purposes"). But see Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1989) (recognizing "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because 'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are
not treated as actions against the State"'); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56, 159, 160 (asserting
"individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the
laws of the State ... may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity" from an action attempting "to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution" adding when an official
claims to be acting under the authority of the state and the act to be enforced is alleged to be
unconstitutional, such official is "stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct").
383 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating Congress has power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"); see also
Nelson v. La Crosse County Dist. Attorney (In re Nelson), 301 F.3d 820, 832 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding
Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity when enacting section 106(a)); In re Mitchell,
209 F.3d at 1121 ("Under Seminole Tribe ... we conclude that Congress did not act within the scope of its
abrogation power in enacting section 106(a)."); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart
Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 243-45 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding "the Bankruptcy Clause is not a valid source of
abrogation power" and finding "§ 106(a) is unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in federal court"); In re Creative Goldsmiths, Inc., 119 F.3d at 1143, 1145, 1147
(repeating "[b]ecause the holding in Seminole extended to restrict all federal jurisdiction over the states
based on Article I powers, we hold.., that Congress has no authority under the Bankruptcy Clause... to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal courts." Mentioning specifically "Congress' effort to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity through its 1994 enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) is
unconstitutional and ineffective"); In re Estate of Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 246, as amended on denial ofreh k,
130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997) (rationalizing "[s]ection 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is
unconstitutional," and instructing "Congress cannot locate the authority ... to abrogate sovereign immunity
in either the Bankruptcy Clause or in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
384 See Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755, 758, 762 (6th Cir. 2003), affd
on other grounds, 124 S.Ct. 1905 (2004) (concluding "the text of the Constitution and other evidence of the
Framers' intent demonstrate that under the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, section 8, Congress has the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity"); Mayes v. Cherokee Nation (In re Mayes), 294 B.R. 145, 161 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2003) (McFeely, J., dissenting) (acknowledging Hood's Sixth Circuit decision found section 106(a)
of Bankruptcy Code "was a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity based on a constitutional compact
2004]
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clear split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hood v. Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp. on a single issue: the constitutionality of section 106
abrogation of sovereign immunity.385 But rather than deciding the issue, the Court
further muddied the waters. It held that discharge of a student loan debt did "not
implicate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity" because it is an appropriate
exercise of the bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction.386 As Justice Thomas noted,
none of the lower courts had ruled on this issue, and none of the litigants had raised
it before the Supreme Court.
38 7
By ducking the issue for which it had granted certiorari, the Supreme Court has
invited continued litigation on section 106's constitutionality. It has also opened a
new can of especially plump and juicy worms: the relationship between a
bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction and sovereign immunity.
In deciding Hood, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in California v.
Deep Sea Research, Inc.388 In Deep Sea Research, a treasure salvor filed an in rem
admiralty action seeking title to a wreck that sank off the California coast in 1865.
The State of California intervened to assert an ownership claim in the wreck,
contending that the salvor's in rem action against the wreck was in effect a suit
against the State barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In writing for the Court,
between the states as expressed through the Constitution's uniformity requirement"). But see id. at 158
(McFeely, J., dissenting) (noticing "[t]here is little case law delineating what constitutes a clear and
unecuivocal abrogation of sovereign immunity").
See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 539 U.S. 986, (2003) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit); Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1908-09 (recognizing
grant of certiorari to determine whether Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from private suits, and affirming Court of Appeals judgment II U.S.C. § 106(a) was a
valid abrogation of Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation's sovereign immunity); see also id. at 1915
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hood "to decide whether
Congress has the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause" arguing
majority avoided addressing principal argument that was basis for Court of Appeals' decision and "which
this Court granted certiorari in order to address-namely, that Congress possesses the power under the
Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate a State's sovereign immunity from suit"); see also Michael J. Lichtenstein,
Supreme Court Ducks Sovereign Immunity Question: A Recap of the Remaining Circuit Conflicts, 23 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., at 28 (July/Aug. 2004) (describing holding in Hood and noting Justice Thomas' statement
in dissent).
386 See Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1908-10; Gardner, 329 U.S. at 574 (defining bankruptcy proceedings as State's
desire to obtain assets from debtor, maintaining "whole process of proof, allowance, and distribution [in
bankruptcy proceedings] is... an adjudication of interests claimed in a res."); New York v. Irving Trust Co.,
288 U.S. 329, 333 (1933) (prophesizing "[i]f a state desires to participate in the assets of a bankrupt, she
must submit to appropriate requirements by the controlling power").
... See Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1915-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority because "[e]ven if
the Bankruptcy Court could have exercised its in rem jurisdicton to make an undue hardship determination
by motion, [Justice Thomas] cannot ignore the fact that the determination in this case was sought pursuant to
an adversary proceeding"); Hon. James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 55 MERCER L. REV.
1101, 1102 (2004) (interpreting Justice Thomas' dissent in Hood as arguing "that while the in rem exception
to sovereign immunity may be appropriate for matters initiated by motion, it should not apply to adversary
proceedings, which are similar to civil litigation"). But see Hood 124 S. Ct at 1914 (disapproving of Justice
Thomas' views because such views would mandate overruling several cases which resembled traditional
civil adjudications and Court was "not willing to take such a step.").
388 523 U.S. 491 (1998) (involving issue of whether Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction of federal court
over in rem admiralty action when res is not within State's possession).
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Justice O'Connor held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a federal court's
jurisdiction over an in rem admiralty action when the State does not possess the
res.
389
Although much of the opinion focuses on the development of admiralty
jurisdiction, it also points to potentially successful arguments that the Eleventh
Amendment might not apply in a particular situation. Thus, in a case decided
before Deep Sea Research, the Fourth Circuit held that a state taxing authority
could not recover taxes on transfers made by a debtor under a confirmed
reorganization plan.390 The state had neither filed a proof of claim nor in any other
way participated in the bankruptcy case. It argued that the Eleventh Amendment
barred adjudication of its claim in bankruptcy. In rejecting the state's argument, the
Court concluded that the power to enter a confirmation order was not a "suit"
against a state, but derived from the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the debtor
and property of the estate.39' If Maryland did not like that result, it should have
intervened in the bankruptcy, i.e., waived its sovereign immunity. This results
comports with Deep Sea Research. So long as the state does not have possession of
property of the estate, it, like any other creditor, must file a proof of claim to protect
its rights.
Another Supreme Court case sheds light on the limits of a state's sovereign
389 Deep Sea Research Inc., 523 U.S. at 494-95 ("We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
the jurisdiction of a federal court over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not within the State's
possession."); see Bliemeister v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383, 392 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2000) (noting significance of holding that states' sovereign immunity does not extend to in rem
proceedings because of fundamental in rem nature of bankruptcy suits); Ralph Brubaker, Of State Sovereign
Immunity and Prospective Remedies: The Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 461, 543 (2002) (suggesting by analogizing to admiralty jurisprudence there may be an in rem
bankruptcy exception to state sovereign immunity).
390 Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 779 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he State of
Maryland and Montgomery County are bound by the bankruptcy court's confirmation order and may not
challenge it collaterally in a subsequent court proceeding."); see In re Linc Capital, Inc., 280 B.R. 640, 645
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) ("[T]he 1 th Amendment does not bar bankruptcy courts from exercising jurisdiction
over the debtor's estate, even if a consequence of such exercise indirectly affects the interest of a state."
(citing Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 787)); Univ. of Va. v. Robertson, 243 B.R. 657, 663 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000)
(interpreting Antonelli to hold "the Eleventh Amendment is not implicated when a bankruptcy court, by a
confirmation order, prevents the assessment of certain state taxes when bankruptcy estate assets are sold
according to that order").
39' Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786 ("While resolution of an adversary proceeding against a state depends on
court jurisdiction over that state, the power of the bankruptcy court to enter an order confirming a
plan... derives.., from jurisdiction over debtors and their estates."); see Patricia L. Barsalou & Scott A.
Stengel, Ex parte Young: Relativity in Practice, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 455, 455 (1998) ("More recently, the
idea that in rem jurisdiction may circumvent the Eleventh Amendment bar has received some attention, if
not encouragement.") (citations omitted); Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh
Amendment Immunity: Limiting the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 18 (2000) ("[T]he
Antonelli Court avoided the Eleventh Amendment challenge to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction by finding
that the power ... was derived from the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the debtor and its estate .... );
Richard Lieb, Eleventh Amendment Immunity of A State in Bankruptcy Cases: A New Jurisprudential
Approach, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 306 (1999) ("Such an 'in rem' exception to the Eleventh
Amendment has been recognized in several post-Seminole Tribe decisions of appellate and bankruptcy
courts .... ).
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immunity in bankruptcy. In Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia,392 a unanimous 393 Supreme Court held that a state waives its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by removing a case from state to federal court. The
Supreme Court concluded that:
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to
invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the "Judicial
power of the United States" extends to the case at hand, and (2) to
claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the
"Judicial power of the United States" extends to the case at hand.394
The impact of this decision on bankruptcy are apparent. In reaching its
unremarkable conclusion, the Supreme Court cited to three old and half-forgotten
cases, including Gardner v. New Jersey. 
395
In Gardner, a railroad reorganization case, the State of New Jersey had filed a
claim for unpaid taxes of nearly $20,000. The debtor and the trustee objected to the
claim, and petitioned the court to determine the validity and extent of the state's
claim. The state then entered a special appearance arguing that adjudicating the
392 535 U.S. 613 (2002); see Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2003) ("What the Court
said [in Lapides], more precisely, was that-a state's voluntary invocation of a federal court's jurisdiction
through removal waives a state's 'otherwise valid objection' to litigation of a state-law claim in a federal
forum."); Ku v. Tennessee, 322 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2003) (appearing without objection and defending on
merits when district court has original jurisdiction is sufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity
defense). Cf Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh
Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1217-18 (2003) ("The impact of Lapides has, however, been
disputed ... [s]ome [lower courts] have treated it as a narrow decision applicable only to cases following its
precise pattern ... while others have applied a broad rule of waiver in light of the 'spirit' of Lapides.")
(citations omitted).
... Lapides, 535 U.S. at 624 ("We conclude that the State's action joining the removing of this case to
federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity-though, as we have said, the District Court may
well find that this case, now raising only state-law issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts
for determination."). It is interesting to note here that Justice Breyer, the author of Lapides and a dissenter in
Seminole, made no mention of Seminole in his opinion. See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity only under section
5 of Fourteenth Amendment). For two other Eleventh Amendment opinions authored by Justice Breyer, see
generally Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 785-87 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority's holding state sovereignty bars federal administrative agency from adjudicating private
individuals' claim against nonconsenting state on practical and federalism grounds); Wis. Dep't of Corr. v.
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 392-93 (1998) (writing for Court, Justice Breyer concluded that "[a] State's proper
assertion of an Eleventh Amendment bar after removal means that the federal court cannot hear the barred
claim. But that circumstance does not destroy removal jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the case
before us").394 Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619.
'9' 329 U.S. 565 (1947). For the other two old and half-forgotten cases, see Gunter v. Ati. Coast Line R.R.
Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) ("Although a State may not be sued without its consent, such immunity is a
privilege which may be waived ... where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its
rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby .. "); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)
("The immunity from suit belonging to a State ... is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure; so
that in a suit.., in which a State had sufficient interest.., its appearance in a court of the United States
would be a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction .... ").
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petition would violate its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument, holding that "the whole process of proof, allowance, and
distribution [of claims] is ... an adjudication of interest claimed in a res .... When
the State becomes an actor and files a claim against the fund it waives any
immunity... respecting the adjudication of the claim."
396
Several circuits had anticipated the Supreme Court's resurrection of Gardner in
Lapides and held that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing a
proof of claim.397 Thus, as one court noted: "[t]he question.., then, is not whether a
state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing a proof of claim in
bankruptcy. Gardner establishes that it does .... Rather, the relevant question [is]
the extent of this waiver ... .
Courts agree that, by filing proofs of claim, states waive their Eleventh
Amendment immunity "in regard to the debtor's claims which arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the state's proof of claim."3 99 As might be expected,
they disagree on how broadly or narrowly to define "same transaction or
396 Gardner, 329 U.S. at 574; see Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933) (recognizing waiver of
immunity via litigation but holding State's application to intervene did not constitute waiver); New York v.
Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 333 (1933) ("If a state desires to participate in the assets of a bankrupt, she
must submit to appropriate requirements by the controlling power; otherwise, orderly and expeditious
proceedings would be impossible and a fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Act would be frustrated.").
For a more current application of this doctrine, see Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation Tribal
Credit v. White (In re White), 139 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The Supreme Court made clear in
[Gardner] that when a sovereign files a claim against a debtor in bankruptcy, the sovereign waives immunity
with respect to adjudication of the claim.").
397 See, e.g., Ossen v. Dep't of Social Servs. (In re Charter Oak Assocs.), 361 F.3d 760, 767 (2d Cir. 2004),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. June 17, 2004) (No. 03-1672) ("One practical application of the waiver-by-
litigation doctrine is the long-standing rule that a state waives its sovereign immunity by filing a proof of
claim in a bankruptcy case."); Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th
Cir. 1999) (concluding sovereignty immunity was waived when proof of claim filed); Ga. Dep't of Revenue
v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (extending waiver to bankruptcy court's
enforcement of discharge injunction and automatic stay); DeKalb County Div. of Family & Children Servs.
v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Because a state voluntarily chooses to enter a
bankruptcy case when it initiates an adversary proceeding, we hold that a state removes itself from the
Eleventh Amendment's protection by starting one .... ) (citations omitted).
398 Schulman v. California (In re Lazar), 237 F.3d 967, 976-78 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding filing proof of
claim in bankruptcy proceeding waives state's Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding bankruptcy estate's
claims arising from same transaction or occurrence as its own); see, e.g., Jones v. Yorke (In re Friendship
Med. Ctr., Ltd.), 710 F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he limited waiver of sovereign immunity created
by the filing of the claim extends only so far as necessary to adjudicate that claim .... "); Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 1969) ("Waiver does not extend to what federal procedure
terms 'permissive counterclaims'. . . claims for affirmative relief in excess of or different in kind from that
sought by the plaintiff.") (citations omitted).
399 In re Lazar, 237 F.3d at 977 (quoting In re Jackson, 184 F.3d at 1049); see Rose v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.
(In re Rose), 187 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding submission of proof of claims in bankruptcy case
waives immunity in related proceedings required for adjudication); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative
Goldsmiths, Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e holdthat to the extent a defendant's assertions
in a state-instituted federal action, including those made with regard to a state-filed proof of claim in a
bankruptcy action, amount to a compulsory counterclaim, a state has waived any Eleventh Amendment
immunity against that counterclaim ... ").
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occurrence.' 400 Still, Lapides makes it clear that Congress has the constitutional
power to determine that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing
a proof of claim, or otherwise intervening in a bankruptcy. In the environmental
context, any state's effort to enforce its environmental laws against a debtor in
possession or trustee will likely amount to a waiver of the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
The Second Circuit recently expanded the effect of a state filing a proof of
claim. In Ossen v. Connecticut Department of Social Services (In re Charter Oak
Associates),4 1 the court held that if one state agency filed a proof of claim, that
filing waived sovereign immunity for all state agencies against which the estate
might have a claim.40 2 In Ossen, the Connecticut Department of Revenue Services
(DRS) filed a proof of claim for unpaid taxes of $148,643.34. At the same time, the
Connecticut Department of Social Services (DSS) owed the debtor $225,309.29 in
rental reimbursements. The trustee filed an adversary proceeding against DSS
seeking the withheld reimbursements. DSS moved to dismiss the complaint on
Eleventh Amendment grounds. It argued that the estate's claim against DSS did not
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as DRS's claim against the estate.
Section 106(c)'s creation of a right of set off under such circumstances violated the
Eleventh Amendment.40 3
Relying on Lapides, the Second Circuit disagreed. It saw "no reason why a
state that has filed a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case should be permitted to raise
400 See In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d at 768 ("Most circuits agree, however, that when a state files a
proof of claim, it waives its immunity as to at least some counterclaims, specifically compulsory
counterclaims."); In re Lazar, 237 F.3d at 978 ("Our sister circuits, in addressing [the question of how far a
waiver extends], have not yet reached consensus on the proper rule."); see, e.g., Arecibo Cmty. Health Care,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding state's immunity is waived with respect to
compulsory counterclaims); Wyo. Dep't of Trans. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir.
1998) (employing "same transaction or occurrence" standard).
401 361 F.3d 760 (2d Cir. 2004); see In re Straight, 143 F.3d at 1391 (concluding in bankruptcy, state
agencies should be regarded as one entity); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 553.03, at 33 (Lawrence P. King
et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) ("[D]ifferent agencies of a state will be treated as a single unitary creditor for
setoff purposes in bankruptcy.").
402 In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d at 772 (holding when two state agencies act as unitary creditor,
fairness requires waiver by one agency constitutes waiver by other).
403 In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d at 766 ("DSS argues that § 106(c) extends the scope of a state's
waiver too far because, under the Eleventh Amendment, a state's filing of a proof of claim can be construed
at most as a waiver of immunity with respect to claims that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence .... ); see 11 U.S.C. § 106(b)-(c) (2000).
A government unit that has filed a proof of claim.., is deemed to have waived
sovereign immunity with respect to a claim.., that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence ... and there shall be offset against a claim or interest of a government unit
any claim against such government unit that is property of the estate.
Id.; 17A JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: CASES, LEGISLATION, AND RULES §
123.41 at 11 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 2004) ("The Second Circuit held that Bankruptcy Code
Section 106(c) that permits the offset of a bankruptcy estate's claims against claims of governmental units
regardless of any assertion of sovereign immunity, constitutes a proper codification of the rule that voluntary
invocation of a federal court's jurisdiction waives Eleventh Amendment immunity."). See generally 2
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 106.02, at 17 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) (discussing
constitutional concerns over 11 U.S.C. § 106 (c)).
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the immunity shield in response to permissive counterclaims brought by the debtor,
at least where those counterclaims are capped by a setoff limitation, as they are
under § 106(c). ' 4°
Even more than Hood, Ossen has relevance for environmental claims in
bankruptcy. States often have significant claims against estates. Once a state files a
proof of claim, Ossen allows the estate to set its own claims off against the state's
claims without worrying about Eleventh Amendment issues. Because Ossen
reached the opposite conclusion from the Fourth Circuit, the only other court to
have considered section 106(c)'s constitutionality, 4 5 the Supreme Court may grant
certiorari and decide the issue. But then again, given Hood, it may not, in which
case, the confusion will continue and opportunities for attorneys will abound.
One final source of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over states in the post-
Seminole Tribe world is the so-called Exparte Young 06 doctrine. Young creates an
exception to the general Eleventh Amendment immunity rule forbidding suits
against states for money damages. It allows prospective declaratory and injunctive
relief against a state official as an individual to prevent that individual from
continuing to violate a federal statute. Such relief is valid even if it has a
"substantial ancillary effect on a state's treasury., 40 7 Under Young, then, states
cannot circumvent the automatic stay or the discharge injunction by wrapping
themselves in the Eleventh Amendment.
Thus, even if the Supreme Court holds section 106 unconstitutional, a
404 In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d at 769; see Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743, 760 (2002) ("The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities."); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002)
("[A]n interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation context rests upon the
Amendment's presumed recognition of the judicial need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and
unfairness ....").
405 In re Creative Goldsmiths Inc, 119 F.3d at 1147 (finding 11 U.S.C. § 106 invalid exercise of Congress'
power and therefore unconstitutional). But see In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d at 770 ("We are not
convinced by the Fourth Circuit's reasoning ... the balance of these equities favors a construction of the
Eleventh Amendment that would permit a debtor to assert a permissive counterclaim capped by a setoff
limitation against a state that has filed a proof of claim."). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
106.02 at 17 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) ("By permitting a setoffagainst a state's claim
... section 106(c) potentially runs afoul of the Eleventh Amendment by subjecting a state to a bankruptcy
court's determination of a claim against it .... ).
4% 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) ("[lI]ndividuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty
in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State... may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from
such action."); see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 n.16 ("[A]n individual may obtain
injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young in order to remedy a state officer's ongoing violation of federal
law."); see, e.g., DeAngelis v. Laskey (In re DeAngelis), 239 B.R. 426, 432 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (holding
debtor could invoke Ex Parte Young doctrine in chapter 7 case).
407 Goldberg v. Ellett (In re Ellett), 254 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127
(2002) ("The Court has ... observed that prospective relief awarded pursuant to Ex Parte Young may have a
substantial ancillary effect on a State's treasury ... but has nevertheless consistently held that this fact alone
is insufficient to convert such actions into actions against the State for state sovereign immunity purposes.")
(citations omitted ); see, e.g., In re Chambers, 348 F.3d 650, 652 n.2 (7th Cir. 2003) (allowing, under Ex
Parte Young, student to sue state school chancellor to declare student loan discharged); Palm v. Stack (In re
Palm), 286 B.R. 710, 717 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2002) (holding determination of debtor's dischargability of
income tax obligations may be brought pursuant to Ex Parte Young).
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bankruptcy estate retains several arrows in its quiver. A state's interest in
environmental issues makes the state a sitting duck.
CONCLUSION
Environmental law and bankruptcy law have at least one thing in common:
neither anticipates confronting another set of policy objectives as imperative as its
own. Environmental law imposes liability on practically all parties involved with a
site. Liability remains unless and until the site is cleaned up at the expense of those
responsible. Bankruptcy acts to discharge liability. Each law expresses a singular
purpose. Those purposes are in direct conflict with each other. The present case
law morass is an inevitable by-product of that conflict.
Until Congress or the Supreme Court speaks, courts will continue to be free to
decide an issue based on the court's own resolution of the conflict. Support exists
for almost any position a court might want to take. The present situation creates
unpredicatability and its constant companion, litigation. Only lawyers, not the
environment and not a debtor's creditors, benefit. It is time for Congress or the
Supreme Court to step up to the plate.
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